Notions of communal benefit are just as long-standing, and are captured today in the concepts of fiduciary duty, altruism, and public service. However, they have struggled against greed and egotism all along. For thousands of years, when governments were merely extensions of family power which dominated localities, and (over the centuries) regions, then countries (i.e. monarchies and aristocracies); rulers’ responsibilities to God (in various configurations) were rarely troubled by the idea that there was any duty to ordinary folks. Much of the development of the modern state in Europe in the 16C-19C was built in conjunction with emerging ideas (e.g. Locke’s liberalism, Montesquieu, Frederick the Great’s “Anti-Machiavel”) that the state was intended to serve the people at large. (Such a notion, I hasten to add, was slightly distinct from democratic theory that the people at large should rule or choose their rulers). Indeed, the very idea that the “state” should be seen as an entity separate from the ruler took quite a while to take hold (as evidenced by Louis XIV’s famous early 18C statement: “L’etat? C’est moi!” [“The state? It’s me!”]).
Indeed, the boundary between “public” and “private” has always been muddled. Kickbacks, “golden shares” in nominally private enterprises, bribes, etc. were pretty much the order of the day and only gradually became seen as improper. Public officials were expected to be personally paid for performing their official duties. Public offices were sold to the highest bidder who then had to recoup their investment. In 18C France, the right to collect taxes in various regions was sold off and tax collection was a business opportunity.
Under the modern mode of government such practices still occur, but less frequently; and are usually deemed improper and criminal. They range from a cop being slipped a C-note to ignore a speeding violation to customs officials lining their pockets to fail to inspect a shipping container to selling subscriptions to personally-owned social media channels which are then used to make official proclamations and statements to the sale of government assets to “friends” for a song (see any number of Russian oligarchs). The recent DOGE effort to expunge “waste, fraud, and abuse” from government operations was led by a leading government contractor (among other attributes) and would be laughably hypocritical if it weren’t for the damage to the beneficiaries of government programs and the livelihood of government employees it engendered.
Our modern democratic theory posits a government whose purpose, Jefferson said, is to enable our citizens to have “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” What we call “democracy” is concerned with the means by which this power is directed and the rule-makers and implementers are chosen. The vehicle for making this happen is a “republic” (i.e., a clearly-demarcated “state” or government as the crystallization of our society). The separation of this entity from private interests is essential and is embodied in such concepts as the “rule of law.” A republic is inherently different from a monarchy in which government is merely an organized administration of society for the benefit of the monarch/aristocracy. All this is adaptation from Socrates, Aristotle, Cicero et al.
The crux is the recognition of the “res publica” [latin for the “public thing”], the political community that is distinct from individual private interests and is more than the sum of those interests. This means that we acknowledge and value a shared life together; that to enhance that life for all of our group we have imagined a locus of the common good. The special value we put on this embodiment makes its abuse by corruption worse than ordinary fraud or theft.
Of course, the existence of the res publica does not mean (Marxist utopianism notwithstanding) that there are no private interests. In addition, the inherent problems with the excess concentration of power means that there is public benefit in dispersing such power across multiple entities and individuals. Government bureaucracies (like other bureaucracies) get stultified and inefficient. In short there are plenty of reasons for a “private sector” and for the state to implement some of its activities through arrangements with companies, NGOs, and individuals.
Precisely where those lines should be drawn is a complex and dynamic set of decisions. Should a state build its own naval ships or hire a private shipyard to do so? Should the care and feeding of the needy be handled by private, religious, or charitable groups or should a government build public housing? Historically, these have been contentious issues and as the scope of government activities has expanded (usually as a product of increased democracy), they have multiplied. There are no simple answers at either the policy or the implementation levels for these and the myriad other functions a government might undertake. There is no room for simple bright lines here.
So, while we have to carry on with doing, we also have to strive to protect this notion of the “res publica.” In our modern semantic salad, we have tossed together “democracy,” “republic,” “constitution,” “government,” “state,” “law,” and a bunch of other sliced fruits and vegetables. There’s lots of ways in which this salad can go bad or be corrupted. Decay will easily spread, so we can’t protect democracy without dealing with the breakdown of the rule of law or the abuse of the public interest (and vice-versa).
On this 249th anniversary of the publication of Jefferson’s powerful expression of our national aspiration, It’s too bad we’re being led by crooks (and ignorant crooks at that.)