Steve Harris
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This Sceptered Isle

5/16/2025

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This Sceptered Isle

In Richard II (Act II, scene 1), the Bard waxes eloquent about his English homeland, using the above line as one paean. It’s a gushy, emotive, and resonant speech, oft-cited down the years; and one that seems profoundly out of date in the prosaic Britain of Charles III and Keir Starmer. In previous posts, I’ve talked at some length about Britain’s politics and its post-imperial epistemic deflation. Having visited here about ten times over the years, I have some sense of the place and my latest foray was full of surprises and historical echoes.

This time, we spent most of our trip in Cornwall, the proudly distinctive (in terms of culture and climate) southwestern corner of Britain. Lush landscapes, friendly people, and beautiful weather awaited us. Into the 20C, Cornwall was tied to the sea and small fishing ports dot the shoreline all around. Proximity to the Gulf Stream made fishing common work and made the land fecund. These days, fishing has faded and tourism is a major part of the economy. Part is based on the innumerable beaches, part on the unutterably charming port towns, art colonies in St. Ives, and a respectable smattering of ruins provide a nice mix for both domestic and international travelers.

One highlight was a day’s jaunt to Tintagel in the northwest corner of the county. The castle (now in ruins) dates from the 13C, built by a local prince on the site of the (then-recent) account by Geoffrey of Monmouth of the legend of King Arthur (mid-11C). Geoffrey’s account was already suspect by the 12C, but the prince invoked it anyway and built a traditional castle on a promontory which was actively occupied into the 15C, then effectively abandoned. For our own age which often seems fascinated with history and legend, it’s remarkable to think that this 13C noble was as much interested in leveraging a dubious mythos in an era with no prospect of tourism profits. In any event, it’s a dramatic site (and a good hike) with extensive ruins and stories that have accumulated over the centuries.

At the other end of the chronological spectrum, we stopped also at the Eden Project, a 21C botanical garden and environmental education center in the southeast of the county. There are many traditional gardens across Cornwall, but this was more about science than aesthetics.

Cornish place names increasingly gave way to English as we moved east. By the time we got to Bovey Castle in Devon’s Dartmoor National Park, we felt well back in the traditional English culture in a grand pile (originally a country house, built by the retailer W.H. Smith at the end of the 19C) on spectacular grounds; it was all quite “Downton Abbey-esque.” We didn’t participate in the archery, shooting, falconry (or even golf) on the property; opting instead for a genteel walk to a nearby village (highly picturesque) and a drive across the moors.

Thence to Salisbury, with its stunning cathedral (dating from the 13C) and its copy of Magna Carta. Also, lunch with an old English friend from high school who lives nearby.

The next day, nearby, we went to Stonehenge, on a cold and windy plain. A remarkable site, living up to the (considerable) hype. The great thing about pre-history is that the “we-don’t-know, but…” factor goes up by an order of magnitude. Indeed, a history of the theories about Stonehenge provides a fascinating window into the cultures that have tried to suss it out. Even now, much of the interpretation remains “contested.” One amazing fact is that the smaller (2-5 tons) “blue” stones of the inner circle were transported from Wales, about 150 miles away in the middle of the 3d millennium BC—quite an impressive engineering/transport project!

Finally, reaching London, our group went to a variety of places and events. One highlight for me was a visit to the Tower of London, famous for the Crown Jewels and the site of numerous famous imprisonments and executions over the centuries. I was there the week of the 80th anniversary of VE day, marked at the Tower by the replanting of 30,000 of the ceramic poppies originally placed there for the 100th anniversary of the commencement of WWI in 2014.  In addition, we stayed right near the British Library, where I had spent many hours doing research for my dissertation. This time, we checked out a second copy of the original Magna Carta (the other two are in Kew and Lincoln).

Magna Carta doesn’t stand so much in the history of democracy, per se. It’s much more about the struggle between the King and the nobles than the rights of ordinary folks, but the outcome of that struggle was the fundamental principle of limitations on monarchical power and the codification of various aspects of the rule of law.

My one theatre experience in London was “Dear England.” It’s nominally about football (soccer) and, in particular, the manager of the English national team during 2016-2024. It was pretty good.

As a historian, however, what struck me about the play and what it crystallized for me about the trip as a whole was how fixed the English are about their history. It weighs on them heavily. There’s a lot of it and they live right in the middle of it in a way quite differently from our US experience. Living up to that history—however polished/mythologized/sanitized—keeps the English overly focused on the past. As Nigel Farage has discovered, it’s fertile ground for his longer-term political angle, now expressed as “Make Britain Great Again.” This weight of the past is at the root of the struggle to get beyond the Empire, the reflexive “Little England” mentality of Brexit, the difficulty of fully integrating an increasingly diverse set of global cultures, and, in general, remembrance of past riches and glory.

The English are ahead of the pack in dealing with national decline and it’s not pretty. It’s also a useful example for the US, even as we enjoy the royal pageantry, the rural charm, the cute towns, and the castle ruins.

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Carbon Rainbow

4/25/2025

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I remain convinced that climate change is the greatest concern facing the world today, more dire than the threats to democracy or the rise of AI. Long-time readers are aware of my priority on tree-planting and other nature-based solutions (“NBS”) to the crisis. Even without the sharp reversals in policy and attitude by the current Administration, changing human behaviors and public policies (including mandatory comprehensive carbon markets) on a world-wide basis will only occur once the impact—storms, famine, heat waves—starts killing millions of people. Those focused on voluntary carbon markets are doing good work, but their scope is small and  (as we’ve seen lately in the US political contexts) voluntary corporate commitments to carbon are ephemeral and politically vulnerable.

It's a daunting prospect. Motivating people to take steps in the short-term that will only have the benefit of mitigating (not preventing) these disasters in decades to come is a challenge in any case. The many well-meaning people who “get” the climate crisis are trying to connect and energize broader swaths of the population to take steps to make a difference, but far more is needed. We need the marketing/advertising masters who have promoted our consumer culture to put their insights and inspiration to a more meaningful cause than selling dishwashing detergent or ginning up audiences for “The Real Housewives of South Podunk.” Again, I’m not talking about campaigns to change behavior (reducing power usage, recycling, etc.) or promoting legislation for carbon markets; I’m focused on means to work with nature to avoid the release of carbon or lock up more of it in the natural world around us. NBS can, by reasonably reliable estimates, handle about 1/3 of the world’s carbon problem over the next few decades and make a real difference in the world of the mid-21C.

We need to make carbon fun/engaging/interesting (or at least as fun as possible given the context). The story can’t just be scientific reports and tables of data. That’s not how you sell tortilla chips or athletic shoes and it won’t work with this tougher item. We need catchy phrases, punch lines, and (probably) some adorable creature/mascot.

As one trained in the law and in history, I claim no great skill set in this regard. However clever I might be at word-play and cultural allusions, I have no illusions about my “common touch.” But, since it’s “all hands on deck” for the climate crisis, here’s one way to think about carbon sequestration.

There is a wide range of environments in which nature can contribute to solving the carbon problem. I think of it as a “carbon rainbow.”  I got the idea from the “Blue Carbon” deals which the Nature Conservancy (and others) have done with an increasing list of small and less-developed countries in which commitments are made to preserve/extend/protect ocean and lake areas in return for a reduction/rescheduling of the country’s existing public debt load. Then I thought about the various other modes of reducing/storing carbon. The “green” leaves of trees, the “brown” of peat bogs, the “yellow” of grasslands, the “black” of coal/oil,

My initial engagement in this area was in planting trees. Several groups raised funds by offering to plant a tree for a fixed amount. I quickly noticed that the cost to plant in the US was much higher than overseas and, focused on getting the biggest carbon “bang for the buck,” I got involved with several groups in this regard. Some of them also worked with consumer-oriented businesses and offered to plant a tree if you bought a jar of their product or similar schticks. This model had the advantage of being consumer friendly—allowing ordinary folks to participate in the climate-solutions process. However, they had the disadvantage of mis-characterizing the nature of the climate solution. Trees involve much more than planting. They need to be sustained over decades and the “dollar-a-tree” model doesn’t really work. Most of these groups have moved to a less-specific model, raising funds for projects, but in less discrete bites.

So, there’s a gap. We need simple-to-understand programs to connect with ordinary folks at the “small bite” level. In the US, the “Arbor Day Foundation has been working this angle for decades, but needs a real ‘juice-up.’One idea in this regard is to adapt a program that was effective back in the 1960s: the UNICEF milk-carton program by which school kids would raise money for UNICEF by collecting small change in a small orange milk carton when we went around “trick-or-treating” at Halloween. In addition to its financial benefits, this program was quite effective at raising awareness of UNICEF with both children and adults and gave children the opportunity to participate directly in a public-service program. Today, with QR codes and “Go Fund Me” similar programs are digitized, but the underlying public awareness campaign is lacking.

As long as the solutions advanced are macro and distant from daily life and contact, it will remain easy to ignore them and let “somebody else” take care of them. We list saturated fat on all food items, why not their carbon cost as well.

Most of the effort in carbon markets has gone towards large corporations and mega, globe-spanning systems. Those would be great if there was a consensus for action by governments world-wide or even a massive upswelling of popular demand. But that is not the world we live in (even before the present retreat). In the meantime, ordinary folks need to be involved and given the opportunity to participate directly in saving the planet. I’m not sure what the right messaging is or how to combine scare tactics with some kumbaya sensibility. But there are experienced communications professionals out there who need to get us all together on this campaign.


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Babies and Bath Water

4/18/2025

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The recent flurry of lame-brained policy decisions coming out of Washington lately has given us so much to be angry about that it’s easy (and far too common) to stop thinking. If we can grit our teeth and hold on through what will likely be several more horrible years, there may be some use in imagining what a successor Administration (no, not JD Vance) might do in 2029. There is certainly a lot to reverse and repair, but not everything done by HWSNBN is horrible and amid the rubble, there’s much that can be (to coin a phrase) “built back better.”

Indeed, a positive and inspiring reframing by one or more leading democrats/progressives of what the new center left party would stand for must include a fair number of specifics that go beyond merely negating the recent GOP agenda. In addition to acknowledging that government has not been up to the challenges of the 21C, we need to articulate means of substantive improvement. These steps also need to be recast outside of the traditional/tiresome/outdated framework of progressives vs. moderates. This is a time for radical, but not utopian thinking. Limited resources (economic, environmental, and political) means that some “sacred” programs and institutions will need to change or be put on the shelf. Ditto for some constituencies (including many that scream loudly).

According to Buddhist teachings, extracting and focusing on what is true and meaningful amid the muck of the world is essential to karmic progress; captured well in the phrase “finding the jewel in the lotus.” Similar (if less profound work) lies ahead in the world of policy and politics. Trumpian bombast and malevolent MAGA/Musk-ites have produced more muck than previously conceived of, but there are still jewels to be found. We need to put our repulsion at the tactics aside and figure out how to do the important things better; not in the context of restoring the inadequate past, but in terms of facing up to the challenges of the future. Whether in terms of foreign policy or domestic administration, merely going back to business as usual won’t cut it. For all the initiatives of the Biden Administration, they were too caught up in inertia, constituency capture, and lack of vision to change the course of political culture in America. Kamala Harris didn’t have the runway, chutzpah, or vision to do so during her brief campaign. Whoever is next will have to do so.

There are several critiques of traditional US policy that underlie the current MAGA-tudes that are accurate:

* The US wastes a lot of foreign aid money.
* The US has let other “allies” get by with inadequate contributions to shared global security.
* Our domestic health policy is ineffective, overcomplicated, and way too costly.
* Our immigration policy is a hash.
* Our tax structure is a confused (and confusing) muddle.
* Our public debt levels are too high and lower interest rates would reduce the burden on the annual budget.
* We do a lousy job of educating young people for their lives as citizens and workers in the 21C.
* (your additions here)

Now, the test is whether you can agree with these points (or most of them) without falling into a rant over how the current Administration has gone about trashing things or pointing fingers in the usual “blame game.” Then, try to come up with effective solutions. The silver lining in the current mass of clouds is that it is actually easier to do so now that the previous structures/institutions are in rubble.

Winston Churchill (among others) said “never let a good crisis go to waste,” and after just a few months, we already have plenty of “good crises” to deal with. So, what to do? (Let’s imagine—just as a fantasy—that we have an Administration and a Congress willing to act promptly and boldly).

* Environmental protection, carbon markets, and real support for workers affected by the transition
* Radically simplified and progressive tax code
* Integrated medical/health security for all (Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans’ programs)
* Modern computer systems for government administration
* Rewrite the UN and NATO charters
* Treat foreign friends in a friendly way
* Put the culture wars (from both perspectives) off to the side for a while
* (your additions here)

FDR and the “hundred days” that kicked off the New Deal in 1933 is a good role model here; in part through the flood of innovative legislation, but more importantly in the sense of renewal and moral grounding that he sought to instill. He had the benefit of large Congressional majorities and widespread popular agreement that something quite different had to be done.

It’s a tall order and by no means clear that there’s the right person out there to pick up the flag. Congressional sclerosis remains a large impediment to innovation and action, but the lack of coherence in the GOP (especially in a post-Trumpian world) might augur well for surprising flexibility. (after all, the Dems aren’t in much better shape). One key will be to assure the varying pockets of anxiety and fear that their concerns are being met. Beyond the essential moral leadership and comforting, this means that many things—highly distasteful to some portions of the electorate—will need to be incorporated into the new program. It’s a democracy, after all, and that means it would be good to get more than a bare majority on board.

I suspect that the current widespread frustration with US politics and policies is one of the reasons why “cultural” issues have become such flash points, i.e., we’ve given up on substantive policy debates and public debate has been relegated to less central issues.

In returning to the central issues of why we have government, we have to avoid succumbing to fantasies of “if I were King.” It might be satisfying for a moment, but each citizen has the responsibility to be political, too. Compromise is necessary and trying to find the jewels in the current muck is a good start.

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Revolutionary Era.3

4/11/2025

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Having recently (March) completed my OLLI class on the history of revolutions and posted twice on the topic of Revolutionary Era (110824 and 010325), I wanted to address an angle omitted in the latter and which loomed ominously over my effort to focus on the history of revolutions in the course: “Are we having a revolution in the USA today?”

My regular readers will know better than to expect I will pin myself down to a clear and simple answer on this fraught topic.

The first point to be made is that it all depends on what you mean by “revolution.” For some, revolutions can only happen according to the historical/moral arc described by Karl Marx and since elaborated by Lenin and numerous others. Rooted in several aspects of the Great French Revolution (1789 and all that) and exemplified by Russia (1917), China (1949), and Cuba (1959), these sharp and dramatic events mark the assumption of power by the “people” and the construction of a socialist state for their benefit. However, scholars over the past 250 years have utilized dozens of specific definitions. I define a revolution as a conflict between two or more major domestic power groupings, leading to the forcible transfer of power over a state and resulting in significant changes in the nature or structure of the state and society. Such events need not, in my view, follow a Marxian path, or one leading to a democracy. They need not be sudden ruptures, nor is widespread violence required. Within this framework, there are a wide range of configurations of power groupings, ideas, and circumstances that have led to revolutions in the past and it’s easy to imagine more variants. I would include, for example, Iran (1979), England (1689), China (1912), among others.

There are many kinds of “big” political change that thus fall outside this definition, including protests and riots, coups d’etat, invasions, some civil wars, and foreign invasions. January 6, 2021 wasn’t a revolution (it failed). Nor would the winner of the pending civil war in Sudan (not likely to change the nature of the state and society),

Second, it is useful to distinguish between “revolutionary situations” and “revolutionary outcomes.” We obviously can’t have any sense of the “outcome” of the current political upheaval in the US; it is (as they say) “too early to tell.” We know historically that many revolutionary situations don’t produce revolutionary outcomes; the wave of uprisings in Europe in 1848 and the Arab Spring of 2011 are good examples. Generally, however, revolutionary situations are characterized by multiple contenders for control of the mechanisms of a state, each with significant support from domestic power centers, and marked by an unwillingness or inability on the part of the incumbent state/ruler to suppress the contenders.

The current situation resembles, both in terms of its style and its political vector, the situations in Italy (1922) and Germany (1933).  In both historical cases and in the US today, legal and constitutional processes were followed by which a leader was elected with a radical agenda. Historically, this was followed by that leader, using formally proper procedures, dismantling the constitutional structure of the state to a point that more extensive changes in both the constitution and laws could easily be made and, eventually, there were only marginal constraints on the power of a centralized, personality-driven state.

So, even if there are striking historical parallels, the question remains whether this counts as a revolution. In contrast to the classic examples, in Italy and Germany the violence utilized to assume control was incidental not determinative, although it was deployed as an instrument of control following the change in the state in order to ensure extensive changes in society. Similarly, the “losing” power centers had effectively surrendered prior to the broad social changes taking place. (As an aside, it’s worth noting that both Italy and Germany (as well as Japan) each underwent a modernizing “revolution from above” in the second half of the 19C.) If we can get past a rigid reliance on Marxist models of revolution, these examples fit the definition set out above.

More fundamentally, however, we can see that the definitional question doesn’t really matter (except to future historians). The impacts on our country and are world are already profound and long-lasting. Great damage has been done, not only to individuals harmed by the loss of rights, jobs, and subsidies, but to the stability of a world-view deeply embedded in our citizenry and the leaders and citizens around the world.

Now we have no way of knowing how this “revolution” will unfold or whether it will “stick.” The Great French Revolution went through half-a-dozen stages before it reverted to a monarchy under Napoleon. The Russian Revolution of 1905 looked successful—for a year or so—and then was rolled back. The uncertainty could as easily lead to a more authoritarian/populist state or anarchy for a while or a counter-revolution by progressives. Give me another decade and call me back then for an update.

Beyond all this, I take the underlying meaning of the question of whether we’re having a revolution as less a question than as an expression of anxiety. By whatever definition, we’re not used to having revolutions in the US and, while we like to strut in the revolutionary mantle of Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, and Washington et al., we’re really a pretty conservative culture. We have a hard time getting our heads around the idea that WE are susceptible to a revolution. Those who pose the question are asking for reassurance that whatever this is, it will turn out well.

On that score, I have no idea (only hope). Those who would be counter-revolutionaries would be well advised to get into gear. This is not a time for burying one’s head in the sand. The boys of 1776 recognized that they were “all in.” They pledged “their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor.” They meant it. We’re glad they did and that it turned out pretty well.

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Cuba Libre

4/4/2025

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I got back last month from a week-long jaunt to Cuba. It’s long been on my bucket list and as a warming winter break, not too far away, with some historical and cultural interest, it fit the bill (besides, who knows if the current administration will cut it off completely soon).

I traveled with a group tour for the first time in about 20 years, which provided structure, a (very) friendly group for interaction, and support (and ease of logistics). Road Scholar did a good job on the ground (although their air travel group dropped the ball on my arrangements).

Cuba was colonized by Spain for 400 years and then either formally or effectively under the thumb of the US for 60 until 1959. We’ve been at war with them since (occasionally hot, but mostly cold); marked by embargoes and isolation. Until the Soviet Union collapsed 35 years ago, a lot of support came from Moscow, but since then, Cuba has struggled pretty much on its own.

Any traveler (particularly for only a week and not speaking the language) can only dip their toe in the water of the local culture. Narratives are shaped by itinerary and guides (and preconceptions). This expedition was certainly no exception. It wasn’t a problem, but it was good to bear in mind. Road Scholar set this up as a culturally focused trip, including a cooking class, a couple of dance performances, a visit to Hemmingway’s house and fishing village, a tobacco farm, time with the famous old American cars of the 1950s, all on top of the usual sightseeing, both in Havana and the countryside. A couple of quite good lectures on the history of Cuban music and architecture also provided good grounding.

The lack of economic development, principally due to the impact of 60+ years of US economic boycott and sanctions, is a central fact of Cuban life. We imposed this mode of economic warfare at the height of the Cold War (immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis). Since then, with some relaxation under the Obama Administration, we continue to pretend that the global struggle against Communism is still underway. Cuba clearly has a socialist economy, but we avidly trade with every other erstwhile (or continuing) Communist country. We’ve gotten over the “loss” of China (1949-1972), the loss to Vietnam (1954-1991), not to mention Russia (1917-1933 and occasional and limited sanctions since then thru to the Putin era). Why pick on Cuba? Could it be that the exiles in Miami who lost their property in Cuba as a result of the 1959 Revolution are stuck in the past? Could it be that there’s no clear major domestic US beneficiary of normal economic relations to lobby for change? It’s a minor issue for us; it’s been devastating for the Cuban people.

It's a curious corner of global imperial history that those who leverage the formal and informal structures of power to their own advantage—aligning with either the imperial power or a local regime of exploitation—are often the most vehement about the loss of that power. The ex-Battista-ites (i.e., those aligned with the regime overthrown by Castro in 1959) now in South Florida are of a piece with the pieds-noir (the French who lived in Algeria and violently opposed that country’s independence) or the Brits in residence in Kenya or Rhodesia. They all stood in opposition to history’s wave of decolonization in the mid-20C. The others have faded away. But not the Cubans.

It's hard to believe that a deal cannot be struck to provide a face-saving compensation plan to those whose families’ property was confiscated by the revolutionary state in the 1960s. More complex situations—post-Holocaust, post-Soviet, or even what we took from the Brits during the Revolutionary War—have pretty much been resolved through payments, claims processing, or a gentle consignment to the mists of “ancient history.” It’s more than time to move on. There is energy and opportunity all across Cuba (although less now, since about a million people have left and gone elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere for new opportunities.

The impact of the sanctions is quite evident in Havana, a city rich in history—empire, slavery, sugar—and home to about 2M of Cuba’s 10M people. Fine colonial architecture and a few modern buildings (built either by the Russians or, more recently non-US investors) sit cheek-by-jowl with crumbling concrete. It’s a vibrant place with plenty of sites for a few days of touristing. We were well fed (one goes only to the burgeoning private restaurants and avoids the overpriced and poor quality state-run stores and eateries).  Our group was supplied with drinks at all meals—the usual range of tropical favorites—which one could get with or without “Vitamin R” (one of the many local rums). I partook regularly. Rum is my normal summer drink, so I was glad to get the chance to “taste local.” I still have (unopened) a bottle of Bacardi which my grandparents brought back from Cuba in the 1950s. Bacardi decamped to the US and Puerto Rico and has spearheaded the US sanctions regime against Cuba since.

Castro installed a “communist” regime, banning private industry, but that has long been relaxed in many sectors. Both in the capital and the countryside, small private businesses have been allowed for a couple of decades and are impressive. Road Scholar goes out of its way to feature success stories in multiple sectors. Private businesses are unconstrained by the formal currency conversion rate and US dollars are widely accepted (the de facto rate is about three times that of the formal rate, making many cash transactions (US credit cards are not allowed) a pretty good deal. Cubans have a long history of resilience—whether vis-à-vis the Spanish, local oligarchies, American sanctions, or the loss of Russian subsidies 30+ years ago, or the current nonsense of US foreign policy. They scrounge and scramble. There’s an appealing spirit and an informal motto that “nothing is impossible.” They deserve a chance to build on that spirit.

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Frames of Perspective

3/28/2025

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Having reached a ripe (not-quite-old) age, I am regularly aware of the distance from where I am now to the memories and the world of my youth. Each of us, regardless of the length of time upon which we look back, is likely quite aware of how much things have changed. Whether we mark things in terms of prices/inflation (gas for 16.9 cents/gallon), memories of sports teams (I was not worldly-conscious the last time the Lions won a football championship), or world events (JFK assassination), we all have markers of how the world was when we were young.

As a historian, it’s part of my job to look backwards—usually further back than I was alive—to see how things were back then. It’s easy to toss off references to Napoleon, or Plymouth Rock, or Plato, without fully resonating with the distance from their worlds to now. I (at least) make a mental jump back as best I can, but it’s a leap; it’s hard to connect directly, piece-by-piece with the more distant past. I have a good friend who is rather into genealogy; he can trace several lines of descent back to the 17C, plotting each generation along the way. Most of us can go back (at least in awareness, if not in actual contact) to our great-grandparents (for me, that’s the 1860s-70s), but not much further; and that’s only a tiny slice of history: one particular family tree and contemplating my own lifespan in terms of the larger development of history seems a step beyond.

How do we grasp the time spans so as to put the changes of history into perspective? How do we respect those of the past who stood in the same relation to their own past as we do to ours? It is difficult to reconstruct their mentalité. Perhaps we can get at it a bit through framing their past as we do our own.

So, here’s a few ways to look at how my lifespan stacks up.
  •  It’s been 56 years since humans landed on the Moon (1969), which was 62 years since the Wright Brothers flew at Kitty Hawk. I was 15 for the Apollo landing, my grandfather was 71, but he was 7 when the news from Kitty Hawk (eventually) made its way to Michigan’s Upper Peninsula where he grew up.
  • I was talking to some people in Nairobi recently, a bustling metropolis overrun with Kenyan population growth (almost 6 million people); hub of Eastern Africa. I worked there for a few weeks in 1981 (44 years ago, population under 1 million). Another 44 years would take us to 1937, when it was a sleepy (pre-war) colonial capital of about 100,000. For Kenyans of a certain age in 1981 (whether of African or English lineage) the move to an independent Black-led country in 1964 was still the defining event in their history. Now, fewer than 10% of the population were part of that moment.
  • We are running up to the Semiquincentennial of the Declaration of Independence (1776); 250 years before then would take us to 1526, the midst of the Protestant Reformation in Europe and not too long since Magellan’s crew returned from their inaugural round-the-world adventure. Such events were deeply embedded in the world of the “Founding Fathers”; much as the Declaration is now part of our ‘furniture.’
  • For my (recent) students (born (e.g.) in 2004), the fall of Communism (1990) was about the same period before their birth as the start of WWII (1939) was for me. These students formative years were slammed by the Great Recession, just as my parents (and theirs) faced the Great Depression of the 1930s.

The end of the Soviet Empire in Central and Southeast Europe and Central Asia also precipitated the end of the Cold War. New countries emerged from within or from under the shadow of Moscow to chart their own courses, each reflecting their own peculiar mix of domestic and global factors. Democracy has often struggled in these places with limited history of a coherent political community. Economies have adapted to the 21C style of industrialism and consumer markets. Cultures have blossomed in sharply differentiated directions.

Some of these countries were in the Russian (/Soviet) orbit for less than fifty years, some for centuries. At what stage do we consign the period of imperial control (now 34 years old) to “ancient history?” At what stage are Romanians, Uzbeks, and Estonians to be considered on their own, where they can’t plausibly blame the cold hand of Alexander II, Stalin, or Gorbachev for their condition? The same question can be asked of the dozens of countries that emerged from European domination in the middle of the 20C. Spain controlled Latin America for about three hundred years, but that was over two hundred years ago. Much of Africa was swooped up by Britain or France in the 1880s and ‘90s. They ran the shows for 70-80 years, but that, too, was now 60 or so years ago. Certainly those periods still echo today in many ways, but in terms of causation (much less blame), they are really of much less significance than the actions and attitudes of those who had no sense of those periods of formal domination. Blaming the former colonial overlords may make for good politics when things are tough, but in most cases, there’s much less there than meets the eye.

Each generation has a set of such landmarks from which they construct their own frame of reference about how the world is (or should be). They’re hard to escape. It’s useful, therefore, to remember that “objects in the mirror are closer than they appear” and to recognize that the distortions are of our own making. The “echoes” of history that each of us recall are largely a product of those particular frames that we construct.

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The Futility of Imperialism

3/21/2025

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I was joking with a friend of mine recently about the implications of a subset of the provocative rantings of HWSNBN: those related to his plans for the US to acquire (in no particular order) Greenland, Canada, the Panama Canal, and Gaza. I suggested that we lay in a stock of 54-star flags to prepare for the “Make (Greater) America Great Again” era now dawning.

Leaving aside the blustering aspects of these pronouncements as a combination of tactical posturing and generic disruption, some are asking whether this is the start of a new era of US imperialism. Having spent some time working on the ways and means of modern empires across the world, I thought it would be good to talk about why it’s a bad idea.

Let’s quickly get the moral issue out of the way. The idea of asserting control over another country for one’s own self-gratification or greed is pretty generally denounced (I was tempted to say “universally” denounced, but such sweeping statements no longer are applicable in our current cultural milieu). Empires in the modern world (predominantly European, but also including the US, Japan, China, Israel(?)) have been universally accompanied by oppression, brutality, and exploitation. There have been, to be sure, most cases, some countervailing benefits, often considerable; but I will not go down the path of trying to tote up a balance sheet on any of them. Most of the benefits have been based on all manner of self-serving rationalizations (such as the French “civilizing mission” theory). Even if we were to conclude that imperial control provided a net benefit to the colonized, we have to acknowledge that there was a lot of ‘bad’ done along the way.

When talking about empire, it’s important to distinguish between “formal” empires (where the (e.g.) British flag flew over Ireland, India, Nyasaland, and New Zealand) and “informal” empires where the country is nominally independent, but is under the influence/domination of the imperial power like the Soviet Empire in Central Europe or the US vis-à-vis South Vietnam, and much of South America from the mid-19C to mid-20C. In the present case, it seems like we’re talking about the formal kind of empire.

Formal empires don’t work in the modern world. They’re expensive to operate and defend and raise all sorts of problems and distractions. That’s part of the reason the British/French/Dutch (and, eventually, the Portuguese) got rid of theirs in the mid 20C. We’ve never quite figured out how to handle Puerto Rico (acquired from the Spanish in 1898). A fascinating study of the costs and benefits of the British Empire to Great Britain showed that it was a net wash to the homeland. (Of course, the benefits went to the commercial elites and the costs were borne by the ordinary taxpayers.)

Another reason they don’t work is that conquest is expensive and continued control is even more expensive. Especially in the fully-connected/globalized world, locals have examples and idealized versions of having a free society and don’t like being blatantly dominated/exploited, much less being forcibly incorporated into another national system. They work less and cause more trouble for the occupying power. Up to WWI, there was a theory that expanding one’s territory and population provided a rationale for conquest and control of other places. It might have worked in a pre-industrial, less educated/interconnected era. The Japanese in China (starting in the 1930s) might have been able to pull it off as might have the Germans in 1940s Central Europe; but in more modern Western Europe they didn’t get the chance since they were only there for a few years before their system crashed and there was already robust resistance.

In the last 75 years, there have been few examples of attempted international conquest, whether forcible/military or otherwise (and it’s hard to think of successful ones). Almost every military conflict during that period has been domestic/civil in nature and most international inventions have been defensive/peace-keeping in nature. Putin’s Ukraine venture might be an exception, but given the strong Russian ethnic presence in the occupied territories, the task of integrating them into Russia might be feasible. It’s not clear how the potential for China taking over Taiwan would actually work in this light. Even if the military invasion was successful, the ensuring destruction and global economic isolation would make the prospects of integration problematic (even in this intra-ethnic context). Formal peaceful transfers of territory and sovereignty are similarly scarce on the ground (leaving aside a handful of negotiated border adjustments).

In a world of nation-states, the thought of forceful integration doesn’t really fit. In a world which hungers for geopolitical stability, only outliers contemplate territorial expansion, even in much of the world (e.g. most of Latin America, Africa, and various parts of southern Asia) where territorial boundaries set up in the last round of European Imperialism were arbitrary and problematic.

Empire is almost exclusively ‘informal’ these days. The US may browbeat Canada and Mexico over tariffs, but most informal empire is much more soft-spoken and most is via the private sector’s control of jobs, investment, and culture. Our global network of military bases is pretty powerful, but not actually used much to control the hosts.

So, let’s keep the stars-and-stripes at its current count (unless we want to add Puerto Rico and DC). We are better off having the US purview “from sea to shining sea” run from the Atlantic to the Pacific and not from the Arctic across the “Gulf of America” and then on to the Mediterranean.

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Samson

3/7/2025

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Samson didn’t have orange hair. When he pulled down the temple (Judges 16: 28-30), he was, in his own way, a nihilist, believing he had little to lose and a minimal and unpleasant future.
His current disciple is not muscle-bound, although he aspires to be a strong-man (albeit of a different tenor). I don’t want to push the Biblical analogy too far; but I can see an echo in the current administration and its supporters. While there have been many analyses of their beliefs and rationales, when we look at their approach to governing, “short-termism” seems to be a plausible common characteristic. Indeed, after my recent historical look at over-the-horizon planning, a friend of mine noted that long-term thinking is pretty rare in our nation’s capital these days.

By “short-termism,” I mean not only a focus on immediate attention in the media and from other countries, companies, and political groups, but the absence of a sense of how the proposed actions—including wholesale firings of senior government employees, mass layoffs of government employees in general, termination of domestic and international financial assistance programs—appear to be inconsistent with previously-established legal principles and accepted conventions of how the country operates. I guess revolutionaries (even those on the right who might be expected to have more resonance with history) have little truck with the concept of precedent.

More importantly, this short-termism is at odds with how most Presidents have conducted themselves (albeit imperfectly). After all, one of the principal differences between “America First”-ers and traditional policies (of either party) is that the former seek only immediate benefits, while the latter take a longer view of the national interest. The premise of international humanitarianism (beyond its moral component) is that a good reputation will redound to the benefit of the US. The premise of predictability and reliability in international diplomacy is that a reputation for trustworthiness will make future dealings more successful. Similarly, domestically, a reliable presence and completing the funding of promised programs and infrastructure is an important basis of citizens’ confidence in their own government.

As a result, the implications of present behavior will extend well beyond their immediate effect on government operations and the beneficiaries of government programs. Presidential actions and attitudes have become unpredictable and destabilizing, increasing risk across the board. Even (temporary?) reversals  or court injunctions can’t prevent a fundamental loss of trust that will take years or decades to rebuild, on top of the extensive direct harm to the individuals and families affected.

Many think all of this is bad. But, those currently driving the bus do not. There are several aspects of their likely motivations and rationales that are worth considering.

1) “We will save the country and launch it on a new direction.” This is a revolutionary outlook, one which implies that the Dems will fall by the wayside; the Constitution is expendable, and that MAGA solutions will not produce longer-term problems.” In this view precedents don’t matter until the revolutionaries are well-settled into incumbency and by then, the US will be so feared internationally that we can continue on without undue cost.
2) “We don’t care what happens in the long term.” This attitude seems to prevail in the GOP leadership in Congress. I don’t think we’ve seen a senior Republican legislator (much less Executive Branch leadership) address the implications of the extensive array of newly-established precedents (among a host of other issues to which they seem intentionally asleep). Assuming (!) a salvageable political environment emerges in four years, GOP leaders will have little basis to say (if that matters) that the new Dem President is going overboard in reversing much of what is being done now. Indeed, it’s hard to imagine, if the Dems sweep to control, that they will comply with any Congressional “courtesies” and customs in their eagerness to “build back better.”

All of this assumes that the electorate is actually appalled by the practical implications of the current torrent of moves. Let’s be clear, no one (of whatever persuasion) will vote based on the wipe-out of USAID and few care about the trashing of norms and procedures. It remains to be seen what portion of the deluge is a political stunt (the domestic equivalent of “shack-and-awe”), and what portion will actually lead to problems that rile ordinary folks up (particularly those who might then vote or swing from the GOP). Offing thousands of “bureaucrats” won’t matter outside of the D.C. area where they are a significant portion of the electorate. When “hold times” get longer, when benefit applications aren’t processed, and programs that affect lots of ordinary folks grind to a halt, then perhaps—perhaps—the electoral outlook will change. In the meantime, closing down National Parks or deporting immigrants to Guantanamo is likely to piss-off the crunchies on the left far more than nature lovers and MAGA-lovers on the right.

Meanwhile, this dramatic activity enables our latter-day Samson to proclaim that he’s “taking action,” “owning the ‘libs’,” and “draining the swamp.” For those whose support for HWSNBN has been a “feelings” statement (rather than one focused on real solutions), this is quite satisfying.

However, from another “short-term” perspective, there’s no reason to think that the current deluge will have any effect on the nominal short-term concerns of the electorate: housing prices and other “inflation,” jobs, and a sense of security in the world. Indeed, tariffs and market uncertainty are likely to harm the economy in due course. If elections are about “are you better off now than four years ago?,” then there’s little on tap to help Vance, Don Jr., or whoever gets nominated brag.

Putin, Netanyahu, and Xi are another story. Marco Rubio may be a craven fool, but he’s not an idiot. I’d love to hear him talk about how the world is going to look four years hence. Say what you will about the Bush-Cheney “doctrine,” but at least it was coherent. “America First” always sounds good and, after all, who could argue with it. The problem with it as a basis for foreign policy is that it never articulates over what time frame we should put the interests of America “first.” Appeasement and retaliatory trade policy are viscerally satisfying, but the hangovers in the real world (in the morning after or the decade after) are always more painful and expensive than taking the short-term hit that its advocates usually say they are trying to avoid.

Samson didn’t care about the morning after. His orange-haired successor doesn’t seem to either (noisy trolling about a third term notwithstanding)

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Genes and Memes

2/28/2025

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Genes and Memes

Well before the cis-/trans/assigned at birth issues became culturally central, personal identification by “national” origin/affiliation was an essential part of the modern global culture that arose across the 19/20C. While this frame of reference was often originally cast in terms of “race,” the meaning of that word has changed over time (we no longer talk about the Scottish “race” for example). That etymological shift was part of the nominal ‘scientification’ of race in the late 19C in which “Caucasian,” “Negro,” and “Asiatic” groups were assigned immutable characteristics and thus, the enabled the rationales for all manner of discriminatory/oppressive behavior, both across empires and within countries. Emerging sociological analyses talked about “national character” which was partially a continuation of the “race” discourse and partially a way to put a scientific gloss on discriminatory treatment.

In parallel, the concept of the “nation” as an ethno-linguistic grouping emerged and became the touchstone for ideas of political organization; initially across Europe, then globally. While this undoubtedly provided a “waystation” for highly localized cultures to deal with the globalizing world, the freezing of identity at the national level eventually led to any number of horrible developments across the 20C and has continued to animate politics in the 21C, with prospects paralleling those of the 20th. Internationalism and its sibling cosmopolitanism were earnest efforts, but almost always secondary to nationalism, even among the elites. For most folks, a national perspective was about as far as they could comprehend.

Despite the proclamations by politicians and group leaders in almost every country in the world, (thundering on about “blood-ties” or “[fill-in-the-blank] – ness)” the key point about national identity is that it is—in almost all cases—a construct of human culture. Just as evolutionary science has undermined the notions of separate black/white/yellow/red/brown “races,” so to do we have to recognize that—biologically—there are no “Irish,” “Arabs,” “Germans,” etc. (much less national identities in Africa and much of Asia (where chiefdoms and other local groups were either split or mashed together by European imperial line-drawing), South America (where chiefdoms and other local groups were overrun by Iberian invaders and interbred with them and imported African slaves).

Americans are, of course, mongrels. As are the Brits (German, French, Norse, Celts, later joined by a variety of imperial imports) and, in fact, almost everyone else. We have known this at an anecdotal level for some time, but now we are on the cusp of leveraging evolutionary genetics to make this clear at a scientific level. Specifically, the emerging specialty of paleogenomics studies the DNA of anthropologically-discovered ancient humans and creates lines of descent between extinct and modern populations. So far, it has undermined the bright line we all learned in school as between Neanderthals and Homo Sapiens and provided more direct evidence about ancient migration patterns that heretofore were the (somewhat) speculative province of paleolinguists (those who track cultural changes through the evolution of language (e.g. Indo-European roots of Modern English).

The most interesting work is still to come, with the ability to trace the migration of very ancient and relative recent peoples (e.g. Mongols, Huns, Goths, Norse) I suspect it will become clearer that the differences between modern Germans and modern French are relatively recent and thin. Ditto for Russians and Ukrainians, Bosniaks and Serbs, Iraqis and Iranians, etc.

Historians will thus have a new arrow in their quiver to puncture populist oversimplifications. It’s a tough sell. The Musk-eteer barging around Europe telling Germans that they have “too much of a focus on past guilt,” Putin is showing a dab hand at recharacterizing the national identity of Ukrainians, and nationalist/populists across the continent are eagerly omitting any mention of the complexities of their own national history. Here in the US, the rush to vocational training and underfunding of universities is making it difficult to get young people to wrestle with the messy stories of the past and various politicians are trying to legislate their version of the “truth.” Other “truths” (or at least equally plausible stories) are (as Al Gore said 19 years ago (!)) “inconvenient.” What happened in the first part of the 20C is not necessarily “repeating itself” these days, but it does look to be rhyming on multiple syllables.

As I suggested a few weeks ago, our modern world has gotten stuck in the first wave of institutionalization, of which national identity is a key component. The challenges raised by social sciences and humanities to this social self-construct have—so far—proved insufficient to turn the tide. It remains to be seen whether the addition of evidence from the “hard” sciences that will show in detail the similarity of so-called national identities will change minds.

Nationalism as a principal means of self-identification arose in the 19C under the pressures of globalization which showed the inadequacy of localities as a foundation for self. Concurrently, other modes-especially religion—were eroding. Thinking of oneself as Hanoverian or as Catholic no longer sufficed. Now, (with the exception of some Muslims, Hindus and Evangelicals) religion provides even less of an anchor to navigate a world beset with 24/7 global communication, instant translation, and culture that is increasingly indistinct. It took decades (centuries?) for nationalism to establish itself and the current transition—in which nationalism is the traditional and soon to be outmoded frame of reference—will not be any faster or less bloody.

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Over the Horizon

2/21/2025

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The onset of the new Administration presents a scary prospect for many: 1430 more days where well-embedded norms of morality, law, and order are likely to be regularly upset with dire consequences for many. The climate crisis will likely have much deeper and longer-term negative consequences. As a result, it’s not surprising that many are “hunkering down,” hoping to wait it out, emerge “après le deluge,” and restart their lives. As a historian, I was curious how people looked at the future the last time such a deluge loomed and I looked at a few angles from the late 1930s and early 1940s as war unfolded across Asia and Europe.

There was resistance, of course, and appeasement/hand-wringing.  Many in both camps did not survive to have much of a future. In terms of those who envisioned or planned for a postwar world, historians have access only to those whose written records survive which skews the sample upon which I will base a few observations.

* Post-cataclysm planning can only occur once survival is assured and there is some optimism of emerging in the aftermath. Until then, it’s hard to have the confidence necessary to posit what things will be like “over the horizon.” With limited exceptions, until the tides turned in 1942/43 from a military perspective (Coral Sea, Stalingrad, El Alamein) there didn’t seem much point.
* In the U.S. while there was some serious consideration in the State Department of what the “post-war” world would look like (starting in 1939). This project looked mostly at global issues and structures, eventually morphing into the plans for the UN and related international organizations that emerged in 1944-45.  This effort was inspired by the recognized failures of the post-WWI Versailles process. Indeed, one notable aspect of the planning effort was the degree to which it was really just an extension of pre-war concerns and beliefs; there wasn’t much in the way of bold new thinking.
* Planning included serious scenarios for “what if the Germans win.” By the time Hitler invaded France (May, 1940) however, it became clear that early assessments based on a more limited war were outdated. By the end of 1942, the press of operational and shorter-term issues overwhelmed the attention of those who were trying to look further out.
* In both the US and Britain, another motivation for the planning was the desire to be able to present a post-war vision that would inspire both soldiers and the home front to make the sacrifices necessary during the war. So, to some degree, the plans made served a domestic propaganda purpose as well as helping senior officials think about what might emerge. This may well have skewed the visions/plans developed in the process.
* “Post-war” planning in the US had a different tenor than that in other countries. We never faced an existential threat, so there was no question of having to start anew. Rather, recognizing that the War wrought significant changes, issues of domestic policy (e.g., race, housing) were considered as modifications of pre-existing practices. In the UK, survival was the sole focus through 1942 when several initiatives began to look at the nature of Britain after the War. The Beveridge Report of that year was the most notable and was the template for the postwar welfare state.
* Governments-in-exile (mostly European and based in London) similarly concentrated on the war effort initially. Later, their post-war planning (for both their home countries and their global imperial holdings) were pretty much premised on the restoration of the status quo ante. Until later in the war, there seems to have been little in the way of focused attention on how their occupied societies would change (and need to change) after the Axis powers were ousted.
* “Planning” was much less of a ‘thing’ back then. Especially in governments (but also in larger private sector institutions), the extensive apparatus and tool kit of strategic thinking and foreshadowing the future was sparse on the ground. The attention to organized planning didn’t gain much traction until after the War.
* As with almost all long-term planning projects, the reality turned out far different from what was on paper. There was never a return to “normalcy.” Restarting societies after the war was principally a matter of relief and repair which gradually morphed into a new status quo. After the USSR joined the Allied effort (mid-1941), it was assumed that they would be part of the postwar international order. Indeed, some have argued that considerable concessions were made (e.g. European boundaries) to try to keep them “in the game.” Of course, by late in the war, the prospect of continued contention between the US/UK and Soviet Union seriously dimmed those prospects.

Eighty-some years later, what perspectives can we gain as we try to muster the energy/fortitude/optimism to see the world of 2029?

1. It’s much too early to tell what the world will look like. Getting beyond platitudes and general philosophy will likely turn out to be futile.
2. Much of the effort will be about repair and recovery.  There is more than enough anxiety about the challenges of the next few years to make it especially difficult to entertain radical/innovative changes for the longer-term future.
3. Long-term planning is as much about supporting morale during the immediate struggle as it is about what will actually happen.
4. No one (other than a sliver of academics) cares about what the losers were planning.



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    Condemned to Repeat It --
    Musings on history, society, and the world.

    I don't actually agree with Santayana's famous quote, but this is my contribution to my version of it: "Anyone who hears Santayana's quote is condemned to repeat it."

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