Steve Harris
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Encylopedie

5/8/2026

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I was sufficiently nerdish in my youth to enjoy reading the World Book Encyclopedia that my parents got us back in the 1960s. I now have to take care not to get lost too deeply in the hyperlinked maelstrom of information in the current version of Wikipedia (67+ million articles in 345 languages) or its AI-souped-up progeny serving up pre-digested info (most of which is actually true). As I started my history studies 20 years ago, I stumbled into the principal precedent for all modern compendia of information: the great French Encylopédie of the 18C. 

This era of scientific “revolution,” “Enlightenment,” and global exploration brought a deluge of new discoveries, inventions, and analyses. We may talk about the accumulation of petabytes of data, but we have the language and a couple of centuries of experience in digesting ever-increasing accumulation of information (with similar—but trailing—growth of knowledge and wisdom) to acclimate ourselves to the constantly growing mass. For the (relatively few) intelligentsia of this period, the 18C was a bewildering and breath-taking time. 

One of the essential challenges was therefore to figure out how to compile and organize all this stuff. While there was a smattering of attempts at comprehensive collections of knowledge stretching back to Pliny in the 1C, therefore, the field didn’t really blossom until the 18C. (Unsurprisingly, there is parallel development of dictionaries/lexicons.) Still, less than a dozen came out before mid-century.

The French project started out as an adaptation of the English “Chambers’ Cyclopaedia” (1735), but it stumbled until it was rebooted by Denis Diderot and Jean D’Alembert in 1748. They envisioned a new concept and a vastly expanded scope. Its goal was to compile, in an organized form, all "the parts of human knowledge", as based upon sensory input and reason. Diderot (with typical modesty) said that its purpose was “to change the general way of thinking.” They did so by covering both concepts and practical issues, in how they organized their articles, and the critical attitude they adopted towards superstition and other traditional epistemologies (and the Catholic Church in particular).

They corralled scores of contributors and, in the end produced over 72,000 articles comprising over 20 million words in 17 volumes of text and 11 volumes of pictures. They called it the “Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 
par une Société de Gens de letters” (“The Encyclopedia, or comprehensive dictionary of sciences, arts and methods, by a group of men of letters”). The articles ranged from Magic to Shakespeare to agricultural tools, with drawings of individuals, machinery, and landscapes. The contributors included Voltaire, Rousseau, and my favorite, the Chevalier de Jaucourt, an aristocratic scholar who employed a team of research assistants and produced almost a quarter of the total number of articles in the entire set.

One of my first projects in grad school was to write a paper on the Encyclopédie. I researched all the articles that talked about magic, sorcery, prophecy and related topics; trying to get a handle on how this epitome of Enlightenment rationalism coped with the supernatural and superstition. It was a fun project, although perhaps a bit too ambitious for a novice scholar.

From start to finish, it took about 27 years to publish the entire set, delayed by financial challenges, censorship, printing issues, and the generally overwhelming scope of the project. Editing was often haphazard, with different authors overlapping and taking different points of view. Afterwards, Diderot said it was “a pit in which the miserable rag pickers [his contributors] threw pell-mell all kinds of things—badly digested, good, bad, detestable, true, false, uncertain, and always both incoherent and disparate.”

Eventually, thousands of copies in several editions were published through the end of the 18C, so it received widespread readership (at least among intellectuals and wannabes). It spawned many imitators, most notably the Encyclopedia Britanica which started publication just as the Encyclopédie was completing its work. Britanica carried the torch into the 21C, with competitors (such as the World Book I read as a boy) flourishing in the mid-20C. There’s a copy online of course (en Francais) and a project at the University of Michigan has been using volunteers to produce an online English translation (I did about twenty articles when I was doing my research)

The basic purpose of encyclopedias remains the same: to encompass and distribute useful knowledge—both practical and cultural. At the time of the Encyclopédie, this was a new kind of thing, reflecting the (then) rapidly expanding scope of information, discovery, and critical reflection on the world and society. Diderot et al. made a good stab at it in the mid-18C with about 20M words. Even if that would be a veritable drop in the bucket for today’s multi-lingual Wikipedia (about 10B words!), we live in a world with far more information at hand; so, in a sense, encyclopedias are increasingly falling behind.

At the dawn of the AI era, we may be moving to a new mode of access to information, one which allows us to automate the “look-up” and integrating functions that were necessary in both paper and electronic encyclopedias to date. This will make more useful information available, but will require more thoughtful questions to access it effectively.

Nonetheless, for those who use encyclopedias (as I did as a boy) to swim in the pond of knowledge (not quite sure where I was headed), AI won’t help so much. A certain amount of randomness is helpful; especially to help us realize how little we actually know. While the Encyclopédie included a fair number of cross-references between articles, the deployment of hypertext links in Wikipedia makes it far easier to splash about and end up (hours later?) in distant and obscure corners of the infoverse. AI can’t (yet) do this sort of thing; so, there’s still room for human curiosity.

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Space Time Continuum

5/1/2026

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Most of us learned something about the space/time continuum in high school physics class; part of the Einsteinian revolution of the early 20C.  It’s a pretty bold idea: that what we perceive as space/area/distance and what we perceive as time/duration/speed are not separate but is an integrated concept. Without specifying all four dimensions (time, length, depth, width), you don’t have a clear picture of where/when anything is in the universe.

However, since physics is pretty much outside my ken, my topic today is more mundane and terrestrial: how do we adapt this profound model to the world of social and economic relations and how has this all changed over time. I’ll start with an example from my own experience. Twenty-some years ago, I took a hiking trip to Switzerland with a couple of buddies. As we were tromping from town-to-town, I was struck by the fact that the Swiss trail signs didn’t indicate the distance from Leukerbad to Lens (~ 16km), but rather the time it would take to walk there (6-7 hours). I figured that since people walk at different paces, one couldn’t come up with a standard estimate of the necessary time. I was wrong, of course; the Swiss had it nailed. More importantly for my point here, they highlighted the interchangeability of space and time at a very practical level.

I’ve been thinking about this as I’ve been giving a set of lectures on the history of globalization. This sprawling topic encompasses not only the movement of people, things, and ideas in gradually broader and more interconnected networks, but also the extent to which people are aware of the size of their “world.” In other words, we can look at globalization as an example of a space-time continuum and one that has evolved over the millennia as a function of technologies ranging from goat paths to asphalt to turbine engines to fiber optic undersea cables.

In pre-modern times, outside of astronomical calculations, most folks weren’t too concerned with precise measurement of either time or distance. The connection, however, was built implicitly into people’s consciousness. Modern Swiss trail markers are the descendants of the markers on Roman roads which measured “distance” in terms of days.

From a historical perspective, we can measure the progress of technologies in terms of increased speed of transportation and communications. On the rough roads of medieval Europe (or elsewhere in the pre-modern world) walking 25-35 km/day was about normal, riding a horse would boost that to 50 km or so. For most folks in most circumstances, this standard was only slightly improved until the 19C. This meant riding from Vienna to Paris (~1200 km) took about 25 days; walking would take about six weeks.

The development of a messenger service (for the Habsburg Empire) led to the creation of a relay-messenger service (a precursor of the Pony Express in the 19C US) which could carry a message in 15 days by 1600 (the guy who ran this project was called  “Taxis,” which is where we get the modern (pre-Uber) term for carriage for hire). In the 17 and 18C, improvement to roads cut the time for a fast mail coach to 7 days. 

The 19C saw the introduction of powered trains and telegraphs. The Orient Express would run from Vienna to Paris in 14 hours. By 1900, the telegraph would communicate words almost instantly. Indeed, the arrival of the telegraph finally led to a divergence between what we call communications and transportation.

Before I go further in this story, I should emphasize that European standards were the peak of human technology at the time, and the increased speeds only applied in very limited circumstances. It could still take weeks to traverse comparable distances between places that were rural, since there was no train from southwest France to northern Bavaria. Moreover, the cost of these “modern” options was out of the reach of almost all people. The story in Africa, Asia, and South America was still more sparse. It took decades to build out roads and rails and wires; a process which is still going on in many places around the world a full two centuries after the first railway began operations.

By the 20C, aviation brought further acceleration. The flight from Paris to Vienna runs under two hours. Telephony similarly accelerated communications and the shift to underseas telephone calls (now on fiber) and satellite calls helped drive down costs and vastly expand the availability of such services. A phone call from Los Angeles to London in 1927 cost $750 for ten minutes (2024 dollars), using the brand new radio system. International Direct Distance Dialing arrived in 1970, the same call now cost only $100 (2024 dollars). Competition and new technologies brought that crashing down to $5 for ten minutes by the turn of the millennium; a curve which has accelerated to the current situation where we can call pretty much anywhere in the world instantly for free. Wow!

There are two salient points to be drawn from this technological progress. The first is that the radical reductions in cost have been a major spur to globalization. More stuff (goods and people and ideas) move from one part of the world to another when it becomes cheaper to do so. At the high end, that means bopping off to Paris for a long weekend (as I often do!). For most folks, it means that economy/steerage class becomes cheap enough to seek new opportunities in the new world, as has happened a lot over the last 200 years.

Second, we can see the space-time continuum in practice. As the massive pandemic-accelerated shift in work habits and world conceptualization driven by video conferencing has shown, distance is trivialized and Zoom et al. have become wormholes in space. I have a friend in Seattle whose daughter lives in Ireland. They text and Facetime multiple times a week. Not much different than if she lived 45 miles away instead of 4500. 

One hundred and thirty years ago, my great-grandparents embarked on journeys from the “Old World” to the “New,” expecting never to see their families again. Thirteen years ago, I was expected to live near enough to my workplace that I could show up every day. Both those worlds are gone, reshaped into a new configuration.


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Slave to Technology

4/24/2026

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As I write this, I am about through with an almost six-week slog in the morasses of telecom service provider hell. I will not rehearse the details, since they are pedantic, you have undoubtedly your own personal experience with some similar situation, and I just can’t stand reliving the more-or-less sixteen hours I have spent on the process. 

I wasn’t trying to do anything fancy either in terms of technology or commercial arrangements. Suffice it to say that I was trying to switch our cell service to Comcast to take advantage of one of their “deals.” They screwed things up so badly that I have bailed on them and switched to another carrier (with another pretty good deal). I have no illusions that any of the four “service providers” involved in my sad tale have or will actually deliver superior service, but Comcast’s performance was so wretched (even if fronted by very cordial service reps) that I will not spend any more money with them.

It's not clear which was worse, the interminable periods on hold, the identity verification processes that took as long as actually providing substantive information, or the general helplessness I felt knowing that I was caught up in the cogs of a seemingly inescapable machine. The people I dealt with were (almost) to a person polite and supportive; even if some lacked competence. I was (almost) unfailingly polite in response. Those on the front lines have little control over the situation; they are foot soldiers of corporate armies. 

It became apparent (during one of those interminable waits) that I have become utterly dependent on the regular functioning of telecommunications/internet technology as part of the foundation of my quotidian life. So much so that the (recurring and very tempting) thought of hanging up on my various interlocutors and disconnecting from the entire metanetwork had to be quickly dismissed. If it had been a matter of walking away from some money, I would have hung up. As it was, however, I felt trapped; I was aware at the time that I had to work my way through their procedures to retain my connection with 21C society. My original thoughts of cost savings were quickly discarded in the face of the amount of time I had to spend/waste. 

Moreover, I had to come to terms with the fact that the unavoidable price of dealing with these (apparently necessary) companies was wending my way through AI-“enhanced” call routing trees, repetitious disclaimers, breathless sales pitches, and redundant problem-“solving” protocols (rebooting, reloading, and reactivating). The stealthy way in which these companies make it exceedingly difficult to talk to a live, knowledgeable human is yet further evidence of the pinnacle of bureaucracy they occupy. Over a century ago, Max Weber famously described bureaucracy as one of the hallmarks of modern life. Little did he know.

Modern information technology was supposed to make our lives easier and, in many ways, it does. Still, I have to wonder whether the economists’ calculation of the resulting increased productivity includes not only the time spent/wasted navigating the maze or the life-shortening stress/frustration of the processes required.

The telecom/internet world is but one aspect of these phenomena, as we all know. Social Security/Medicare/health insurance is every bit as delightful. Taxes, school admissions/enrollment, compliance activities at work, and the various channels of ordinary commerce are all viable competitors. If Dante recast the seven levels of hell for the modern world, he would have a lot of material to work with. You can make your own list.

I’m not sure there’s much to be done about it. Perhaps the emerging personal AI intelligent agents will cheerfully do the slogging for us. If they can effectively solve problems faster than their corporate counterparts on the “service” side of things can create them, then being assimilated into the Borg might be worth it. Until then, I don’t think I’m ready to disconnect and return to the world of printed books, physically-present sources of music, face-to-face shopping, and snail-mail (now at 82¢ per letter!). So, unless the corporate AIs are reading this and ready to retaliate against my rant, you can still reach me at [email protected] and (415) 440-4535.

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International (Dis-) Organization

4/17/2026

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This is a follow-on to my pieces a few weeks ago on 1) whether we are facing a revolution here and now in the USA (A Revolution? 040326) and 2) the state of “International Law” (032726). In the first, I pretty much did a scholarly duck of that question, and don’t propose to answer it here; but I do want to address one aspect: the state of the “international order.” In parallel with the turmoil in the domestic constitutional and political environment, the broad arrangements which seems to have governed how most countries relate to each other have been upset by a series of disruptive statements and actions emanating from Washington. Is another revolution afoot?

While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.

The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).

The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China).  Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift. 

On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa. 

The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments. 

It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.

Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes, 
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement). 

Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,

Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies  will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.

In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world. 

This is a follow-on to my pieces a few weeks ago on 1) whether we are facing a revolution here and now in the USA (A Revolution? 040326) and 2) the state of “International Law” (032726). In the first, I pretty much did a scholarly duck of that question, and don’t propose to answer it here; but I do want to address one aspect: the state of the “international order.” In parallel with the turmoil in the domestic constitutional and political environment, the broad arrangements which seems to have governed how most countries relate to each other have been upset by a series of disruptive statements and actions emanating from Washington. Is another revolution afoot?

While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.

The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).

The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China).  Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift. 

On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa. 

The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments. 

It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.

Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes, 
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement). 

Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,

Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies  will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.

In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world. 

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Rutabaga

4/10/2026

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My wife and I had a long running debate about the intelligence of her cat Samantha. She (my wife) noted that Samantha would, among other things, respond to someone calling her name. I challenged that by pointing out that I could say “rutabaga” in the same tone of voice and get the same feline response. Needless to say, this debate went on until Samantha went to the great feeding bowl in the sky. 

I think the same approach could be applied to the term “capitalism,” which is to say that the word itself has no meaning and much depends on the speaker’s tone and intent. The result is that much of what passes for debate about merits or deficiencies is really just people talking past each other, leading to a waste of time and no clearer understanding of the issues involved, much less to specific solutions for the considerable problems and abuses of the current way of doing things. Of course, there is no single “right” definition, conceptual words morph across cultures, histories, and speakers’ intentions. All we can ask is that people make clear what they mean by “capitalism,” (or, for that matter, by “history,” “democracy,” or American “greatness”) and their purpose in using the term.

As I have previously noted in this occasional series, Historians have described the emergence of a socio-economic system, primarily in Western Europe and primarily over the past five hundred years. “Capitalism” in this reading has evolved both in terms of its institutions, practices, and significance over this time; indeed, its protean nature is one of its notable attributes (e.g., it’s a long way from the Bank of England in the late 17C to bitcoin in the 21C). We can trace these changes not only through those institutions (e.g., the number of limited liability corporations), but also through the critique of these phenomena by contemporary commentators (including champions of religion, ethics, nature, and humanism).

Of these analysts, Marx was the most important for both his insights and his profound long-term influence on both thinkers and practitioners of political economy. Marx got a number of things wrong (and those who claimed to implement his ideas in Russia and other places over the past 110 years got even more wrong), but his juxtaposition of “capitalism” and “socialism” remains the touchstone of debate, even though, as the subsequent practice of both business and government has evolved, the distinctions have become increasingly blurry (see, e.g., “state capitalism” in China, “public-private partnerships,” and the quasi-investment banking deals coming out the White House lately). 

While both capitalism and socialism have evolved considerably since the 19C, most political debate is conducted under a somewhat simplistic A vs. B rubric which does little to comprehend the national or historical variants or the complex texture of each. Indeed, what has emerged, especially since the 20C triumph of capitalism over communism and fascism, is the use of “capitalism” as a somewhat generic term for the dominant socio-economic system of modernity. It’s a label that doesn’t tell us much in general, much less with particular regard to “capital” or “capitalists.” 

For example, once we stop thinking of “our” mode of “capitalism” as the (if you’ll pardon the expression) gold standard, we can see that there are many ways to mix the roles of the state and the private sector. Using various indices, we can line up countries according to tax rates and progressivity, public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, extent of the social safety net, competition/antitrust policy, or the pro rata number of bureaucrats. We would find a continuum for each standard rather than sharply distinguished groupings. Moreover, we would find pretty much of a mish-mash, with particular national systems high on one measure and low on another. In other words, there’s no simple model of capitalism and likely few places that are at the extremes across a group of standards.

From another perspective, we have to acknowledge that whatever “capitalism” is, it has evolved over the past several centuries in many ways. So, critiques by Marx or others, however accurate they might have been at the time, don’t necessarily tell us very much about the phenomena that we face in the 21C. A recent study of the “Crisis of Democratic Capitalism” (2023) illustrates this point. In general, Martin Wolf’s analysis is quite perceptive, especially his tight linkage between the types of political and economic systems which dominate our world.  However, the “crisis” with which he is concerned is not with “capitalism” per se, but rather with the hypercapitalism (i.e., push towards plutocracy/monopoly/oligarchy) characteristic of many “advanced” countries today.  

The situation with “capital” and “capitalists” is much the same. We now have “natural capital,” human capital,” and “information capital” among others. Such terms however, don’t make a copse of trees or a group of laborers into capitalists. Similarly, no everyone who lives and actively participates in our modern socio-economic-political system is thereby a “capitalist,” even if they have a 401k.

The phenomenological morass is one reason I prefer to think of capitalism in terms of epistemology or a set of attitudes about money, personal value, and the nature of society which can be considered at both the societal and individual levels.

The upshot of this conceptual and semantic confusion is that public debate about capitalism (as well as a fair amount of scholarly discussion) is confusing and fruitless. I often think it would be better for both public and scholarly debates to stop using terms that have been hollowed out by abuse and overuse (capitalism, sovereignty, and progress all come to mind in this context). Taking a few moments to flesh out what we mean would avoid these semantic traps and perhaps provide some clarity of both diagnosis and prescription. In my History work, for example, I try to avoid bald references to the “industrial revolution,” referring instead to the “period of rapid industrialization.”

“A rose,” as the Bard said “by any other name would smell as sweet.” The way our world works, too, would be however good or bad it is, regardless of the labelling. Samantha responded both to her name and to “rutabaga;” although more quickly in either case if you had a piece of turkey in your hand.

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A Revolution?

4/3/2026

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Last week, as I was sending out my uncheerful assessment of the state of international law, a good friend passed along a recent posting from the invaluable Heather Cox Richardson about the fundamental reshuffling of the global order currently underway as part of the present administration’s general program/chaos. My friend asked if this constituted a revolution. My bottom line: it’s too early to tell.

The Richardson piece draws on recent statements by the Foreign Minister of Singapore and other developments—Iran, Viktor Orban in Hungary, the erosion/demolition of US constitutional controls—to sketch an ominous picture of both the domestic and international scenes. I’ve commented on many aspects of this situation; the vast majority of which are somewhere between troubling and horrific. So, from certain perspectives, things look bleak. Does that make for a revolution? Let’s look at the domestic side this week.

If we take the loose, popular definition of revolution as a big, quick, dramatic change, then yes. But many Historians feel obliged to take a longer-term perspective. Modern political revolutions might well be dated from the English Civil War (1840s-50s) and the Glorious Revolution (1689). Since then, whether something counts as a revolution depends in part on when you’re asking the question. 

Even the “American Revolution” (which arguably, merely replaced the ruling structure of a small peripheral country with one set of rich white guys with another set of rich white guys) has been the subject of debate as to when the “revolution” occurred. Benjamin Rush argued that the Revolution continued after the War had been won, but Thomas Jefferson, said the Revolution had already been completed by the issuing of the Declaration of Independence.

The Great French Revolution went through four different regimes before Napoleon and then reverted to the Bourbon Monarchy in 1815. Important French Historians argue that the Revolution was not completed until the 1880s. The Russian Revolution, too, went through multiple stages and directions. If you had asked whether there was a revolution happening at various stages, you might well have gotten a different answer. So, a snapshot taken in April, 2026 might look pretty inaccurate by September or by 2029.

All this potted history tells us is that you can’t tell what’s going on while it’s happening, much less have any sense of what the outcome will be. Indeed, it’s hard to find any historical evidence for a revolution ending up anywhere near what most revolutionaries thought they were starting when they were starting it. In general, the pressure of historical inertia and the complex dynamics of current events quickly and sharply skew the “best laid plans.” 

Revolutions arise though a confluence of events, trends, and personalities. Once they get past the stage of throwing out the old regime, revolutionary coalitions usually fracture, cracked apart by circumstances require that compromises and leave any pre-existing ideological program severely frayed if not in shambles. Lenin flip-flopped on basic principles of socialism once he was steering the ship. Factionalism and egomania (e.g., self-proclaimed ‘guardians’ of the revolutionary spirit) usually make a hash of any coherent program. 

Now that we have established a firm foundation of uncertainty, we can turn to the question of our leading “revolutionary.” The orange-haired one is a charismatic leader of the first order, but he is no ideologue. He has surrounded himself and channeled the views of a coterie of folks whose combination of smarts, sycophancy, and smarm have given him a set of policies more notable for their drama and disruption of norms than their ability to move the nation towards their self-proclaimed vision. There are definitely revolutionaries among them: Bannon, Miller, Vought; but they are all derivative of him and lack their own power base. Most of the team is just along for the ride. This is actually fortunate; he would be more dangerous if he were actually interested in constructing a new version of the US rather than self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement. 

I’m not a psychologist (even if I am married to one), but you may consider the following definition from Wikipedia:
  • Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and emotional dysregulation that are excessive and pervasive…. ADHD symptoms arise from executive dysfunction. 

I have argued previously (Samson, 030725), that his endemic short-termism won’t move the country much past the phases of turmoil. Combined with his age and apparent cognitive decline (“Sleepy Don”) this will leave the country’s direction wide-open in a few years. Still, we can’t deny his short-term impact. Domestically, previously settled constitutional and political norms are being tossed aside at several levels.   
  • Notions of comity and incrementalism that have characterized our political life for two hundred years are being ignored. 
  • Institutional safeguards embodying the concept of the separation of powers are becoming meaningless principally due to the lack of backbone shown by Republican members of Congress. 
  • The liberal/progressive project of constitutional change via judicial decisions that built much of the jurisprudence over the past 75 years has proven reversible.
  • There are also a host of policy changes being made radically altering the scope and direction of federal government activities across the board from rights to support programs to budget priorities.

Globally, the situation is much the same. 

As in most revolutionary situations, there are a lot of problems with the incumbent regime. I have little hope that the Democrats as currently constituted are capable of addressing the real problems the country and the world face. A couple of months ago (A Poisoned Chalice, 020626) I suggested that the best that could be hoped for from the next center-left administration was to staunch the bleeding and stabilize the patient.

In sum, while we might be able to sketch several (more or less dire) scenarios for the future, we can have little confidence about the future, regardless of the outcome of the next election, not to mention any number of geopolitical, climatic, or economic contingencies. Could we be in the middle of a “revolution”? Sure, we’re at least ten years too early to tell (and likely at least 25 years). 

History offers few examples of rapid cultural change. Societies evolve, change takes time to digest, what happens in capitals may not show up in the ordinary life of the hinterlands for a while. Most revolutions are futile. Resist evil, but remember to breathe.


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International Law

3/27/2026

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With the US rampaging around the world, with air strikes and assassinations, one doesn’t hear too much about international law these days. Our current Administration premises its policies on realpolitik, relegating international law and morality to the proverbial dustbin of history. I look on this with mixed feelings, born of a lengthy engagement with international law and a greater degree of self-reflection.

Some decades ago, I was a big fanboy of international law. In both college and law school, it was a major part of my academic career. I was even a student member of the American Society of International Law and the founding editor of the Michigan Journal of International Law. As a junior lawyer, although I shifted my focus to telecommunications, I continued to work on international telecommunications regulation issues for a while. When I got back to school, I chose to write my dissertation on the history of arbitration: the peaceful settlement of disputes between countries from the late 18C through WWI. I also wrote an article on certain aspects of British treaty practice in Africa in the late 19C.

Of course, during that time—stretching from the 1970s to the 2010s—the nature of international law changed as did the ways in which we study its history. Along the way, I’ve come to take a more critical stance about International Law than I did as a youth. Back then, I subscribed to the idealistic view of international law as a vehicle for incremental global progress towards peace and the rule of law. It was still a work in progress, but progress was being made, both in terms of principles and general adherence as well as of the construction of more extensive sets of rules and regulations governing international trade and other activities. Now I see the later portion as continuing to progress, but the grand vision is looking pretty faded.

One of the essential problems with the general public perception of international law has to do with the word “law.” Most of the time, we think of traffic laws, criminal laws, corporate law, etc. These are all within a domestic context and are enforced by the relevant sovereign government (e.g. Colorado, Canada). This type of law “works” because it is generally accepted by the people subject to it, usually complied with, and enforced by the government through police and courts. It's part of the social contract we have all implicitly signed as members of a particular society. In this context, it’s OK that Coloradans drive on the right side of the road and the British drive on the left or that a will in Delaware requires two witnesses, but in the Netherlands, you have to have two witnesses plus a notary. Differences in national rules and behavior are entirely acceptable. 

International law, on the other hand, isn’t really “law.” That is to say, there’s nobody to enforce it. Countries (which are the subjects of international law, just like citizens are the subject of Colorado law) haven’t signed any “social contract” by which they agree to accept and abide by the rules enacted by the UN or WTO or similar groups. Even if a country signs a treaty, there’s nobody to enforce it once it’s breached. For example, a few years ago, the International Court of Justice ruled that China’s claim of control over much of the South China Sea was unfounded. Now, China had signed the ICJ’s underlying treaty, but there’s nobody to “legally” make them dismantle their bases on the contested islets.

In this way, international “law” has been (since its modern inception in the 16C), aspirational. There’s lots of cajoling going on, and bad press if you break the rules, but not much else. Even the relatively recent development of international criminal courts (starting at Nuremburg in 1946) still have a highly selective impact. As a practical matter, its only losers in war who get tried.

This reveals a fundamental problem with law in the somewhat “anarchic society” of states; it’s highly political and its impact is often a function of power. This has been illustrated by historians working with the development of international law across the past five centuries. What we call international law is almost exclusively the product of a small group of European thinkers who were trying, in the context of Christian Europe, to defend “civilization,” and promote rules of behavior which they wanted countries to adhere. They had no power, just ideas. Moreover, they wrote their aspirational rules with a bald disregard for those people, countries, and cultures outside of Europe. War and slavery were acceptable, even if “laws of war” were written to try to make it a touch less barbaric. In other words, it was selective, distorted, and used to justify oppressive behavior by Europeans as they bestrode the world.

History, they say, is written by the victors. So, too, is the law; whether domestic or international. That is to say law is a function of power and the most powerful are almost always subject to the least amount of legal constraint. One of the reasons for the relative demise of international law at the broad principled level (as compared to the relatively well-functioning administrative/ regulatory level) is that the most powerful country has fended off its advances. Constraints on US behavior are usually criticized as “political” (a defense which does, in all honesty, have more than a germ of truth); but much of the defense is no more sophisticated than “Don’t gotta, don’t wanna.” China’s refusal to subject itself to the Western-rooted system is similar. 

In a world where the US (increasingly baldly) acts based on a worldview based on power and declines to even pay lip service to morality in international affairs, there is less and less reason for the 190+ other countries in the world to act differently.  For centuries, international law was at least allowed to be the hypocritical standard of behavior around the world; even that is now in danger. 

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Seven Guineas

3/20/2026

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I’m just starting work on a course about “Modern Empires” to be offered this summer. In poking around this vast topic, it struck me that there is some significance behind the etymology of a term that arises in multiple locations and contexts: Guinea. As a place name it appears to show up in six different countries on three continents (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea (all in Africa), Guyana and French Guiana (South America), and New Guinea (Oceania)), and a currency. And therein lies a tale.

“Guinea” first entered European awareness as a Portuguese adaptation of the term “guineus;” their way of referring to the “black” Africans (as distinguished from the lighter-skinned Africans of the Berbers and Arabs of North Africa. The Berbers themselves used the term “Ghinawen” meaning “the burnt people.” Or it might be tied back to the important trading town of Djenné (now in Mali). In any event, the term became applied to the entire region as well as to the nearby portion of the Atlantic. 

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As they hop-scotched down the coast, swapping territories and seeing which ones would be economically viable and militarily defensible, Europeans ended up with a hodge-podge of territories, paying no attention to existing ethnic groupings, chiefdoms, and empires either in terms of organization or naming. What is now Guinea was French, what is now Guinea-Bissau was Portuguese, and what is now Equatorial Guinea was, sequentially, Portuguese, Spanish, British, and finally Spanish. Each attained independence as part of the mid-20C wave of decolonization.

Over on the other side of the Atlantic, Europeans (all the usual suspects) were equally active. While the Spanish and Portuguese took over most of South America, the French, British, and Dutch grabbed relatively small chunks of the coast just to the north of Brazil in the 16C and 17C.  They each referred to their territories as Guiana, a name NOT derived from their African activities , but from an indigenous word meaning “land of many waters, a reference to the many streams which flow into the Atlantic there. Suriname took a new name upon independence and French Guiana is still a part of France.

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New Guinea was the name applied by Spanish explorers in 1545, to the island which the locals called “Papua”. Ynigo Ortiz de Retez used “Guinea” since he saw a resemblance between the locals and west Africans. Later, control over the island became shared by the British, German, and Dutch empires. Today, the western half is part of Indonesia (the imperial successors to the Dutch), while the British and Germans did a deal in the 1880s to split the eastern half. The Brits passed their piece on to the Australians during WWI. They added the German northeast quarter in the aftermath of WWI, and granted Papua-New Guinea independence in 1975. 

The British have many names for their money. The “Guinea” was an actual coin minted from the middle of the 17C to early in the 19C, and was originally worth one pound. It got its name from the source of much of the gold that was used in the minting: the “Guinea” region of West Africa. It was used as an informal synonym for a pound throughout the 20C, long after its direct connection was superseded. Indeed, long after British attention to the lesser portions of their African empire had waned, this linguistic remnant continued in everyday culture.

(Btw, “guinea pigs” come from western South America and are thus not “Guinean” (or “guyanan”) (or, for that matter, pigs). Nonetheless, the term may well have emerged into European consciousness via their transshipment from the Guyana region on the Atlantic Coast, thus acquiring that (distorted) nomenclature.)

What can we take away from these linguistic connections and coincidences? First, they show the interconnectedness of the various European imperial projects. In both Africa and South America, the first empire in place inspired the follow-ons, both in terms of seeking commercial and proselytizing opportunities and in nomenclature. They also show the modern impacts of decisions made centuries ago by captains and explorers. 

Place names (and other words) affect how we see the world. Referring to the United States of America as “America” leaves out the other 34 countries on the two continents (and, of course, just referring to us as “The” United States omits other countries with similar names, including the United States of Mexico, Brazil, and half-a-dozen defunct polities). Calling the islands in the Caribbean the (West) “Indies” is good evidence that Columbus and other European explorers of the late 15C were headed for East and South Asia when they stumbled across the various land masses of the Western Hemisphere. 

In our case here, the Spanish explorer who brought a conception of darker-skinned people from Africa across two oceans to an island near Australia was expressing the importance Europeans placed on the difference in the color of peoples’ skin as a defining attribute even where, genetically and culturally, African “Guineas” were likely more closely related to Europeans than to the “Guinean” people of the Pacific. This definition by difference highlights that what we call “race” was an embedded part of European world-views long before “scientific” racism blossomed in the 19C.

So, too, was the lust for gold that spurred many explorers and exploiters. Deriving the name of a significant aspect of your domestic coinage after a region named for the color of the locals’ skin says much about British imperial culture. 

The plethora of “Guineas” today owes much to the power of European imperial practices. We can never know what names would have emerged if local powers had developed on their own terms instead of being run over by the white Christians from the northwest corner of Afro-EurAsia. Nor can we, even as we recognize the awfulness of the behavior often visited upon them, take a stab at the broader questions of alternate history: What would the rest of the world have looked like if Europeans didn’t or couldn’t exercise the power they did across the planet from the 15C through the 20C? Who would have been “better off” and who worse? (Especially since our very sense of “better” and “worse” is derived from that same dominant European culture.)

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Democracy and Complexity

3/13/2026

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We’ve come a long way from the citizen assemblies of ancient Athens. Some towns in New England still make decisions by getting all the local citizenry together, but that doesn’t work with larger groups of people. The solution—more-or-less standardized since Madison and the gang in Philadelphia (1787)—is “representative democracy.” Having the masses choose which members of the elite would make decisions for the whole society was a way to keep power in the (relatively trustworthy and reliable) hands of those with a mix of education and wealth, while providing a means for the demos to express itself and retain nominal oversight of the process and tools of government.

Many things have changed in the last 250 years in the US and around the world: in terms of the condition of the mass electorate, we have industrialization, an information tsunami, mass education and culture, and a whole lot more people living. While the precise spread between elites and masses have varied over time and across different cultures, the fundamental differential remains. (It’s one of the discrepancies which our current idealization of democracy buries.) In terms of the world, these same factors, particularly the nature and extent of technologies (high and low, material and cultural) have made for a much more complex environment. On top of these phenomenological changes, our knowledge levels (or, at least, our beliefs about what we know) about causation and effects have drastically increased the difficulty of making decisions. Science and experience have made us more aware of the broad implications and longer-term effects of any nominally straightforward policy option. Whether dealing with tariffs, vaccines, immigration, AI regulation, in toting up the pluses and minuses of any potential policy decision we have a lot more entries. Keeping track of them, then weighing them, and sorting through the trade-offs has become a much more difficult process. We can see this in the construction of bureaucracies and administrative regimes (e.g. taxes, Medicare, education policy, and various schemes of discrimination and preference). 

What challenges do this increased complexity of life raise for the practice of democracy?

The theory of modern democracy is that informed citizens should deliberate and select representatives who devote sufficient time and intellect to comprehend the issues and resolve the political issues that are inherent in the differing beliefs, interests, and priorities of any large group of people. Elected representatives should, in theory, become experts in sorting policy choices as well as interpreting the values of their constituency and applying them to those policy choices. That’s “normal” politics. However, there are problems with this theory both in terms of the represented and the representatives.

First, the levels of complexity and detail are so great that even most elected representatives (especially at the state and federal levels) can’t begin to cope and, de facto, delegate their decisions to either their party leaders, their colleagues (vote-swapping), or their staff members or the implementing bureaucracy. Each presents its own particular problems and risks of corruption and distortion, but in essence, our representatives are working through representatives, most of whom aren’t elected. This was not so much of an issue in the 18C or early 19C, but has swamped the process since the mid-20C.

However, the more fundamental concern is that the electorate, for all its increased education and access to information, can’t make more than a broadly directional choice when it comes to electing representatives. We’re all different, but there’s only a limited set of possible representatives to choose from. Both politics and policy intersect in different mixes, political parties kinda help alignments, but present their own complications and corruptions. The result, in our over-saturated media age, is decision by sound-bite, charisma, and money.

Representative democracy thus looks inherently problematic and even more so these days. Unfortunately, neither of the two most popular solutions is a real improvement. The more well-established alternative is the popular referendum, allowed in about half the states. As we in California know all too well, this method of popular participation is messy and subject to the same money/media distortions as other modes. One principal problem is that ordinary voters are called on to read through and understand an extensive statutory implementation of some policy scheme. By the time you winnow out those who have the capability to work through these challenging questions (e.g. tax codes, environmental regulation, social benefit eligibility) and those that are not interested enough in public policy and have the economic wherewithal to devote the necessary study hours, you’d end up with a fairly skewed (and self-selected) group of citizens; hardly a representative body.

The same problem undercuts the various proposals to have “ordinary” citizens, usually selected at random, participate either as part of regularly-established legislatures or as a stand-alone “citizens’ assembly” which would have a role in the legislative process). It’s nice symbolism, but I suspect this innovation would merely transfer power to the staffs to explain things and the bureaucracies to implement them.

I have been thinking about this issue in the context of an upcoming lecture marking the tenth anniversary of Brexit, the 2016 decision which propelled the United Kingdom out of the European Union (pretty much of a disaster on all fronts and of which more in a coming posting).
British voters were presented with a nice short “yea-or-nay” question for an immensely complicated situation about which there was no clear understanding of what was likely to ensue.

Still, I think there is a role for referenda, as long as they are relatively straightforward and high-level AND subject to either implementation by the legislature or (unlike Brexit) a further ratification of a final detailed plan. Capping referenda questions at 100 words would likely provide broad policy direction without pretending that the electorate reads the third subclause of the fourteenth section of the proposed law.

Not a great overall solution to an increasing problem of democratic governance in the 21C, but worth a shot. We need other ideas of how to balance the complexity of the real world with ensuring all the ordinary folks can help steer the ship.

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One Perspective on Capitalism

3/6/2026

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I recently bought a book (no news there!) and faced a panoply of choices as to price, delivery speed, format, and book quality. Multiple websites provided a great demonstration of the ubiquitousness of capitalism at work in modern life. Consumers’ preferences are dissected and products designed to meet those particularities. So, it’s no small irony that the book in question was Sven Beckert’s new doorstop (1000+ pages) providing a comprehensive history of “Capitalism.” As we said when I was in the law biz: “res ipsa loquitur” (“the thing speaks for itself”).  

As a work of history, “Capitalism” is well thought-through and remarkable in its research, if rather too heavy for the casual reader. Beckert shows that capitalism was a global phenomenon, drawing on practices and experiences far beyond the usual “its all about Europeans” (including the US) framework. He also shows that it has deep roots, extending far earlier than the usual early-modern/industrial revolution/robber barons/globalization storyline. After all, as I have noted elsewhere, greed and profit are hardly modern inventions. He does a good job, as well, in blowing up the myth of “laissez-faire,” the idea that large businesses have developed apart from and in spite of governmental activity.

Beckert applies a phenomenological focus; i.e., he concentrates on the actual practice of “capitalists.” Marx merits less than 30 mentions and other theorists (pro and con) are similarly sidelined.  I would have preferred a more inclusive approach, but his is a legitimate choice and his story benefits from its grounding in the real world. My bigger concerns are that 1) he doesn’t pin down the definition of the concept he’s writing about, and 2) he doesn’t wrestle with how the capitalist mentality spread and swamped other values-based cultural systems. There is, to be sure, a reference to capitalists’ focus on markets/commodities/money, but there is something in modern commercial practice that is different from the mindset of traders a thousand-or-two years ago, and he doesn’t grab on to it. 

This, to me, is the central issue. Capitalism has been a principal strand in the story of the modern world, whether economic, political, or ideological. Historians in general, however, are loath to take on psychological changes, however fundamental they might be. There’s good reason for this, since the evidence is sparse and largely inferential and there’s always a risk of self-projection. And yet, without understanding or at least suggesting some ways in which historical actors were motivated, we can’t come close to understanding how history came about.

As I said a few weeks ago (Capitalism and Me, 012326), I see capitalism as a culture (i.e., a socio-economic-epistemic system) in which we define ourselves and evaluate others and determine how to act across our lives principally from an economic perspective: morals are secondary to money.” In contrast, the practices and institutions which manifest this mentality are what Beckert is talking about.

It is important not to make moral judgments about these institutions per se. Lord Acton famously observed that “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” In a similar vein, St. Paul found money to be the “root of all evil.” They were, however, both wrong. A critic of Acton saw that power itself was not the corrupting source, but rather the vehicle by which human corruption was revealed. Similarly, we can see that money, too, is just the means by which evil is exercised. The fault, in other (Shakespeare’s) words, is not “in our stars” (or our wallets or our ability to affect others), but “in ourselves.” The economic power which the practice of capitalism concentrates in “capitalists” merely allows them to demonstrate their moral (dis-)abilities and their unwillingness to face the complexities (These fundamentals of human nature are essential to parsing the semantic soup that surrounds the term “capitalism.” I will have more to say in a later posting about the different ways in which that term and its cognates, “capital” and “capitalist” are used.)

It's not difficult to see the practice of “capitalism” as the dominant economic system of the modern era. As with other human activities, its significance is the product of the confluence of means, motive and opportunity. The motivation of capitalists, in my framing, is based in the deeply-rooted nature of humans—a desire for security (both physical and psychological) and the many ways in which that desire is overextended, as most pithily captured in the traditional deadly sins of greed, envy, gluttony, and pride. The laissez-faire mythos may have some nuggets of truth, but it’s mostly about the desire of “capitalists” to claim all the credit for the work of many; in other words: ego (also not a new story).

So, from a historical perspective, the rise of practical capitalism is more a function of the means and opportunity, which are largely exogenous factors, and which we can parse into three angles. First, institutions and practices: banks, corporations, trading networks, advertising, governmental actions, etc. Second, new technologies which have created new productivity and economies of scale and scope (not least in terms of transportation and communications).  Third, population growth and density which have created large numbers of consumers, thereby providing the demand which pays prices well above (the new, lower) marginal cost of goods (i.e, more profitability). These factors are the normal materials of historical analysis and we can trace their manifestation, at both the personal and societal levels. But we can’t forget that without the psychological urge, there would be no capitalism at all.

Beckert focuses on these exogenous factors, principally the first and second. I’ve got a bunch more reading lined up on that score and related topics; perhaps someone has taken on this moral/psychological angle in historical perspective. I’ll be back with more on the semantics, the significance, and the solutions—in due course.

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    Condemned to Repeat It --
    Musings on history, society, and the world.

    I don't actually agree with Santayana's famous quote, but this is my contribution to my version of it: "Anyone who hears Santayana's quote is condemned to repeat it."

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