Condemned to Repeat It

Going for Broke

11/14/2025

The recent US government shut down echoes the ongoing political crisis in France over its Parliament’s inability to agree on a budget for the country as just the latest manifestations of a fundamental problem with government, governability, and the endemic short-termism of modern western culture. Virtually every major Western government has been facing similar crises over the past decade. Our own situation here in the US is worse, even if we’re more devious in our means of ducking the problem.

This chart gives a rough picture of how public debt levels in the major Western countries (US, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Canada) have changed since the turn of the 20C. If you “normalize” out the spikes caused by WWI and WWII, you can see that debt levels increased only marginally across the 20C. This is remarkable in itself given the significant changes in the nature and scope of governmental activities (esp. the rise of the “welfare state”) during that period.

Since then, things have gotten much worse. It’s not just the demands of the particular challenges of the Great Recession (fifteen years ago) or of COVID (five years ago), although they have certainly contributed to the problem. Rather, it reflects some real problems in terms of how governments raise and spend money. There are several (overlapping) contributing factors:
* Political short-termism – Politicians have rarely met a bullet they were willing to bite. No one wants to raise taxes, everybody wants to feed at the government trough. The implications of not investing today will be the problems of the next generation (by which time the current gang will be retired and forgotten, but in the meantime, they will have sipped and supped with power).
* Intergenerational theft – This is often unintentional, but no less damaging. The responsibility (blame?) lies most heavily on the Boomer generation who grew up in an era of expanding governmental support programs (health care and pensions in particular) which had been funded by the expanding economies of the late 20C. The burden falls on the younger, less powerful (and less likely to vote) generations. Now, with demographic changes, there are relatively fewer younger folks and the older recipients won’t let go of their entitlements.
* Bad accounting -- Dodgy calculations (retirement, health care, inflation), and a refusal to save up for infrastructure depreciation will eventually come due.
* Oligarchical domination of governments – This shows up principally in innumerable tax-reduction schemes and regressive structures that—while rationalized by all sorts of (well-lobbied) arguments about investment and property “rights”—mainly benefit the top few percent of the wealthy in each country who have disproportionate political power.
* Bourgeois entitlements – This is another way of characterizing the benefit programs and tax schemes (“middle class” tax breaks) that are embedded in the system and are accordingly difficult to retrieve without a great “hue-and-cry” about embedded expectations. As Ronald Reagan said of the Panama Canal: “We stole it fair and square.”

Of course, the problem of government overspending is hardly a new one. History is littered with the bankruptcies of great powers and the French inability to come to terms with their debt accumulation was a significant cause of the crisis that led to the Great Revolution of 1789. Spain and France (the leading powers of the 16-18C) each defaulted more than a half-dozen times during that period. Indeed, one of the key aspects of the rise of British power to replace them during the 18C was its ability to manage its debt (both in terms of spending and financing). The pattern waned in the 19C, although lesser powers (e.g. Portugal and especially Argentina (much in the news lately, too) became notoriously unreliable. In the 20C, there were fewer formal defaults (if you leave aside the wholesale flushing out of the finances of Russia by the new Soviet regime in 1918 and Germany, Italy, and Japan in the aftermath of WWII).

Despite the pie-in-the-sky claims of an AI-generated spurt of productivity, the situation going forward is actually pretty bleak. Aging populations will suck up lots of cash for retirement and health care. Roads and bridges will need to be repaired. A less stable/secure world will demand more expenditures for military modernization. Not to mention climate repair/mitigation. Fewer workers per retiree (especially as we slash immigration) means that we’re running out of places to find cash for the government costs.

The likely outcome will be a combination of politically unpalatable steps. There will be much screaming and hand-wringing, but (even in this age of mythical thinking) numbers need to add up. Capping or cutting social benefits, increasing taxes, and, seemingly inevitably, an extended bout of non-trivial inflation, lie ahead. Much of this will cut along class lines, leading to a significant economic “populism” movement. We’re seeing the first steps along those lines now, the recent tax and expenditure moves will soon (within the next two years) start to bite. So, we will have an early indicator of whether those adversely affected will mobilize to protect the social safety net by demanding an increase in taxes. Everyone will be affected by inflation, although those most well off will face the biggest impact on the relative value of their accumulated wealth.

Politically, this won’t be pretty. The desultory skirmishing over the government shut down will seem trivial. Lots of folks will be getting pretty angry and increasing numbers will radicalize. The hollowing out of the middle-class will make the premises of democracy less tenable. The combination will make the fears of political philosophers from Plato and Aristotle onwards—the perennial tension between the masses and the well-off--more tangible. It will be remarkable if the body politic can come through this with a new balance of power, money, and justice.

Maybe we should require all elected officials to pass mathematics and accounting exams and cut their pay and benefits if their numbers don’t add up.

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On Gates and Climate

11/7/2025

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On Gates and Climate

Last week, Bill Gates published a statement on climate change and the broad direction of national and global policies aimed at improving the lives of people around the world. It was timed to affect the imminent annual global meeting on our dire environment; a fraught process that already faces fresh headwinds due to political retrenchment by the US and others. While I only have a small fraction of Gates' readership (and a much, much smaller fraction of his resources to apply towards these concerns), I think it’s important to address what he said (and not what politicians and the mass media said about what he said). Here are his three punchlines:

“Climate change is a serious problem, but it will not be the end of civilization.” [Well, that’s nice to know. Nuclear war, biological agents (intentional or accidental) haven’t ended civilization either …yet. By the same token, malaria and starvation in poor tropical countries won’t end civilization either. Climate change will, however, likely kill millions in the meantime and vastly disrupt the lives of virtually everyone else. For the former, their civilization WILL end; and for those whose lives will only be marginally affected (i.e. the well-off), what kind of “civilization,” morally, will be left?]
“Temperature is not the best way to measure our progress on climate.” [Even if this is true, it’s a simple and easy to understand standard for the millions of folks who will need to pay attention. Public support and engagement is an essential part of addressing the problem.]
“Health and prosperity are the best defense against climate change.” [Dead corals and other collapsing ecosystems may not find much protection here. Even if this were just about humans, many climate impacts don’t care about net worth and nutrition. The need for improved global health stands on its own. Figuring out what prosperity means on a global basis is another issue altogether; getting everyone in the Global South up to OECD levels of living standards would be equitable, but would vastly increase the drain on the planet.]

I cannot, of course, challenge any of the facts that he cites. But there’s a lot of opinion mixed in with his facts and no small amount of selectivity in the facts he chooses to highlight. My concerns are more with his assumptions and the way he frames the issues than his particular positions.

Concern #1 –Short-term perspective: It takes a long time to alter planetary climate. We humans have been at it aggressively for several hundred years, particularly in the last century. It’s virtually impossible to see how we could get back to 1950 climate levels within a century and ecosystems around the world (e.g. icecaps or coral reefs) may never recover even if temperature increases are reversed.

Gates is concerned about people living now, especially those in poverty or subsistence lifestyles; but they, and the rest of us, will be living for a while and will do so increasingly in a world adversely affected by climate change. We also need to consider those who might live on this planet later in this century or the next, with climates running 2-3º (best case) above “normal.” In other words, if we don’t start fixing it now, it will never get better. Deterring action, as Gates implicitly argues for, will mean more folks will have problems longer.

Concern #2—Naivité about how public awareness and public policy change over time: The modern environmental movement is about 50-70 years old. It was pretty much on the fringe for the first several decades and has only been a serious force domestically and globally for 30-40 years. As the science has gotten better, the public debates have gotten more serious and meaningful, but despite the efforts of the more outré groups (e.g. Greenpeace, Climate Extinction), most folks don’t pay attention and the ranks of climate deniers (not least the current Administration) remain robust. Until we start to do enough, we need to continue to make noise and push changes in policy and behavior.

Gates is aware that his statement will be used against climate activists (the orange-haired tweeter said the next day that Gates statement means that: “I won the war against the climate change hoax.”) I have to ask whether fortifying an administration that has little interest in either climate issues or improving the health and well-being of the millions of folks that Gates claims are his priority was useful.

In addition, as a practical matter, climate impacts on those individuals and countries which have more resources to do something about it are more likely to garner attention and resources that benefit everyone, even in the face of inadequate focus on improving global health and welfare generally.

Concern #3 –A false dichotomy about the choices we face: Gates says we should measure our policies and allocate resources against a broad standard of improving “human welfare,” rather than “partitioning it off for particular causes.” Well, of course. But that begs the question of how best to achieve improved human welfare and then how to allocate resources to each effort. Global health and welfare are underfunded. Climate is underfunded. Pitting them against each other isn’t helpful, nor does it reflect the underlying problem of economic inequality (at both the individual and global levels).

Concern #4—Techno/capitalistic-optimism: Improvements in technology, whether in health, agriculture, or energy production and usage will make things better across the board to be sure. Real progress is being made. But changing attitudes and behaviors, especially about humans exploiting the planet and pretending that there are no consequences, remain the necessary root source of real solutions. Eliminating malaria and generating food surpluses will increase that exploitation, especially given the population projections for Africa. Smart investors will certainly make money along the way, but this is a different kind of challenge for humanity and doubling-down on modernity will end poorly.

In sum, however accurate his facts and well-meaning his intent, Gates’ memo is politically ham-handed, unlikely to increase the resource allocation to the good causes he supports, and likely to make it easy for climate deniers and climate ignorers to blithely carry on. Not good.

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A Party Incubator

10/31/2025

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Almost five years ago (111320), I pointed out the charade of our two political parties (the Dems being only marginally better off than the GOP) and called for a reformulation of the structure of our partisan system. The Biden interregnum—focused as it was on being more anti-Trump than something innovative—did little to stop the deflation and distraction of the Democrats. Their reaction to the loss last year has been aimless and incoherent and is reflected in dire drops in popular support (both voter registrations and fund-raising). The Republicans, while organizationally stronger, have wholly gone over to the cult of personality and nihilism.

So, I observed with considerable interest the announcement last July of the establishment of the America Party. Now, the principal sponsor of this new organization is none other than the inimitable Elon Musk, whose outsized personality ensures attention to any of his proposals. His remarkable business success (PayPal, Tesla, Starlink, SpaceX, X (nee Twitter), Boring Company, etc.) has lately been overshadowed by his bizarre dabbling in government reorganization (DOGE). Still, he has been the country’s most successful serial entrepreneur and even if his political nous is spotty, he has a track record for start-ups. The America party may, however, be stillborn. In August, Musk indicated that he was refocusing on the ailments at Tesla (he’s hardly been in the press for months); and it’s not clear whether the party will ever get off the ground. Given Musk’s substantive policy predilections, however, this may not be a great loss to our political culture.

At the time I wondered whether any number of more center-left billionaires would similarly sponsor a new party (Bloomberg?, Soros?). Fund raising would not be a problem, and expertise can be quickly hired (of course substantive political leadership is much harder to find and any likely standard-bearer would likely be wary of being seen as a hired shill).

Perhaps a more promising approach could be getting a bunch of such folks to each chip in (say, $100M each) into a party incubator. We would need 6-10 folks with different political views or who had no particular political profile to ensure that the funds would not come with any particular agenda attached.

The project would be overseen by a set of perceptive worthies from across the political spectrum who would be charged with spinning off three or four new partisan entities. Instead of our current donkey and elephant symbolism, we could have an eagle, whale, bison, and salmon (or some such). Groups of polticos would pitch their ideologies/platforms/organizational capabilities to this panel who would choose the most coherent and capable to contest future elections. Given our current selection, we need to repopulate civil society and reboot our political culture.

This approach would accelerate the development of a new political culture in this country. Multiple entities would reframe the issues facing the country, provide platforms for new potential leaders, and garner lots of attention. They would be well funded and not tied to any current organization or ideology or personality.

It would be a radical re-set for the country. There is a long history of popular interest in independent candidates and “third” parties in this country. However, efforts over the past few decades (John Anderson (1980), Ross Perot/Reform Party (1992/96/2000), Ralph Nader (2000/04) have mostly been vehicles for individuals. Most fringe parties (e.g. Libertarian, Peace and Freedom) have been based on marginal ideologies and have thus had to struggle for funding.

Incubators have popped up all over as places to spur the development of technology projects, sometimes in academe, sometimes as vehicles for venture capitalists. Philanthropies use them, too, to help nascent non-profits get off the ground. In this sense, politics may not be so different as a field of activity. Bringing together money, mentors, dreamers, and doers without a sanctioned or pre-conceived set of policies or philosophies is a different way to think about moving past our current decimated political landscape.

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Kill all the Historians

10/24/2025

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In Henry IV (Part II), one of those planning to overthrow the incumbent royal dynasty says: “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.” It’s a line we attorneys have frequently heard since we were in law school. Usually offered as a derogatory remark, it misconstrues Shakespeare’s sense that lawyers were, in fact, laudable champions of order, whose disposal would pave the way for revolution.

It’s hard to know what the Bard would write about our own parlous times. The current administration clearly doesn’t want to get rid of all the lawyers. After several years of foaming about the Dems “weaponizing” the law, the current incumbents are offering a master class in how to do so. They clearly want at least some lawyers to validate their own interpretations of all sorts of laws. And, as some law firms have demonstrated, there are plenty who (even if not fully fallen to the dark side) have been willing to make Faustian bargains. It seems likely, after all, that we will have plenty of lawyers for years to come.

Nonetheless, Dick the Butcher (Shakespeare’s character)’s sentiment would seem well applicable to my second profession. Whether in terms of attacks on universities in general, or planning to promote only “patriotic history” (according to a recent proposal from the rump Department of Education), or willfully ignoring inconvenient historical facts (foreign or domestic), or trimming the booklists at your local public library, History is under attack as never before.

Regular readers of this blog are familiar with my critiques of the History discipline, so I won’t rehearse them here. After all, those shortcomings all fall within the category of venial sins and the critiques were intended to promote a more robust engagement with the complexity of our pasts. The current onslaught is more severe and Orwellian.

History, as the saying goes, is “written by the victors” and has been a tool of state power for millennia. The rise of a professional discipline in the 19C, working toward producing “accurate” descriptions of the past has thus been a counter-vailing trend, which flourished in the 20C; an important branch of the “speak truth to power” school of public engagement. History has also been part of the modern project of recognizing and dealing with the complexity of life. Indeed, one of my grad school professors constantly challenged us to “complicate” the stories we were exploring and explaining.

There are virtues in simplicity and the versions of history that are told in elementary schools are necessarily more cursory than those in high school (a fortiori, in college). It is a sign of intellectual maturity to be able to hold conflicting interpretations and perspectives in one’s head simultaneously. It’s difficult to square the call to only offer “patriotic” history with such aspirations, but perhaps it’s only fitting for an Administration whose members often seem to be stuck in sixth grade and who generally seem to prefer mythology. As Jack Nicholson’s character says in “A Few Good Men” they “can’t handle the truth.”

We can see this not only in terms of the specific policies and budget moves towards History (slashing NEH and public broadcasting budgets, rewriting the signage in National Parks), but also in the renaming of the Defense Department, recalling the halcyon days of the “War” Department when America won all its wars (and was right (dammit!) to do so), soldiers were soldiers, and men were men. In its eagerness to be anti-“woke”, the Administration is planning a broad return to the “good old days” when only white male lives mattered. Military bases; names are once again named in honor of Confederate Generals (whose patriotism did not fully extend to the United States of America), not to mention the likely plans to haul various Confederate statues out of storage. The “hit list” (so far) of senior government officials includes the Archivist of the United States, most of the leadership of the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Librarian of Congress.

Beyond the political level, the discipline is in disarray and ill-prepared to defend itself. Universities caving into Administration pressures provide little cover for those who wish to “speak truth to power” and stand up for their version of history and, more importantly, for the possibility of multiple interpretations. Drops in enrollment generally and evaporating endowment of small liberal-arts colleges (on top of the disorientation of dealing with AI) have demoralized academic Historians across the country. If there’s relatively little protest about the gutting of health care, you can be sure that “History Forever” will not be the battle cry of a mass-movement Resistance.

Almost five years ago, in the context of the first impeachment trial, I noted that the final appeal was not to the legal courts, but to History. This assessment is especially important if (at least) some of the lawyers are “killed” (at least metaphorically). It also highlights the importance of a diverse and vibrant community of Historians to argue over the interpretations of the past and engage youth and citizens in considering their own place in history. In contrast to the (mercifully) relatively incompetent first term, this time around, they seemed to have learned to move against this fallback line of defense as well.

In doing so, the Administration and its fellow-travelers demonstrate their own short-sightedness. They think theirs is the final act and that the pendulum will not swing back in due course (even if not soon enough for many). If I were to overstep my role as a Historian and enter into a prophecy, I might say that “History will come back.” Instead, I will merely point out that it always has so far.

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Baltic States

10/17/2025

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Baltic States

No, not the Balkans. I’m talking Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (with honorable mention for Finland). As a traveler and as a Historian of Modern Europe, I had a big gap for this corner of the Afro-Eurasian continent that’s now (after a 12-day sojourn) patched (if not fully explored).

Big countries get all the press—in both History and current affairs. The political crisis in France the past few weeks has gotten far more coverage than the conflicts within the government in Lithuania, for example. Little countries (and the three Baltic States all qualify, with a combined population of about six million) get squeezed in between big powers, a situation often to their geopolitical detriment. The Baltics have been caught between Russians and Germans (and the Swedes in the 16-18C) ever since they were dragged into Christendom in the 13-14C. It hasn’t been pleasant and since the rise of European nationalism in the 19C, they each have bristled under the domination of their bigger brethren.

When the Russian Empire collapsed under the twin blows of WWI and Lenin’s Revolution, they bolted for independence, only to be swept up by Stalin in 1940, Hitler in 1941, and Stalin again in 1944. It’s no wonder they were first out the door when the USSR collapsed in 1991. Each asserted that they were reviving their independence from early in the 20C. The Museum of the Occupation in Riga (Latvia) stacks these eras together in a powerful story of modern independence in the face of oppression.

It's also no wonder that they jumped into the arms of the European Union and NATO in 2004 as the best protector both of modern democratic norms and of military defense. The number of NATO flags flown in all corners of the three countries was remarkable and shows that these folks know what’s really important. Even more than the NATO and EU flags, the Ukrainian flag was everywhere. As fellow-sufferers of Russian aggressiveness, the Baltics are strongly committed to support Ukraine morally as well as financially. In both Latvia and Lithuania, they have renamed the street on which the Russian Embassy sits as the “Street of Ukrainian Freedom” and anti-Russian protests are an ongoing feature. Significant Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia make them uncomfortably similar to Ukraine as targets of Putin’s efforts to reconstruct the Russian Empire.

Beyond their geopolitical situation, it's important to recall that while we may lump the three countries together, there are sharp differences between them in history, culture, and language; although local animosities and rivalries seem to be suppressed. None of the three languages is mutually intelligible and none has any significant connection to their European neighbors. Estonian is closest to Finnish and Hungarian, but Latvian and Lithuanian are their own branch of the linguistic tree. Fortunately (and, again, typical of small countries) everyone in the big cities speaks multiple foreign languages with English being ubiquitous. Lithuania is predominantly Catholic (tied to their close relationship with Poland for several hundred years (16-18C). Latvia is mostly Lutheran, and Estonia is a mixed bag of post-religious, Lutheran and Eastern Orthodox.

Lithuania was a major power in its own right in the Middle Ages. It was the largest country in Europe in the 15C, famously stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea (far more important than the contemporaneous Henry VIII of England who gets vastly more press). It is now, of course, just a shadow of its former expanse (only about 7%). The Grand Dukes were remarkably religiously tolerant then and, among other groups, Jews flourished, becoming a significant portion of the population before Russia took over in the 18C. Russia confined Jews mostly to that territory (called the “Pale of Settlement”) and, of course, the population of Jews was almost eliminated during the Holocaust. There are moving memorials and museums to this lost culture in each country. Latvia and Estonia never grew beyond their own neighborhood. Instead, their principal ports: Tallinn and Riga were key parts of the Hanseatic League, a Baltic-focused association of trading cities from the era (13-17C) before modern nation-states became the dominant form of political organization.

As former Soviet territories, they emerged in the early 1990s far behind Western Europe in terms of economic development, but have made considerable strides since then, especially in Lithuania and Estonia, not far from Spain in GDP per capita, leaving Russia far in their wake. They cling to their traditional culture even as they increasingly shift towards comprehensive European integration. While Wi-Fi is everywhere, Estonia is notable for its commitment to digitalization, especially of governmental processes. Each has its own sets of castles (mostly from the Middle Ages) and palaces (a couple of Versailles wanna-be’s). Tallinn has a well-preserved medieval old city, Riga has a lovely Art Nouveau quarter, and Vilnius has some older buildings as well, but comes across much more as a bustling modern European capital.

History, as I have repeatedly said, doesn’t hold many specific lessons for current events; there’s too many differences in contexts. Nonetheless, given the current febrile political environment and the dark outlook we all face on several fronts, there is inspiration to be found in the example of the Baltics. They’ve been occupied for most of the last five hundred years. They have suffered—culturally and economically—far more than what we in the modern West are used to. Still, they persevered and, eventually, triumphed. In each of the three countries, they look back with pride not only on their uniqueness, but also how they banded together in 1988 to create a human chain of more than 2 million people stretching from Tallinn to Riga to Vilnius to demonstrate a shared commitment to their independence and hope for freedom. They were likely as surprised as most that it came to fruition so quickly, when the Soviet empire collapsed in 1991, but they showed that dark times are not all end times. The event is called “The Baltic Way.”

Overall, I had a successful trip. It was a good reminder that one of the benefits of travel is seeing the diversity of people in places, even (especially?) in parts of the world that we think are broadly familiar. There is diversity and pride in culture and history in every corner of the world and, in an important sense, everywhere is a corner.

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The Number of Nines

10/11/2025

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There is an ongoing (and seemingly perpetual) debate between historians and social scientists over the purpose, feasibility, and value of each others’ work and discipline. As a historian, I am “true to my school,” and can easily poke holes in the premises and theories of social scientists. At the same time, I am alive to the conflicts, limitations, and overreaching of my fellows.

Social scientists critique historians by saying that the latter fail to advance human understanding, that the mere chronicling of human events might well be interesting and their stories might be engrossing, but that without theories and models, we have no way of evaluating behavior and come to an understanding of how and why people do what they did (and do). Historians might respond that their work often (usually) incorporates social science theories (e.g., the will to power/domination, the importance of community compliance and acceptance, or the economic value of personal fashion). Historians would also stress 1) that such theories only go so far in explaining historical actions, 2) that there is so much that is unknown about human motivation, and 3) that there is so much contingency in human events; that theories aren’t, in the end, worth very much.

Historians’ critique of social scientists builds off these points. They emphasize that theories and models may have all sorts of mathematical elegance, but for all their complex calculations, they are still crude approximations of behavior. For example, extensive studies have been made of the correlates of war as social scientists seek to understand what causes such conflicts. Historians remain dubious (to put it mildly) of such efforts, pointing out the significant difficulties of defining what is meant by war (and its various theoretical causes), not to mention the limited number of cases of war in human history, each of which has so much distinctive context as to make them incommensurable.

A central component of social scientists’ defense of their approach is that they are at least trying to derive meaning from the sprawl of human experience. They emphasize that—as social scientists—they a pursuing an ever-greater approximation of an accurate depiction of the nature and practice of humanity. It is no accident (and here both groups agree) that “science” is part of the rubric of this set of disciplines. The methodologies and language used by social scientists—including experimentation, testing hypotheses, and statistical analyses—are all grounded in the “hard” sciences. Their aspiration is to replicate the amazing success of physics, chemistry, and biology over the past half-millennium only, this time, in terms of understanding economic behavior, voting patterns, and social structures.

The value of science lies in its production of knowledge that enables us to predict how nature will work in the future. By “nature” here, I mean all manner of ‘things:’ blood vessels, comets, and the addition of a liter of nitric acid to five kilograms of granite. Science, however theoretical or “pure,” is not merely about understanding stuff; historically; it has to lead—eventually—to our ability to interact with nature in the future. The success of science historically can be seen in the extent to which we as a species have gained confidence that we can predict this aspect of the future: the apple that fell from a tree onto Newton’s head gives me confidence that I could determine (with appropriate testing of the tree and stem, combined with an evaluation of the wind) when the apple that sits over my head will fall on me or how, with appropriate design, the ceiling that sits over my head will NOT fall on it. The “scientific revolution” of the 16-18C is a short-hand description of not only the process of gathering such knowledge, but, more importantly, the dramatic boost in human confidence in the understanding, management, and predictability of nature.

Science has leveraged mathematics to foster this sense of confidence and to accommodate its incompleteness (science inherently being a “work in progress”). We can’t be entirely sure that some rogue asteroid won’t hit our planet, but we can speak of a 99.9999% degree of confidence. This is close enough to “true” that we can thereby get on with our lives. This (apparent) precision is an inestimable part of creating the appearance of accuracy as a source of trust.

Few parts of the social sciences can aspire to this kind of precision, much less this degree of approximation of ultimate accuracy. There are too many variants and vagaries in human psychology to support it and there are too many contingencies in the future course of events to enable predictability. Stated simply, social scientists necessarily produce fewer “9s” than their “hard” science counterparts (I will, of course, grant that there are no bright lines here (for example, between physiology and psychology).) What social scientists can produce at best are plausibilites, likelihoods, and indications as to whether Amazon Prime Day prices will result in larger sales volumes, or recent diplomatic gestures regarding Palestine will cause Israel to moderate its attacks.

Academic social scientists at least insert some number of caveats into their work, even if these often don’t make it into the popular press reports or these same academics when they become talking heads on TV or the Net. Applied social scientists (by which I mean the vast majority of white-collar jobs such as business managers or other bureaucrats, salespeople, educators (including history teachers), or therapists) were either never aware that they don’t know exactly what they’re talking about or have forgotten it.

As I have repeatedly remarked, historians are also at risk of forgetting the necessary caveats in their work or, worse, of forgetting that our knowledge of the past (or as close as we can get to it) provides no more basis for predicting future behavior than for any other profession. Generally, however, we avoid even talking about such precision or accuracy. In other words, we don’t even claim any “9s”

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The 20th Century

9/26/2025

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The 20th century has been defined by profound ideological struggles in international relations; a multi-act drama between communism, fascism, and liberal democratic capitalism, ultimately concluding with the latter’s triumph. Here’s how I look at all this:

World War I
- WWI was a turning point that "drove Europe off the cliff," leading to the exhaustion of European elites and the disintegration of their worldview of progress. It eviscerated the romanticized view of technology, power, and culture, and highlighted the fragility of what had been built.
- The war undermined European self-confidence and exposed the financial and psychological strain on imperial governments, increasing awareness among colonial populations of their exploitation for imperial purposes.
- The barbarity of the war shattered European claims to cultural superiority that had justified their "civilizing mission" in Asia and Africa. Propaganda efforts during WWI attempted to portray the "Hun" as evil and the attack on Belgium as a "rape," with Wilsonian rhetoric framing the conflict as a crusade for democracy; Wilson was quite racist and Belgium had been “raping” the Congo for decades.
- Despite arguments from figures like Ivan Bloch about the economic irrationality of inter-European war due to increasing interdependence, these warnings were dismissed, contributing to the war's outbreak. The war's end saw the demise of four empires—German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman—and was fought in the older terms of "liberal democracies" versus "stale monarchies".

World War II
WWII has been "easily cast in stark Manichean terms" of good versus evil. This was largely due to the "manifest crimes" committed by the Axis powers and the effective propaganda campaigns by the Allies. This dichotomy included racist stereotypes against the Japanese.
Echoing the collapse of 1914, the onset of WWII demonstrated that "progress" is not linear, as few in 1925 or 1935 predicted the scale of the conflict to come.
From a strategic standpoint, WWII was largely won by air and naval forces, logistics, and supply chain interruptions, rather than solely by ground battles. The destruction of German factories and Japanese supply lines proved more decisive than famous ground engagements. The Soviet Union, through the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943, played an indispensable role in terms of sacrifice, firepower, and strategic impact on the Eastern Front, which marked a major turning point in the European war.
Post-WWII planning in the US began early, recognizing the failures of the post-WWI Versailles process and leading to the development of international organizations like the UN. These plans often served domestic propaganda purposes and, while seeking a new status quo, reality often diverged from the initial paper plans.

The Cold War
- The Cold War is deeply "drenched in ideology and existential animosity," primarily between the US and the Soviet Union, amplified by the looming threat of nuclear annihilation.
- The "realpolitik" approach of figures like Henry Kissinger was shaped by a strong anti-communist stance.
- While characterized by less direct military engagement between the superpowers, the Cold War maintained a high level of military and economic competition. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, attributed to its "internal contradictions" and the inability of a bureaucratic economy to match capitalist dynamism, marked the end of this ideological struggle and led to Francis Fukuyama's proclamation of the "end of history".

International Relations and the Nature of War
- The conceptualization of the individual and ideas of international cooperation, emerging from the 19th century, have played a global role, influencing concepts like human rights. "Soft power," derived from mass media and public opinion, gains motivational force, compelling countries to at least pay "lip service" to ideals like democracy and morality. However, this "moral capital" can easily be spent or lost, as seen with Israel and South Africa.
- The Realist school of international relations posits that power (military and economic) is paramount, with morality and ideologies being secondary or inconsequential in state behavior. Despite claims of moral high ground, external perspectives often reveal the conflicts, compromises, and shortcomings inherent in the exercise of power.
- Formal empires, characterized by direct territorial control, are expensive and problematic in the modern, globalized world, leading to their decline in the mid-20th century. Informal empires, which exercise economic and cultural influence without direct territorial rule, have largely replaced them. The US has a long history of informal economic and cultural imperialism.
- The concept of the nation-state, rooted in ethnic/cultural coherence and territoriality, gained prominence in the 19th century as a "waystation" against globalization, but its "fetishization" has led to instability and oppression of minorities in the 20th and 21st centuries.
- The nature and practice of warfare has evolved over millennia and continues in new directions. Economic sanctions and cyber attacks are new forms of coercion that blur the line of what constitutes "war". Still, war, particularly in its industrialized and bureaucratic forms, often makes no rational economic sense and can be triggered by a form of "national insanity". Western powers often decry atrocities committed by others but fail to intervene due to their own historical inaction or guilt, or limitations on their ability to effect change.

Historical assessments of wars are dynamic and depend on when they are made, with judgments changing over time and influenced by contemporary concerns. Historians strive to interpret events without present-day values, but acknowledging the limits of "truth" and causation in historical analysis is crucial. Historical analogies, while common, are often of limited value for predicting future events due to unique contexts and contingencies.

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The Climate Crisis

9/26/2025

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Climate change is the greatest existential concern facing the world today, potentially more dire than threats to democracy or the rise of Artificial Intelligence. It is an unprecedented emergency whose medium-term impacts (20-50 years) are likely to dwarf all other disasters faced by humanity over the past 5,000 years combined, including wars and pandemics. I am pessimistic about humanity's ability to cope with this challenge, highlighting deep-seated societal and political impediments.

The Nature and Urgency of the Climate Crisis

Climate change is an "existential crisis". Its physical manifestations include storms, heat waves, droughts, and mass migrations, which are projected to lead to millions of deaths and widespread global distress. The impact on vulnerable populations, such as small island nations at risk of permanent immersion due to rising sea levels, is particularly severe, questioning their very existence as territorial states.
Our current course (even before the latest round of back-tracking presents an "irreversible risk." Waiting another decade to act will only result in longer and deeper damage, leading to millions more deaths.
Despite increasing awareness, the public consciousness of the problem's scale remains weak. The severity is often dismissed or denied due to psychological barriers, political motivations, and short-term thinking.

Challenges to Addressing Climate Change

Human Nature and Inertia:
- Many intelligent people reject the idea of man-made climate change due to cognitive dissonance with its implications or a psychological need for a simpler, more manageable reality. This denial is akin to vaccine rejection or "stop-the-steal" sentiments.
- There is considerable inertia in human social change. People are generally lazy when it comes to disrupting deeply ingrained habits of overconsumption and entitlement, and only take action when threats become dire and immediate, and "body-counts start mounting".
- Societies, especially wealthy ones, are often geared towards immediate economic gains and material accumulation, making it difficult to prioritize long-term, abstract threats like climate change.

Political Dysfunction and Ungovernability:
- At a national level, most major democracies suffer from a "general crisis of ungovernability," characterized by political gridlock, lack of leadership, and an inability to implement radical, outside-the-box thinking. Governments are seen as unable to mobilize action at the necessary scale and pace. The US political system, with its split government and congressional sclerosis, is particularly highlighted as an impediment.
- At a global level, international political systems are likewise unable to foster effective solutions. The current UN structure, for example, is critiqued for its dysfunction and lack of cohesion among leading members. American leadership in global climate efforts is indispensable, but will be absent at least for the next several years. The idea of spontaneous global coordination is a "pipe-dream".
- The nation-state model, while the "fundamental mode of global political organization," often prioritizes national "honor" and sovereignty over collective global action. Nationalist opposition can override efforts to address global issues like climate.

Economic Systems and Fixation on Growth:
- Modern capitalism is a significant driver of the climate predicament due to its foundational premises of private property and markets and an epistemology centered on economics where "morals are secondary to money".
- The economic system has historically ignored the "real costs" of environmental degradation, such as clean air and water, treating them as "externalities". This flaw persists, with politicians who champion markets often opposing market-based solutions for carbon.
- Part of the problem is due to our "fixation on growth” (often a substitute for compassion and justice).

The "Moral Hazard" Argument:
- This argument, applied to climate change, suggests that implementing solutions like geoengineering, renewable energy or carbon capture reduces the incentive for people to make fundamental behavioral changes.
- I reject this approach, since it's based on an unrealistic "hope in human enlightenment" that lacks historical precedent. Instead, incremental progress and technological solutions should be embraced as they provide crucial transition time, and cutting them off preemptively would be the "real moral hazard".

Interconnections with Other Global and Societal Issues
- New migratory diasporas caused by climate change put pressure on existing social and political structures, potentially leading to new disputes and challenging traditional notions of territoriality.
- The stark evidence of economic and social inequality, both within and between countries, undermines the place of moral arguments and highlights that the benefits of modern capitalism have disproportionately flowed to some, while others bear the costs. Rich countries are reluctant to provide "meaningful cash" for climate solutions, while poorer countries are disproportionately affected.
- Public understanding of science is undercut by "delusional leadership" and media sensationalism, contributing to climate denial. The "scientific method" is based on tentative findings and constant revision, which is difficult for the public to grasp, and often leads to a preference for simpler, comforting narratives or conspiracy theories over complex scientific truths.
- There are parallels between the current climate crisis and past historical events, such as Europe's appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s or the national response to COVID-19, Societies rarely get ahead of strategic challenges until they become dire and immediate.

Potential Solutions and Outlook
- Radical Solutions: Incremental changes are insufficient given the crisis, we need "radical remedies" and "fundamental changes" to economic and cultural patterns. Alternately, we might strategically pause current climate efforts to conserve energy and funding for when the world is "readier to actually do something," focusing immediate policy efforts on entities already willing to act and designing implementable policy structures. This involves a "triage" of global issues, prioritizing existential threats over "merely godawful" ones.
- Despite these dire projections, despair is not a necessary outcome. Humanity has historically shown resilience and an ability to reconstruct after disasters. Individuals need to "fortify [ourselves] and figure out what is really essential" to cope with the overwhelming nature of the modern world.

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Democracy and Governance

9/19/2025

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Democracy and governance are central to contemporary global and societal issues, yet simultaneously facing profound, interconnected challenges. The system is under immense strain, characterized by dysfunction, inertia, and a fundamental mismatch between its current structures and the scale of modern problems.

The "state" as the crystallization of its society's power structure. Its purpose, in modern democratic theory, is to enable citizens to pursue "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness". This involves acknowledging and valuing a shared communal life, or "res publica" (Latin for "the public thing"), which is distinct from individual private interests and represents the common good. The separation of public and private interests is seen as essential for a republic governed by the rule of law.

Democracy is an aspirational ideal, where political power resides with "the people" and relies on an informed and engaged electorate. However, historical practice has always fallen short of its theory, initially excluding vast segments of the population (women, slaves, property-less men). Progress towards full democracy has been incremental, chipping away at formal and practical impediments over centuries.

There are numerous threats and impediments to effective democracy and governance:

Political Dysfunction and Ungovernability:
- Most major democracies, particularly the US, are afflicted by a "general crisis of ungovernability," characterized by political gridlock, lack of leadership, and an inability to implement necessary, often radical, changes. Congress is noted for its "sclerosis" and inability to act on minute legislative matters, let alone major issues.
- Governmental institutions are often "stuck," with outdated statutes and regulations persisting without review or updating, and bureaucracies becoming inefficient and resistant to adaptation.

There is a "fundamental lack of leadership, vision, and radical/outside-the-box thinking" at all levels, from global to personal. Political leaders often focus on short-term gains and are unwilling to address complex realities.
Erosion of Public Trust and Engagement:
- Many young people, and the populace broadly, express deep disconnection and disenchantment with how government works, viewing it as ineffective, susceptible to corruption, and captive of elites.
- The commitment to truth in modern Western culture is facing "distinctive challenges". "Delusional leadership," media sensationalism, and the instantaneous spread of information via social media accelerate the pace of distribution while reducing critical reaction time, leading to "epistemological silos" and a preference for comforting narratives over complex truths.
- Public discourse is often driven by "feelings" rather than facts or rational solutions, exacerbated by media sensationalism.
Economic and Social Inequalities:
- Modern capitalism, with its focus on private property, markets, and profit, has "leveraged the perennial human foible of greed" and often operates amorally, neglecting the "real costs" of environmental degradation and exacerbating wealth disparities.
- The "maintenance (expansion?) of privilege and wealth seems to drive much domestic and international policy-making," often at the expense of children, the poor, and future generations.
Structural Flaws in Democratic Systems:
- The US system is particularly problematic, with concerns about the Electoral College, the anti-democratic configuration of the Senate (equal representation for vastly different populations), and the difficulty of constitutional reform.
- Courts sometimes intervene in political issues, or conversely, enabling political branches to avoid difficult decisions, leading to frustration and disengagement.
- The adversarial nature of politics, where opponents are treated as enemies, contributes to social peril and makes compromise difficult.
The Weight of the Past: Societies can be "overly focused on the past," using historical claims (even centuries-old) to justify current geopolitical actions or to avoid dealing with present realities. The "lessons of history" are often misapplied or simplistic, giving a false sense of predictability.

Interconnections with Global and Societal Issues

Democracy and governance are not isolated problems but are deeply interwoven with other major global challenges:

Climate Change: Explicitly named as the "greatest existential concern" and an "unprecedented emergency" whose medium-term impacts will "dwarf all other disasters". The inability of political systems, particularly in the US and other major democracies, to make "fundamental long-term changes in our economy and culture" to address climate change is a product of the challenges noted above and a cause of increasing disenchantment with government, especially among the young.
Nationalism and Globalism: The nation-state model, while the "fundamental mode of global political organization," often prioritizes national sovereignty and "honor" over collective global action, hindering solutions for trans-national issues like climate change or trade. The rise of nationalism and "populist" leaders are a regression from broader cosmopolitan ideals.
Technological Advancement: While offering benefits, technologies like AI and social media exacerbate societal problems by accelerating information overload, facilitating misinformation, and potentially leading to "psychological coherence" disruptions.
Migration and Displacement: New diasporas, partly caused by climate change, challenge traditional territoriality and put pressure on existing social and political structures.
Children and Future Generations: The current situation is particularly acute for children, highlighting a societal failure to prioritize their well-being despite amassed wealth.
Truth and Science: Public understanding of science is undercut by "delusional leadership" and media sensationalism, contributing to climate denial and hindering rational discourse. The inherent tentativeness of scientific truth conflicts with a public desire for simple answers.

Outlook and Potential Pathways

Thus, there’s plenty of reasons to be pessimistic about the immediate future, with historical parallels suggesting societies rarely get ahead of strategic challenges until they become "dire and immediate". However, despair is not the only option.

Incremental solutions are insufficient, we need "radical remedies" and "fundamental changes" to economic and cultural patterns.
We need to rethink the state model and explore alternatives beyond the nation-state, such as localized governance units or updated "trusteeship" models for "failed states".
Proposals like the "Mission for America" advocate for a comprehensive, integrated approach to the climate crisis by restructuring the US economy.
Given limited resources, we need a "triage" approach, prioritizing existential threats like climate change, AI, and nuclear/biological disasters over "merely godawful" problems like specific civil wars or tax code unfairness.
At a personal level, the overwhelming nature of the modern world necessitates "fortifying oneself," managing media consumption, engaging meaningfully with others, and tamping down excessive "appetites".
History, despite its dark periods, also shows humanity's capacity for reconstruction and that things can eventually "settle down" after periods of turmoil. We may hold a long-term hope that "the arc of the universe" bends towards justice, even if it runs into the wall of eco/capitalistic/technological catastrophe first.

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The State of States

9/19/2025

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How we organize ourselves as political communities remains an essential concern, whether from a historical perspective or in terms of current affairs. Border disputes and failed states are critical and interconnected aspects of contemporary international relations, deeply rooted in historical developments and influenced by evolving concepts of sovereignty, nationalism, and global power dynamics.

Border Disputes in International Relations

Historical Roots and the Rise of Territoriality: The concept of a precisely defined national border is a relatively recent development in international relations. Prior to the 17th and 19th centuries, especially in Europe, boundaries were often "kind of squishy," and allegiances were more fragmented. The emergence of the modern nation-state was driven by factors such as the decline of feudalism, the rise of nationalism (based on ethno-linguistic groups), and advancements in surveying and mapmaking. These factors were exported by Europeans as part of their imperial gaze and in the way that they defined the international system for the (relatively small) group of countries which remained outside of imperial orbits. This led to an increased emphasis on territoriality, the idea of exclusive jurisdiction over a defined landmass. While this "fetishization" of the nation-state provided a "waystation" against globalization pressures, it has also frequently resulted in instability, rigidity, and the oppression of minorities in the 20th and 21st centuries.
The Enduring Legacy of Colonialism: A significant source of modern border disputes is the legacy of European imperialism. During the 18th and 19th centuries, imperial powers often drew arbitrary "straight lines on a map in some Chancery in St. Petersburg, London or Berlin" with "little thought given to any sense of social or economic or geographic sensibility; much less to any cultural traditions of the peoples who had lived in those lands for centuries." Following decolonization, particularly in Latin America (early 19th century) and Africa (mid-20th century), newly independent countries largely accepted these inherited imperial lines. This was a "conscious decision... to avoid the complexity and conflicts inherent in revisiting those old lines," which, while contributing to stability by "forgetting the past," also laid the groundwork for ongoing problems. Many current African political crises, for example, stem from disputes between traditional groups forced to coexist within (and often split by) these externally imposed boundaries.
Nationalism and Identity as Core Drivers: Nationalism is a powerful force, often transforming into a "reactionary ideology" in the 20th and 21st centuries, fueling border disputes. Claims to territory are frequently rooted in "a national mythology" (e.g., China's historical self-perception as the "Middle Kingdom"). Political leaders often exploit foreign "enemies" or territorial claims to generate "rousing nationalistic politics," deflecting from domestic insecurity. The "othering" of groups perceived as different from a core national identity, often based on constructed notions of "race" or "nation," provides a mechanism for explaining disruption and uncertainty, which can "turn ugly on a global scale". Assertions of national "honor" can escalate to military conflict, as seen in the Falklands War. Even historical claims, sometimes "thousands of years old," are often "more a reflection of the modern (human?) tendency to seek validation from the past (instead of dealing with the current 'facts on the ground')". The sources suggest that accepting the status quo of existing boundaries and "consigning the past to the past is likely the better course" for geopolitical stability, as efforts to rectify historical wrongs often prove counterproductive.

Examples and Dynamics of Modern Border Disputes:

China's territorial claims against small Bhutan in the Himalayas and in the South China Sea (against Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines) are mostly bluster used for domestic nationalistic politics or leverage.
Venezuela's drum-beating over Guyanese territory is similarly a distraction from internal issues.
The Falklands War in the 1980s and low-level conflicts between China and India since the 1960s illustrate how such disputes can "spiral out of control” into actual military conflict.
Kashmir (India and Pakistan) and Jerusalem (Israel, Jordan, Palestine) are "live and dangerous disputes". The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, relies heavily on competing historical claims and narratives, despite the "historical dubiousness" of some aspects. The idea of a coherent "Palestinian" nationhood prior to 1948 is doubtful, it's a "derivative and negative case" exacerbated by the geographic split between Gaza and the West Bank. A "three-state solution" (Gaza, West Bank, and Israel) is a potential path forward, moving beyond historical arguments.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine is framed within Vladimir Putin's "highly-selective and often-distorted view of history," claiming that "Russians and Ukrainians... all actually one people". This aggression is complicated by the Taiwan analogy, as Chinese endorsement of Russia's actions would set a precedent for US involvement in supporting Taiwan, which China seeks to avoid.
Northern Ireland's border illustrates how Brexit's "insistence on formal sovereignty" has resurrected complex issues, forcing a choice between an economic border with the Republic of Ireland (and the EU) or maintaining the UK's territorial integrity at the cost of social stability in the North. The Good Friday Agreement had made Northern Ireland effectively a "British-Irish condominium," where a clean demarcation was never truly possible.
Greenland's potential independence raises questions about micro-states with very small populations (<60,000) and their ability to function internationally, often relying on subsidies from former colonial powers like Denmark or payments from military bases. The current US administration's recent rumblings about annexation or buying Greenland highlights continued (though informal) imperialistic tendencies.
The US's historical "longing northward" to "grab Canada" through formal annexation has largely been replaced by "informal economic and cultural imperialism," although recent US rhetoric has taken a "more hostile than familial tone."

International Law and Evolving Territoriality: The modern international system, established since the 17th-century Peace of Westphalia, is "premised on territorial control," meaning a country cannot exist without exclusive control over some land. States are "increasingly jealous of their status" and wary of relaxing standards. However, the "very idea of territoriality as the premise of a governance regime/state is coming under increased pressure." Phenomena like diasporas (due to wars or climate change) and global integration through telecommunications/internet capabilities mean that the link between land and jurisdiction "means much less than a century ago". The plight of micro-states, particularly small island nations threatened by climate change, highlights the impracticality of the traditional model, raising questions about whether a country can exist without territory or how "permanent" a government-in-exile can be.

Failed States in International Relations

Definition and Characteristics of Failed States: A "failed state" is characterized by severe existential problems such as lawlessness, social collapse, and humanitarian crises, often involving civil war. Fundamentally, a state is defined as "the crystallization of the power structure of a society, institutionalized to preserve order (domestic and internationally) and to keep itself in operation." It typically aspires to a "monopoly of legitimate violence". A state is considered "failed" if it "can’t do at least its core job," evidenced by extended civil war or being invaded/taken over. States that were created and stabilized before World War II tend to be more coherent because the state is "embedded in a more-or-less established and coherent political society" with sufficient "social 'glue'." Many states fail because there is "no coherent community which the state can represent."

Causes of State Failure: A primary reason for state failure, particularly in post-colonial contexts, is that states were often formed with artificially drawn boundaries and had "relatively little time to accomplish social integration" compared to European nations that took centuries to coalesce. Western "nation building" efforts are often criticized for their culturally-blindered view, expecting other societies to adopt Western models within short timeframes, which is unrealistic given that true integration takes centuries, not decades. Furthermore, a lack of deep national community and democratic practice can lead to pervasive corruption and political instability.

Examples of Failed or Struggling States: The sources list several contemporary examples of failed or struggling states:

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Syria have experienced revolutions, reaching some form of climax, though their long-term stability is uncertain.
Venezuela, Sudan, and Myanmar have ongoing revolutionary struggles.
A broader list includes Haiti, Sudan, Palestine, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, northwestern Myanmar, Kurdistan, Iraq, and many minute island countries in the Caribbean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific.
Cuba has struggled economically since the collapse of the Soviet Union, largely due to a long-standing US economic embargo and isolation, despite its socialist economy.

Proposed Remedies and Broader Context: Addressing failed states requires moving "beyond the critiques to actually thrashing around new concepts and frameworks". This includes reconsidering the traditional notions of sovereignty and independence and perhaps reviving an updated version of the "trusteeship" model, inspired by the UN's 1947 program and the League of Nations' "mandate" system. Under this model, affected territories would temporarily "surrender their 'sovereignty' for a period to gain some stability" and undergo a process leading to restored independence and improved living conditions. This approach would challenge "accepted myths of the modern global political system" like continuous political progress and self-determination. Key to its success would be ensuring a direct voice for the affected peoples through supervised elections and strong UN sanction for external and internal support. For micro-states, "laying low, sticking with the (generally friendly and good-natured) Danes" (as in the case of Greenland) might be preferable to seeking full independence, given their functional and financial dependencies.

In the larger context of international relations, both border disputes and failed states underscore the challenges to the traditional state system. While formal empires have largely declined due to their expense and complexity, they have been replaced by informal empires exerting economic and cultural influence, such as the US's historical informal imperialism towards Canada. The modern international system, based on territorial control, faces pressure from new phenomena like diasporas and global telecommunications, which diminish the significance of rigid land-based jurisdictions. Despite these pressures and the acknowledged problems, the nation-state remains the "fundamental mode of global political organization", and efforts towards a truly global democracy with population-weighted voting remain a "distant idealistic dream".

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Going for Broke

On Gates and Climate

A Party Incubator

Kill all the Historians

Baltic States

The Number of Nines

The 20th Century

The Climate Crisis

Democracy and Governance

The State of States

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