Steve Harris
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The Luxury of Details; the Price of Anger

6/12/2026

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I know plenty of folks who are appalled by what we see happening to our country (and the world) these days. There’s plenty of reason to be scared and angry, but for most people I know (fortunately) the risks and problems arise at the level of principle and at some distance from our day-to-day lives. For those who wish to change the nature and tone of our government now is the time for cool consideration of our options and to do so in three contexts: 1) the 2026 elections, 2) the posture of those elected this year, and 3) the stance of those who wish for further change in 2028.

Ethics are important, but we’re usually not given the choice between simple black and white. Life, as they say, is filled with trade-offs. My general approach is to maintain my ethical and political views in favor of social justice and compassion, domestic and international order, and assessing policies with a due respect for a long-term perspective. At the same time, the current situation is so dire as to demand that we ensure our social and political foundations before we try to (in order) repair the damage or enact policies that try to broadly improve society. 

I have long bemoaned the state of the Democratic Party and I have no illusions about the likelihood that it will be a useful vehicle for necessary social change. Still, we might hope that the ongoing example of the Republicans will impress on both voters and elected officials the need to swallow our grand visions and just get stuff done. The first step is to minimize further inroads by MAGA-ites and get sensible people (even moderates or other boring folks) into positions to minimize further damage. 

The current California Governor’s race is a great example. As we went into the primary a few weeks ago, there were three Democrats and two Republicans with a significant chance of getting through the open primary and into the final election in November. Both the Republicans illustrate the range of MAGA/Republicans but the prospect that they would both have gotten into the run-off, shutting out the Dems, seemed real. As among the leading Dems—Becerra, Porter, and Steyer—there are notable differences in personality, experience, and demeanor, as well as policy priorities. Nonetheless, any one of them is so far superior to Hilton or Bianco, that I really didn’t care which Dem gets elected. Indeed, I wish the primary ballot had an option that read: “Whichever Democrat comes first among those who vote for one of them.” I suspect such a ballot entry would swamp the tally for any of the named individuals. 

Here in San Francisco, we will elect a successor to Nancy Pelosi. I quite liked Chakrabarti as an innovative policy thinker. Scott Weiner and Connie Chan (the eventual finalists for the November election) are both also thoughtful and they are likely to vote the same on a vast majority of actual legislative proposals. Again, it’s too bad time and money will have been spent between those two (and a few others). Flip a coin and let’s move on.

What then of those who win this fall? In Congress, where the Dems are a good shot to win back the House and have a slight chance to win the Senate, it will be a time of great temptation. Performative politics beckons and many will fall into the trap, wasting time, money, and energy better spent on a small number of priorities. There will be innumerable calls for investigations into the malfeasance and incompetence of the current Administration. There will be hundreds of bills introduced to right the current litany of wrongs, trying to constrain or reverse the Executive or Judiciary. Almost all of this will be a waste of time.

Dems need to demonstrate that they are thoughtful and prudent guardians of the interests of the entire nation. Even if bills get passed by the House (or, in some minor miracle both the House and Senate), there is no chance anything of substantive merit would become law with our current orange-haired leader. So, all this performative energy needs to be targeted at a focused set of policies that will engender support at the 2028 election: health care, jobs, economic growth, voting rights, taxes on the top 10%. The parade of those demanding a wide range of changes that have only a bare majority of support—however much they might meet important political or moral goals—need to be held in abeyance. In addition, the Dems need to show that they can govern responsibly and effectively. That means actually passing bills without the dramatics, futility, and waste that has exemplified current GOP legislators (especially in the House).

Finally, in the two years between elections, those folks who want change need to model responsible citizenship and demonstrate that we have a clear understanding of the difference between idealized policy goals and the views of the bulk of the country. This means that valid arguments and goals will need to be sidelined. Taking pot-shots at elected officials who are less than perfect (measured on whatever scale) is self-destructive. If the damage wrought in the past 16 months (that’s right, we’re only 1/3 through the 2d term of HWSNBN) has taught us anything, it is that most of the fine print in policies isn’t so important.  

If we are lucky, a leader with charisma and vision will emerge for 2028. More likely, it will be someone with only a bit of both. No matter. We will be fortunate to arrive in January 2029 with some semblance of a country and a world still intact. As I noted this past winter (A Poisoned Chalice 020626), even then, we shouldn’t expect too much. The road back is far too long to be walked in anger.

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English Lessons

6/5/2026

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The apparently imminent meltdown of the Labour Government in the UK is a fitting marker for the tenth anniversary of Brexit: that “world-historical” mistake of 2016 in which a bare majority of the British electorate convulsed and apparently directed their government to leave the European Union. After years of high political drama, the Conservative Government under Boris Johnson, finally “Got Brexit done.” The Tories then stumbled on in government for another couple of years (due at least as much to an unsavory sharply left-wing domination of the Labour Party) until both the party and the public were exhausted.

Labour, under the deliberately bland Sir Keir Starmer, then positioned itself as a sufficiently centrist “non-Tory” option and swept into office int he General Election of 2024. The rejection of the incumbents after 14 years and 5 prime ministers was no surprise. Their internal divisions over Brexit continued to haunt them and they were stale in terms of both policies and personalities. It was clearly time for a change. Since the British electoral system (like ours) does not provide for proportional representation, small shifts in support can make for big shifts in the number of seats. In 2024, the Tories faced the additional problem of a resurgent right/populist party under Nigel Farage, the bête-noire of the Brexit movement which bled of some of its support in close contests. As a result, Labour won its largest victory ever, securing 424 seats out of 650.

Starmer should have been on top of the world: an apparent mandate for change and a huge parliamentary majority. There were three problems, however. First, actual mandates to do anything in particular amid the broad array of issues and interests which voters face are exceedingly rare (despite the common proclamations of victorious politicians). Second, Starmer while undoubtedly a capable lawyer and administrator, lacks both popular charisma and the internal party ‘oomph’ to marshal his troops. Third, as Boris Johnson said back in 2013, the problem with all the Brexit ‘hoo-hah’ is that it was a distraction from the deep and long-term problems which Britain faces: inadequate adaptation to a post-industrial economy, post-imperial hangover, economic inequality, dysfunctional labor markets, creaking educational system, and wheezing social services; to name a few. Stated otherwise, the country faces nigh-unto-intractable problems which require bold/radical solutions for which there is no national consensus and no charismatic leadership.

Britain thus faces a situation not all that different from most other well-off countries. It’s not that they are “ungovernable” in the sense that “The Economist” and other commentators usually mean. These are not matters which can be fixed by repairing the (real and significant problems of a particular political system (e.g., Britain’s first past the post parliamentary system, the division of powers between France’s Executive and Legislative branches, or the abuses inflicted on the US political system by the two-party duopoly). It’s “ungovernable” in the sense that there are fundamental problems facing society and the electorate as a whole is unwilling (unable?!) to address them.

In contrast, in the dire situation faced by Britain in 1940-41, the country rallied around Churchill’s leadership and demonstrated an extraordinary national willingness to (literally) go to war to address it. Alas Starmer is no Churchill (nor, for that matter is any other national politician on the British stage). Perhaps it is only in the clearest and direst of circumstances that there is a mandate for decisive action. Despite the urgings and table-poundings of the AOC/Bernie wing (or, for that matter, the MAGA-ized Republicans); there is no consensus and therefore no mandate in the US to address our version of this problem set. (It is also useful to recall in this circumstance, that FDR had no mandate for his active support of Churchill/the “Allies” as he slid the US to a pre-war footing until Pearl Harbor.)

The second lesson from the British situation is more directly aimed at the US Democratize Party.  Neither having the “right answers” to the nations policy questions, nor having a working legislative majority are sufficient, even both together would not be enough. 

The Dems, in their wildest dreams, will not command legislative majorities comparable to what Labour now has. With what they’re like to have, the temptation to muddle and temporize remains great. The threat of fringe elements invoking ritual purity to halt incremental progress on any number of policy fronts is also great. Imagine what the current administration could accomplish if they had the Freedom Caucus fully on board. It might be scary, but it’s certainly imaginable. Now try to imagine the Dems getting their collective act together to remedy the policy crimes and abuses of the current administration and to actually address and at least make a dent in some of the other pressing problems facing the country. It’s a utopian fantasy.

As I noted in “A Poisoned Chalice” (020626), the Dems risk looking like failures, even if they sweep the boards in 2028. Even if they had a leader, a program, and an unheard-of degree of party discipline, they would still have to spend so much time cleaning up after the current disaster and the impacts of the kinds new policies initiatives would be too long-term in their effects to do them much short-to-medium electoral good.

So the underlying problem lies with “the people,” not the party (or even the parties). The “ungovernability” issue current bedeviling the English chattering classes is transatlantic; indeed, it is global. It is societal, not governmental or even constitutional. 

Neither elites nor the “masses” have a clear and coherent policy program. MAGA only works if you believe in historical fiction and have an extremely short-sighted view (and no sense of social justice). Socialism has been sufficiently successful through the 20C (even in the US) so as to be stale for the 21C. New formulations are needed—across the political spectrum. The clock is ticking.


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The Construction of Memory

5/29/2026

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Picture
The Jewish Holocaust Memorial in Berlin is a striking place; over 2700 rectangular concrete pillars of different heights, creating a forest like effect that makes it easy to forget you’re in the middle of a city (and a particular city at that). It was opened in 2005, marking the 60th anniversary of the end of the War. Even more than the sensibility created by the memorial itself, I was struck by its location: about 100 yards from the Brandenburg Gate, the symbolic center of Berlin and another 100-200 yards from the German Bundestag/Parliament building. 

This siting represents Germany’s decision to confront the worst episode in modern human history, perpetrated at its hand; rather than sweeping it under the rug or relegating such a memorial to the fringes of society both geographically and metaphorically. It’s true that there’s no particular connection between this site and the events of the Holocaust, but it’s message is moral, not historical. Commemorations at Dachau or other camps in Germany exist and are appropriate, but they’re often far from population centers and popular attention.

Whatever might be said about the morals of those Germans who created or participated in the Holocaust, we can respect the moral stance of those who pushed this memorial to the forefront of the German national awareness. It’s easy to blame the Germans, including more recent generations; and Americans are all too ready to point out the moral failings of others. By way of comparison, can you imagine the responses to a proposal to put a memorial to the European/American treatment of Native Americans over the past 500 years on the National Mall in Washington. It would never happen in this Administration, of course, but even under a more “enlightened” government, there would be quite a brouhaha. Of course there would be deniers and rejecters, but as troubling is the likely response of the majority who might accept theoretical societal responsibility, but would be “uncomfortable” with such a statement. 

It would be easy to say:” Oh, that was those folks [i.e. the earlier generation who actually conducted the extermination]; that’s not us, we’re new and improved [Germans, Americans, etc.]” Indeed, there is something to be said about the limits to national characterization and holding a subsequent generation responsible for the “sins of the fathers.” But one of the most important and least discussed and least comfortable aspects of general reflections on the Holocaust is that the Germans (and their allies) who perpetrated these horrific deeds were NOT all that different from the rest of us. It’s too easy to carve them out as distinctively morally defective or evil, and avoid wrestling with the part of each of our human nature that is awful.

Part of the job of History is to insist that all aspects of human experience are kept available for view and to ensure that memory does not fall into mythology, nostalgia, or simplistic and white-washed stories of the past. We need to do this without imposing our moral judgement on the people and events of the past, and without falling into the parallel traps of blame/self-justification. The Berlin Jewish Holocaust Memorial is an important and effective step in this regard.

It is doubly significant that just a block away from this somber site is another location whose memorialization is of quite a different nature. It’s not featured on the tourist maps. There’s no staffed and well-presented information center. In fact there are no structures at all (although in well-bombed Berlin, this is hardly a distinction). There’s merely a medium-sized explanatory sign (in German and English). It’s the site of the Fuhrerbunker, the underground control center from which Hitler directed the last days of the War and in which he, Goebbels, and others ended their lives. It’s now a parking lot, surrounded by undistinguished apartment and office buildings.

In the immediate aftermath of the War, this part of Berlin was occupied by the Red Army and the remnants of the Fuhrerbunker were destroyed and plowed under. It’s a different way of dealing with horrific memory. All of the Allies, not just the Soviet Union which occupied this particular plot of land, were concerned to avoid any memorialization of Nazidom and this site is especially susceptible of being seen as a shrine to their fallen leader.

The story of how Germans have faced up to their Nazi past is a complex one, intertwined with guilt, denial, ideology, and the positioning of ex-Nazis in the heightening Cold War tensions of the 1950s and ‘60s. Officially banned on both sides , Nazi anti-Communism respectively exacerbated or ameliorated the status of ex-Nazis in the East and West. Large-scale and official recognition and responsibility for their actions did not begin until the 1970s and, one might say, could not be addressed on its own terms until Germany was reunited so that any statements could encompass all of Germany and without concern that positioning vis-à-vis that aspect of the past could no longer be used in Cold War propaganda jousting. As a result, the more fulsome recognition didn’t materialize until the 1990s and 2000s as the generation that come to political and cultural power could face these questions more squarely than their parents.

So, even as acknowledgement of the Nazi crimes became normalized, their continued exclusion from current political life ensured that their sites were carefully marginalized; of which the site in the heart of Berlin is clear evidence.

The juxtaposition of the two—in such close proximity—provides a stark illustration of the range of memory and the complexity of arranging memory and its management with the historians’ task of recollection end education. Regardless of what happened in the past, the construction of memory is always the responsibility of the present.

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The German Question

5/22/2026

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The German Question

This posting comes live from Munich where I’m getting myself updated on Germany, its history, and its current mood. The last time I was here was in 1971, where, along with several dozen other American teenagers, I was getting my first taste of Europe (including fresh Lowenbrau beer (but that’s another story)). In the next posting, I will talk about the construction of memory regarding relatively recent German historical developments, here I want to take a broader view.

Germany has been the heart of Europe for centuries; certainly since medieval times. While we in the US tend to get a heavier flavoring of British and French history, we can’t begin to understand Europe without addressing the “German question.” 

Part of the problem in adjusting our perspective is that until 1871 there was no “Germany” in the national, political sense. The formation of a single integrated state, building on increasing industrial and economic power in the mid-19C shifted the gravitational patterns across Europe. For several reasons, that project went off the rails, as Germany fostered the descent into WWI and was the primary instigator of WWII. The solution to that problem was the peace settlement imposed by the Allies splitting the country into two pieces, each tied into their respective Cold War blocs and effectively neutralizing Germany as a geopolitical force. The collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1989, marked by the (effective, then physical) dismantling of the Berlin Wall led to reunification and the eventual shift of the national capital back to Berlin. 

The presence of important centers of German culture in Austria, Switzerland, and other border areas highlights the difficulty of automatically tying politically-framed history to a particular piece of territory. For example, if the Habsburg’s Austrian Empire had defeated the Prussians in 1867, the contours of German political entities would have followed a far different path than what we are familiar with. Instead, Prussia won, knocked Austria out of the picture and became the heart of the German unification project which had been going on for much of the 19C until then. Forced territorial adjustment following WWI (vis-à-vis France, Belgium, and Poland in particular) left Germany with a different shape for twenty years until Hitler (through diplomacy chutzpah, and invasion) launched his (temporarily successful) effort to build a “Greater Germany.” The Cold War split put yet another spin on the definition of “What is Germany?

These events make it pretty plain to see the centrality of the German question for European geopolitics over the last 160 years. But even before then, one might say the European political history wrestled with the absence of Germany; it was a political vacuum and battlefield for the great powers, with famous wars involving dynastic politics, religious politics (particularly following the Reformation), not least of which was the “Thirty Years War (1618-1648), and various tussles over who would dominate the Continent. At various points the German lands “hosted” Russian, Swedish, Danish, Dutch, British, French, Italian, Austrian, Hungarian, Polish, and Lithuanian incursions. 

Of course it’s not as if there was no one there, either in terms of people or of political entities. For hundreds of years (962 -1806), there was a bizarre entity called the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. It started with Charlemagne, but it wasn’t a state, controlled from the center; but rather a kind of loose federation of over 300 principalities, kingdoms, duchies, free cities, and bishoprics; with  an important linkage to Papal politics in Rome. They all spoke German, although in a bewildering range of dialects. Following the Reformation of the 16C, there was a hodge-podge of Protestant (multiple flavors) and Catholic states. While the Protestants were stronger in the north (Hamburg, Saxony, and Prussia), the Catholics were stronger in the south (Bavaria, Austria). But the key to the eventual quieting of the religious wars as the principle of “Cuius regio, eius religio,” which meant that the local ruler would determine the local religion; accompanied by widely varying degrees of toleration of other creeds.

None of the politico-military history occurred in a vacuum. While the German-speaking lands had no single center a la London or Paris, culture and industry flourished. Important universities popped up in multiple small states, and intellectuals were connected in both Latin and German. Philosophers such as Leibniz, Kant, Hegel or Marx, authors such as Novalis or Geothe, and a splendor of musical genii (Bach, Mozart, et al.) are but a few of the luminaries of the scene. 

All of which is to say, there was a lot of “there” there.

The disruptions, devastation, and drama of the German 20C, provide a sharp illustration of our common tendency in history to look backward into the distant past through the lens of the intermediate past. We tend to color the earlier centuries with our filters of the Cold War and Nazidom, either dismissing them as insignificant or looking at them only in terms of how the earlier events might have led up to the later conflict and cataclysm. 

In German history, this is called the problem of the “Sonderweg,” trying to understand the “special path” that Germany took. Historians have tried to explain how Germany, which was so similar to its neighbors for centuries could have turned into the mid-20C monstrosity. I don’t think there’s much to this line of thought. We can always connect lines of trends and historical developments, but those connections are at least as much our projection as any lead-bottomed “truth.” 

It’s better to take German history, with its complexities and distinctions, on its own terms—whether earlier, or mid-20C, or today. There is certainly no sense to holding a German born in 2000 responsible for what their great-grandparents might have done (or not done) sixty years earlier. Germany today insists on being treated as…Germany today. They are mindful (as I will discuss next week) of their past, but they don’t wallow in it (with the exception of a fringe populist nostalgia). The benefit of travel today is to respect its history, but not be captured by it.

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Encylopedie

5/8/2026

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I was sufficiently nerdish in my youth to enjoy reading the World Book Encyclopedia that my parents got us back in the 1960s. I now have to take care not to get lost too deeply in the hyperlinked maelstrom of information in the current version of Wikipedia (67+ million articles in 345 languages) or its AI-souped-up progeny serving up pre-digested info (most of which is actually true). As I started my history studies 20 years ago, I stumbled into the principal precedent for all modern compendia of information: the great French Encylopédie of the 18C. 

This era of scientific “revolution,” “Enlightenment,” and global exploration brought a deluge of new discoveries, inventions, and analyses. We may talk about the accumulation of petabytes of data, but we have the language and a couple of centuries of experience in digesting ever-increasing accumulation of information (with similar—but trailing—growth of knowledge and wisdom) to acclimate ourselves to the constantly growing mass. For the (relatively few) intelligentsia of this period, the 18C was a bewildering and breath-taking time. 

One of the essential challenges was therefore to figure out how to compile and organize all this stuff. While there was a smattering of attempts at comprehensive collections of knowledge stretching back to Pliny in the 1C, therefore, the field didn’t really blossom until the 18C. (Unsurprisingly, there is parallel development of dictionaries/lexicons.) Still, less than a dozen came out before mid-century.

The French project started out as an adaptation of the English “Chambers’ Cyclopaedia” (1735), but it stumbled until it was rebooted by Denis Diderot and Jean D’Alembert in 1748. They envisioned a new concept and a vastly expanded scope. Its goal was to compile, in an organized form, all "the parts of human knowledge", as based upon sensory input and reason. Diderot (with typical modesty) said that its purpose was “to change the general way of thinking.” They did so by covering both concepts and practical issues, in how they organized their articles, and the critical attitude they adopted towards superstition and other traditional epistemologies (and the Catholic Church in particular).

They corralled scores of contributors and, in the end produced over 72,000 articles comprising over 20 million words in 17 volumes of text and 11 volumes of pictures. They called it the “Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 
par une Société de Gens de letters” (“The Encyclopedia, or comprehensive dictionary of sciences, arts and methods, by a group of men of letters”). The articles ranged from Magic to Shakespeare to agricultural tools, with drawings of individuals, machinery, and landscapes. The contributors included Voltaire, Rousseau, and my favorite, the Chevalier de Jaucourt, an aristocratic scholar who employed a team of research assistants and produced almost a quarter of the total number of articles in the entire set.

One of my first projects in grad school was to write a paper on the Encyclopédie. I researched all the articles that talked about magic, sorcery, prophecy and related topics; trying to get a handle on how this epitome of Enlightenment rationalism coped with the supernatural and superstition. It was a fun project, although perhaps a bit too ambitious for a novice scholar.

From start to finish, it took about 27 years to publish the entire set, delayed by financial challenges, censorship, printing issues, and the generally overwhelming scope of the project. Editing was often haphazard, with different authors overlapping and taking different points of view. Afterwards, Diderot said it was “a pit in which the miserable rag pickers [his contributors] threw pell-mell all kinds of things—badly digested, good, bad, detestable, true, false, uncertain, and always both incoherent and disparate.”

Eventually, thousands of copies in several editions were published through the end of the 18C, so it received widespread readership (at least among intellectuals and wannabes). It spawned many imitators, most notably the Encyclopedia Britanica which started publication just as the Encyclopédie was completing its work. Britanica carried the torch into the 21C, with competitors (such as the World Book I read as a boy) flourishing in the mid-20C. There’s a copy online of course (en Francais) and a project at the University of Michigan has been using volunteers to produce an online English translation (I did about twenty articles when I was doing my research)

The basic purpose of encyclopedias remains the same: to encompass and distribute useful knowledge—both practical and cultural. At the time of the Encyclopédie, this was a new kind of thing, reflecting the (then) rapidly expanding scope of information, discovery, and critical reflection on the world and society. Diderot et al. made a good stab at it in the mid-18C with about 20M words. Even if that would be a veritable drop in the bucket for today’s multi-lingual Wikipedia (about 10B words!), we live in a world with far more information at hand; so, in a sense, encyclopedias are increasingly falling behind.

At the dawn of the AI era, we may be moving to a new mode of access to information, one which allows us to automate the “look-up” and integrating functions that were necessary in both paper and electronic encyclopedias to date. This will make more useful information available, but will require more thoughtful questions to access it effectively.

Nonetheless, for those who use encyclopedias (as I did as a boy) to swim in the pond of knowledge (not quite sure where I was headed), AI won’t help so much. A certain amount of randomness is helpful; especially to help us realize how little we actually know. While the Encyclopédie included a fair number of cross-references between articles, the deployment of hypertext links in Wikipedia makes it far easier to splash about and end up (hours later?) in distant and obscure corners of the infoverse. AI can’t (yet) do this sort of thing; so, there’s still room for human curiosity.

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Space Time Continuum

5/1/2026

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Most of us learned something about the space/time continuum in high school physics class; part of the Einsteinian revolution of the early 20C.  It’s a pretty bold idea: that what we perceive as space/area/distance and what we perceive as time/duration/speed are not separate but is an integrated concept. Without specifying all four dimensions (time, length, depth, width), you don’t have a clear picture of where/when anything is in the universe.

However, since physics is pretty much outside my ken, my topic today is more mundane and terrestrial: how do we adapt this profound model to the world of social and economic relations and how has this all changed over time. I’ll start with an example from my own experience. Twenty-some years ago, I took a hiking trip to Switzerland with a couple of buddies. As we were tromping from town-to-town, I was struck by the fact that the Swiss trail signs didn’t indicate the distance from Leukerbad to Lens (~ 16km), but rather the time it would take to walk there (6-7 hours). I figured that since people walk at different paces, one couldn’t come up with a standard estimate of the necessary time. I was wrong, of course; the Swiss had it nailed. More importantly for my point here, they highlighted the interchangeability of space and time at a very practical level.

I’ve been thinking about this as I’ve been giving a set of lectures on the history of globalization. This sprawling topic encompasses not only the movement of people, things, and ideas in gradually broader and more interconnected networks, but also the extent to which people are aware of the size of their “world.” In other words, we can look at globalization as an example of a space-time continuum and one that has evolved over the millennia as a function of technologies ranging from goat paths to asphalt to turbine engines to fiber optic undersea cables.

In pre-modern times, outside of astronomical calculations, most folks weren’t too concerned with precise measurement of either time or distance. The connection, however, was built implicitly into people’s consciousness. Modern Swiss trail markers are the descendants of the markers on Roman roads which measured “distance” in terms of days.

From a historical perspective, we can measure the progress of technologies in terms of increased speed of transportation and communications. On the rough roads of medieval Europe (or elsewhere in the pre-modern world) walking 25-35 km/day was about normal, riding a horse would boost that to 50 km or so. For most folks in most circumstances, this standard was only slightly improved until the 19C. This meant riding from Vienna to Paris (~1200 km) took about 25 days; walking would take about six weeks.

The development of a messenger service (for the Habsburg Empire) led to the creation of a relay-messenger service (a precursor of the Pony Express in the 19C US) which could carry a message in 15 days by 1600 (the guy who ran this project was called  “Taxis,” which is where we get the modern (pre-Uber) term for carriage for hire). In the 17 and 18C, improvement to roads cut the time for a fast mail coach to 7 days. 

The 19C saw the introduction of powered trains and telegraphs. The Orient Express would run from Vienna to Paris in 14 hours. By 1900, the telegraph would communicate words almost instantly. Indeed, the arrival of the telegraph finally led to a divergence between what we call communications and transportation.

Before I go further in this story, I should emphasize that European standards were the peak of human technology at the time, and the increased speeds only applied in very limited circumstances. It could still take weeks to traverse comparable distances between places that were rural, since there was no train from southwest France to northern Bavaria. Moreover, the cost of these “modern” options was out of the reach of almost all people. The story in Africa, Asia, and South America was still more sparse. It took decades to build out roads and rails and wires; a process which is still going on in many places around the world a full two centuries after the first railway began operations.

By the 20C, aviation brought further acceleration. The flight from Paris to Vienna runs under two hours. Telephony similarly accelerated communications and the shift to underseas telephone calls (now on fiber) and satellite calls helped drive down costs and vastly expand the availability of such services. A phone call from Los Angeles to London in 1927 cost $750 for ten minutes (2024 dollars), using the brand new radio system. International Direct Distance Dialing arrived in 1970, the same call now cost only $100 (2024 dollars). Competition and new technologies brought that crashing down to $5 for ten minutes by the turn of the millennium; a curve which has accelerated to the current situation where we can call pretty much anywhere in the world instantly for free. Wow!

There are two salient points to be drawn from this technological progress. The first is that the radical reductions in cost have been a major spur to globalization. More stuff (goods and people and ideas) move from one part of the world to another when it becomes cheaper to do so. At the high end, that means bopping off to Paris for a long weekend (as I often do!). For most folks, it means that economy/steerage class becomes cheap enough to seek new opportunities in the new world, as has happened a lot over the last 200 years.

Second, we can see the space-time continuum in practice. As the massive pandemic-accelerated shift in work habits and world conceptualization driven by video conferencing has shown, distance is trivialized and Zoom et al. have become wormholes in space. I have a friend in Seattle whose daughter lives in Ireland. They text and Facetime multiple times a week. Not much different than if she lived 45 miles away instead of 4500. 

One hundred and thirty years ago, my great-grandparents embarked on journeys from the “Old World” to the “New,” expecting never to see their families again. Thirteen years ago, I was expected to live near enough to my workplace that I could show up every day. Both those worlds are gone, reshaped into a new configuration.


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Slave to Technology

4/24/2026

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As I write this, I am about through with an almost six-week slog in the morasses of telecom service provider hell. I will not rehearse the details, since they are pedantic, you have undoubtedly your own personal experience with some similar situation, and I just can’t stand reliving the more-or-less sixteen hours I have spent on the process. 

I wasn’t trying to do anything fancy either in terms of technology or commercial arrangements. Suffice it to say that I was trying to switch our cell service to Comcast to take advantage of one of their “deals.” They screwed things up so badly that I have bailed on them and switched to another carrier (with another pretty good deal). I have no illusions that any of the four “service providers” involved in my sad tale have or will actually deliver superior service, but Comcast’s performance was so wretched (even if fronted by very cordial service reps) that I will not spend any more money with them.

It's not clear which was worse, the interminable periods on hold, the identity verification processes that took as long as actually providing substantive information, or the general helplessness I felt knowing that I was caught up in the cogs of a seemingly inescapable machine. The people I dealt with were (almost) to a person polite and supportive; even if some lacked competence. I was (almost) unfailingly polite in response. Those on the front lines have little control over the situation; they are foot soldiers of corporate armies. 

It became apparent (during one of those interminable waits) that I have become utterly dependent on the regular functioning of telecommunications/internet technology as part of the foundation of my quotidian life. So much so that the (recurring and very tempting) thought of hanging up on my various interlocutors and disconnecting from the entire metanetwork had to be quickly dismissed. If it had been a matter of walking away from some money, I would have hung up. As it was, however, I felt trapped; I was aware at the time that I had to work my way through their procedures to retain my connection with 21C society. My original thoughts of cost savings were quickly discarded in the face of the amount of time I had to spend/waste. 

Moreover, I had to come to terms with the fact that the unavoidable price of dealing with these (apparently necessary) companies was wending my way through AI-“enhanced” call routing trees, repetitious disclaimers, breathless sales pitches, and redundant problem-“solving” protocols (rebooting, reloading, and reactivating). The stealthy way in which these companies make it exceedingly difficult to talk to a live, knowledgeable human is yet further evidence of the pinnacle of bureaucracy they occupy. Over a century ago, Max Weber famously described bureaucracy as one of the hallmarks of modern life. Little did he know.

Modern information technology was supposed to make our lives easier and, in many ways, it does. Still, I have to wonder whether the economists’ calculation of the resulting increased productivity includes not only the time spent/wasted navigating the maze or the life-shortening stress/frustration of the processes required.

The telecom/internet world is but one aspect of these phenomena, as we all know. Social Security/Medicare/health insurance is every bit as delightful. Taxes, school admissions/enrollment, compliance activities at work, and the various channels of ordinary commerce are all viable competitors. If Dante recast the seven levels of hell for the modern world, he would have a lot of material to work with. You can make your own list.

I’m not sure there’s much to be done about it. Perhaps the emerging personal AI intelligent agents will cheerfully do the slogging for us. If they can effectively solve problems faster than their corporate counterparts on the “service” side of things can create them, then being assimilated into the Borg might be worth it. Until then, I don’t think I’m ready to disconnect and return to the world of printed books, physically-present sources of music, face-to-face shopping, and snail-mail (now at 82¢ per letter!). So, unless the corporate AIs are reading this and ready to retaliate against my rant, you can still reach me at [email protected] and (415) 440-4535.

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International (Dis-) Organization

4/17/2026

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This is a follow-on to my pieces a few weeks ago on 1) whether we are facing a revolution here and now in the USA (A Revolution? 040326) and 2) the state of “International Law” (032726). In the first, I pretty much did a scholarly duck of that question, and don’t propose to answer it here; but I do want to address one aspect: the state of the “international order.” In parallel with the turmoil in the domestic constitutional and political environment, the broad arrangements which seems to have governed how most countries relate to each other have been upset by a series of disruptive statements and actions emanating from Washington. Is another revolution afoot?

While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.

The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).

The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China).  Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift. 

On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa. 

The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments. 

It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.

Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes, 
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement). 

Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,

Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies  will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.

In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world. 

This is a follow-on to my pieces a few weeks ago on 1) whether we are facing a revolution here and now in the USA (A Revolution? 040326) and 2) the state of “International Law” (032726). In the first, I pretty much did a scholarly duck of that question, and don’t propose to answer it here; but I do want to address one aspect: the state of the “international order.” In parallel with the turmoil in the domestic constitutional and political environment, the broad arrangements which seems to have governed how most countries relate to each other have been upset by a series of disruptive statements and actions emanating from Washington. Is another revolution afoot?

While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.

The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).

The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China).  Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift. 

On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa. 

The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments. 

It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.

Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes, 
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement). 

Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,

Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies  will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.

In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world. 

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Rutabaga

4/10/2026

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My wife and I had a long running debate about the intelligence of her cat Samantha. She (my wife) noted that Samantha would, among other things, respond to someone calling her name. I challenged that by pointing out that I could say “rutabaga” in the same tone of voice and get the same feline response. Needless to say, this debate went on until Samantha went to the great feeding bowl in the sky. 

I think the same approach could be applied to the term “capitalism,” which is to say that the word itself has no meaning and much depends on the speaker’s tone and intent. The result is that much of what passes for debate about merits or deficiencies is really just people talking past each other, leading to a waste of time and no clearer understanding of the issues involved, much less to specific solutions for the considerable problems and abuses of the current way of doing things. Of course, there is no single “right” definition, conceptual words morph across cultures, histories, and speakers’ intentions. All we can ask is that people make clear what they mean by “capitalism,” (or, for that matter, by “history,” “democracy,” or American “greatness”) and their purpose in using the term.

As I have previously noted in this occasional series, Historians have described the emergence of a socio-economic system, primarily in Western Europe and primarily over the past five hundred years. “Capitalism” in this reading has evolved both in terms of its institutions, practices, and significance over this time; indeed, its protean nature is one of its notable attributes (e.g., it’s a long way from the Bank of England in the late 17C to bitcoin in the 21C). We can trace these changes not only through those institutions (e.g., the number of limited liability corporations), but also through the critique of these phenomena by contemporary commentators (including champions of religion, ethics, nature, and humanism).

Of these analysts, Marx was the most important for both his insights and his profound long-term influence on both thinkers and practitioners of political economy. Marx got a number of things wrong (and those who claimed to implement his ideas in Russia and other places over the past 110 years got even more wrong), but his juxtaposition of “capitalism” and “socialism” remains the touchstone of debate, even though, as the subsequent practice of both business and government has evolved, the distinctions have become increasingly blurry (see, e.g., “state capitalism” in China, “public-private partnerships,” and the quasi-investment banking deals coming out the White House lately). 

While both capitalism and socialism have evolved considerably since the 19C, most political debate is conducted under a somewhat simplistic A vs. B rubric which does little to comprehend the national or historical variants or the complex texture of each. Indeed, what has emerged, especially since the 20C triumph of capitalism over communism and fascism, is the use of “capitalism” as a somewhat generic term for the dominant socio-economic system of modernity. It’s a label that doesn’t tell us much in general, much less with particular regard to “capital” or “capitalists.” 

For example, once we stop thinking of “our” mode of “capitalism” as the (if you’ll pardon the expression) gold standard, we can see that there are many ways to mix the roles of the state and the private sector. Using various indices, we can line up countries according to tax rates and progressivity, public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, extent of the social safety net, competition/antitrust policy, or the pro rata number of bureaucrats. We would find a continuum for each standard rather than sharply distinguished groupings. Moreover, we would find pretty much of a mish-mash, with particular national systems high on one measure and low on another. In other words, there’s no simple model of capitalism and likely few places that are at the extremes across a group of standards.

From another perspective, we have to acknowledge that whatever “capitalism” is, it has evolved over the past several centuries in many ways. So, critiques by Marx or others, however accurate they might have been at the time, don’t necessarily tell us very much about the phenomena that we face in the 21C. A recent study of the “Crisis of Democratic Capitalism” (2023) illustrates this point. In general, Martin Wolf’s analysis is quite perceptive, especially his tight linkage between the types of political and economic systems which dominate our world.  However, the “crisis” with which he is concerned is not with “capitalism” per se, but rather with the hypercapitalism (i.e., push towards plutocracy/monopoly/oligarchy) characteristic of many “advanced” countries today.  

The situation with “capital” and “capitalists” is much the same. We now have “natural capital,” human capital,” and “information capital” among others. Such terms however, don’t make a copse of trees or a group of laborers into capitalists. Similarly, no everyone who lives and actively participates in our modern socio-economic-political system is thereby a “capitalist,” even if they have a 401k.

The phenomenological morass is one reason I prefer to think of capitalism in terms of epistemology or a set of attitudes about money, personal value, and the nature of society which can be considered at both the societal and individual levels.

The upshot of this conceptual and semantic confusion is that public debate about capitalism (as well as a fair amount of scholarly discussion) is confusing and fruitless. I often think it would be better for both public and scholarly debates to stop using terms that have been hollowed out by abuse and overuse (capitalism, sovereignty, and progress all come to mind in this context). Taking a few moments to flesh out what we mean would avoid these semantic traps and perhaps provide some clarity of both diagnosis and prescription. In my History work, for example, I try to avoid bald references to the “industrial revolution,” referring instead to the “period of rapid industrialization.”

“A rose,” as the Bard said “by any other name would smell as sweet.” The way our world works, too, would be however good or bad it is, regardless of the labelling. Samantha responded both to her name and to “rutabaga;” although more quickly in either case if you had a piece of turkey in your hand.

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A Revolution?

4/3/2026

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Last week, as I was sending out my uncheerful assessment of the state of international law, a good friend passed along a recent posting from the invaluable Heather Cox Richardson about the fundamental reshuffling of the global order currently underway as part of the present administration’s general program/chaos. My friend asked if this constituted a revolution. My bottom line: it’s too early to tell.

The Richardson piece draws on recent statements by the Foreign Minister of Singapore and other developments—Iran, Viktor Orban in Hungary, the erosion/demolition of US constitutional controls—to sketch an ominous picture of both the domestic and international scenes. I’ve commented on many aspects of this situation; the vast majority of which are somewhere between troubling and horrific. So, from certain perspectives, things look bleak. Does that make for a revolution? Let’s look at the domestic side this week.

If we take the loose, popular definition of revolution as a big, quick, dramatic change, then yes. But many Historians feel obliged to take a longer-term perspective. Modern political revolutions might well be dated from the English Civil War (1840s-50s) and the Glorious Revolution (1689). Since then, whether something counts as a revolution depends in part on when you’re asking the question. 

Even the “American Revolution” (which arguably, merely replaced the ruling structure of a small peripheral country with one set of rich white guys with another set of rich white guys) has been the subject of debate as to when the “revolution” occurred. Benjamin Rush argued that the Revolution continued after the War had been won, but Thomas Jefferson, said the Revolution had already been completed by the issuing of the Declaration of Independence.

The Great French Revolution went through four different regimes before Napoleon and then reverted to the Bourbon Monarchy in 1815. Important French Historians argue that the Revolution was not completed until the 1880s. The Russian Revolution, too, went through multiple stages and directions. If you had asked whether there was a revolution happening at various stages, you might well have gotten a different answer. So, a snapshot taken in April, 2026 might look pretty inaccurate by September or by 2029.

All this potted history tells us is that you can’t tell what’s going on while it’s happening, much less have any sense of what the outcome will be. Indeed, it’s hard to find any historical evidence for a revolution ending up anywhere near what most revolutionaries thought they were starting when they were starting it. In general, the pressure of historical inertia and the complex dynamics of current events quickly and sharply skew the “best laid plans.” 

Revolutions arise though a confluence of events, trends, and personalities. Once they get past the stage of throwing out the old regime, revolutionary coalitions usually fracture, cracked apart by circumstances require that compromises and leave any pre-existing ideological program severely frayed if not in shambles. Lenin flip-flopped on basic principles of socialism once he was steering the ship. Factionalism and egomania (e.g., self-proclaimed ‘guardians’ of the revolutionary spirit) usually make a hash of any coherent program. 

Now that we have established a firm foundation of uncertainty, we can turn to the question of our leading “revolutionary.” The orange-haired one is a charismatic leader of the first order, but he is no ideologue. He has surrounded himself and channeled the views of a coterie of folks whose combination of smarts, sycophancy, and smarm have given him a set of policies more notable for their drama and disruption of norms than their ability to move the nation towards their self-proclaimed vision. There are definitely revolutionaries among them: Bannon, Miller, Vought; but they are all derivative of him and lack their own power base. Most of the team is just along for the ride. This is actually fortunate; he would be more dangerous if he were actually interested in constructing a new version of the US rather than self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement. 

I’m not a psychologist (even if I am married to one), but you may consider the following definition from Wikipedia:
  • Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and emotional dysregulation that are excessive and pervasive…. ADHD symptoms arise from executive dysfunction. 

I have argued previously (Samson, 030725), that his endemic short-termism won’t move the country much past the phases of turmoil. Combined with his age and apparent cognitive decline (“Sleepy Don”) this will leave the country’s direction wide-open in a few years. Still, we can’t deny his short-term impact. Domestically, previously settled constitutional and political norms are being tossed aside at several levels.   
  • Notions of comity and incrementalism that have characterized our political life for two hundred years are being ignored. 
  • Institutional safeguards embodying the concept of the separation of powers are becoming meaningless principally due to the lack of backbone shown by Republican members of Congress. 
  • The liberal/progressive project of constitutional change via judicial decisions that built much of the jurisprudence over the past 75 years has proven reversible.
  • There are also a host of policy changes being made radically altering the scope and direction of federal government activities across the board from rights to support programs to budget priorities.

Globally, the situation is much the same. 

As in most revolutionary situations, there are a lot of problems with the incumbent regime. I have little hope that the Democrats as currently constituted are capable of addressing the real problems the country and the world face. A couple of months ago (A Poisoned Chalice, 020626) I suggested that the best that could be hoped for from the next center-left administration was to staunch the bleeding and stabilize the patient.

In sum, while we might be able to sketch several (more or less dire) scenarios for the future, we can have little confidence about the future, regardless of the outcome of the next election, not to mention any number of geopolitical, climatic, or economic contingencies. Could we be in the middle of a “revolution”? Sure, we’re at least ten years too early to tell (and likely at least 25 years). 

History offers few examples of rapid cultural change. Societies evolve, change takes time to digest, what happens in capitals may not show up in the ordinary life of the hinterlands for a while. Most revolutions are futile. Resist evil, but remember to breathe.


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    Condemned to Repeat It --
    Musings on history, society, and the world.

    I don't actually agree with Santayana's famous quote, but this is my contribution to my version of it: "Anyone who hears Santayana's quote is condemned to repeat it."

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