Rudderless

When we look at Early Modern Europe, principally in the 17/18C, we can see the roots of many critical aspects of the modern world. Two of the most significant were the emergence of capitalism and the rise of the coherent, bureaucratic “State.” While each of these has many material/ on-the-ground components and practices, they also reflect the development of ideas and conceptions which have continued (and morphed) down to the 21C. In particular, they both represent means by which human activity could be organized outside of the previously existing moral structure of society. Indeed, each developed distinctive and self-perpetuating rationales for their claims to human attention and loyalty that were, more-or-less consciously, amoral. This untethering has allowed for each of these institutions to develop prodigiously, but there has been a considerable cost and only part of the bill has yet been paid.

As noted by Albert Hirschman (see “The Passions and the Interests”), a key part of the rationale of capitalism was that provided a means of social organization that broke away from the destructive sectarian conflicts of the 16/17C which followed the Protestant Reformation in Europe. Focusing on economic “interests” facilitated commerce, regardless of the beliefs (“passions”) of the merchants involved. The nominal rationality of those “interests” was also consistent with the mentality emerging out of the “scientific revolution” of the same period.

At the same time, the theorists of a distinctive, permanent “State” (even if not yet rooted in democratic nationalism), who also rejected religious-tinged morality as the basis of governmental action (Machiavelli is key here), were on a parallel path. The doctrine of “raison d’etat” enabled those in power to base their actions (both domestically and internationally) without regard to Christian compassion, but on the self-perpetuation of the State.

With some centuries of momentum behind them, both capitalism (profit) and the State seem to have acquired some degree of self-perpetuating rationalization; apologists for each claim that their continuation is an important goal in and of themselves, outweighing the costs of that preservation. We can see this in the rise of the national security state in many countries around the world, as well as the vast amount of intellectual and financial resources devoted to corporate profitability (and lower taxes!).

Despite Adam Smith’s championing of moral sentiments (often lost in the shadows of “The Wealth of Nations”), various resurgences of Christian/religious beliefs, and the claims for “social justice” (especially from the political left), the hoped-for constraints of morality on the acts of states and business enterprises have largely evaporated leaving these principal parts of human societies adrift. Relatively recent initiatives (i.e., late 20C), such as the promotion of “human rights” and democracy as the basis for international relations or “ESG” and “DEI” in the corporate world, notwithstanding. Indeed, the current repositioning of both US domestic and international policy under HWSNBN shows that this hard-nosed stance is very much alive, despite decades of the US claiming to “don” (sorry!) moral clothing globally.

More broadly, the stark evidence of economic and social inequality so visible both within individual societies and on an international/comparative basis, speaks volumes as to the tenuous place of moral arguments in our world. Maintenance (expansion?) of privilege and wealth seems to drive much domestic and international policy-making, both here and elsewhere. The aspiration—dating from the 17C—that America should be a shining city on a hill and an example for all finds no place in the current rhetoric.

The risks of this course have hardly gone unnoticed. There is a long line of cultural, religious, aesthetic, and social thinkers who have sought to warn the “West” of its moral peril. Many of these arguments have been rooted in the preservation of the past (conservatives), a disconnect with nature, or a disconnect with humanity (romantics). Actual policies and practices, too, have swung back and forth showing varying degrees of awareness of this challenge. Among the most notable is the critique that arose in the aftermath of the two “World Wars” of the 20C, particularly the rabid destructiveness of Nazi Germany. These arguments stressed that modernity has gone too far in its focus on untethered rationality.

Many philosophers have struggled to find a moral anchor for modernity, once Christianity was dethroned by schism, deism, and rationality; especially since non-Western belief systems have had limited purchase. Without an “author” (i.e. God), it’s difficult to have authority; and, given the vagaries of human nature, there seems to be little firm ground upon which to build an ethical edifice.

It is the human condition to struggle for meaning. Christian nationalists (an oxymoron!) inherently offer little of universal appeal, the Roman Church, too, is saddled with history and scandal, non-Western sources are too much on the defensive against modernity to spark a new formulation.  Musk-ean profit is simple and superficially attractive, as is national tribalism; but the former is out of reach for all but a few and the latter rings hollow and superficial in a well-melded and interconnected world.

I have asked in the past whether modernity was “worth it,” but I certainly don’t advocate returning to the 15C.  The resolution is not clear. If I’m looking for a response rooted in something other than morality, perhaps I’ll ask ChatGPT for the answer.