The onset of the new Administration presents a scary prospect for many: 1430 more days where well-embedded norms of morality, law, and order are likely to be regularly upset with dire consequences for many. The climate crisis will likely have much deeper and longer-term negative consequences. As a result, it’s not surprising that many are “hunkering down,” hoping to wait it out, emerge “après le deluge,” and restart their lives. As a historian, I was curious how people looked at the future the last time such a deluge loomed and I looked at a few angles from the late 1930s and early 1940s as war unfolded across Asia and Europe.
There was resistance, of course, and appeasement/hand-wringing. Many in both camps did not survive to have much of a future. In terms of those who envisioned or planned for a postwar world, historians have access only to those whose written records survive which skews the sample upon which I will base a few observations.
* Post-cataclysm planning can only occur once survival is assured and there is some optimism of emerging in the aftermath. Until then, it’s hard to have the confidence necessary to posit what things will be like “over the horizon.” With limited exceptions, until the tides turned in 1942/43 from a military perspective (Coral Sea, Stalingrad, El Alamein) there didn’t seem much point.
* In the U.S. while there was some serious consideration in the State Department of what the “post-war” world would look like (starting in 1939). This project looked mostly at global issues and structures, eventually morphing into the plans for the UN and related international organizations that emerged in 1944-45. This effort was inspired by the recognized failures of the post-WWI Versailles process. Indeed, one notable aspect of the planning effort was the degree to which it was really just an extension of pre-war concerns and beliefs; there wasn’t much in the way of bold new thinking.
* Planning included serious scenarios for “what if the Germans win.” By the time Hitler invaded France (May, 1940) however, it became clear that early assessments based on a more limited war were outdated. By the end of 1942, the press of operational and shorter-term issues overwhelmed the attention of those who were trying to look further out.
* In both the US and Britain, another motivation for the planning was the desire to be able to present a post-war vision that would inspire both soldiers and the home front to make the sacrifices necessary during the war. So, to some degree, the plans made served a domestic propaganda purpose as well as helping senior officials think about what might emerge. This may well have skewed the visions/plans developed in the process.
* “Post-war” planning in the US had a different tenor than that in other countries. We never faced an existential threat, so there was no question of having to start anew. Rather, recognizing that the War wrought significant changes, issues of domestic policy (e.g., race, housing) were considered as modifications of pre-existing practices. In the UK, survival was the sole focus through 1942 when several initiatives began to look at the nature of Britain after the War. The Beveridge Report of that year was the most notable and was the template for the postwar welfare state.
* Governments-in-exile (mostly European and based in London) similarly concentrated on the war effort initially. Later, their post-war planning (for both their home countries and their global imperial holdings) were pretty much premised on the restoration of the status quo ante. Until later in the war, there seems to have been little in the way of focused attention on how their occupied societies would change (and need to change) after the Axis powers were ousted.
* “Planning” was much less of a ‘thing’ back then. Especially in governments (but also in larger private sector institutions), the extensive apparatus and tool kit of strategic thinking and foreshadowing the future was sparse on the ground. The attention to organized planning didn’t gain much traction until after the War.
* As with almost all long-term planning projects, the reality turned out far different from what was on paper. There was never a return to “normalcy.” Restarting societies after the war was principally a matter of relief and repair which gradually morphed into a new status quo. After the USSR joined the Allied effort (mid-1941), it was assumed that they would be part of the postwar international order. Indeed, some have argued that considerable concessions were made (e.g. European boundaries) to try to keep them “in the game.” Of course, by late in the war, the prospect of continued contention between the US/UK and Soviet Union seriously dimmed those prospects.
Eighty-some years later, what perspectives can we gain as we try to muster the energy/fortitude/optimism to see the world of 2029?
1. It’s much too early to tell what the world will look like. Getting beyond platitudes and general philosophy will likely turn out to be futile.
2. Much of the effort will be about repair and recovery. There is more than enough anxiety about the challenges of the next few years to make it especially difficult to entertain radical/innovative changes for the longer-term future.
3. Long-term planning is as much about supporting morale during the immediate struggle as it is about what will actually happen.
4. No one (other than a sliver of academics) cares about what the losers were planning.
There was resistance, of course, and appeasement/hand-wringing. Many in both camps did not survive to have much of a future. In terms of those who envisioned or planned for a postwar world, historians have access only to those whose written records survive which skews the sample upon which I will base a few observations.
* Post-cataclysm planning can only occur once survival is assured and there is some optimism of emerging in the aftermath. Until then, it’s hard to have the confidence necessary to posit what things will be like “over the horizon.” With limited exceptions, until the tides turned in 1942/43 from a military perspective (Coral Sea, Stalingrad, El Alamein) there didn’t seem much point.
* In the U.S. while there was some serious consideration in the State Department of what the “post-war” world would look like (starting in 1939). This project looked mostly at global issues and structures, eventually morphing into the plans for the UN and related international organizations that emerged in 1944-45. This effort was inspired by the recognized failures of the post-WWI Versailles process. Indeed, one notable aspect of the planning effort was the degree to which it was really just an extension of pre-war concerns and beliefs; there wasn’t much in the way of bold new thinking.
* Planning included serious scenarios for “what if the Germans win.” By the time Hitler invaded France (May, 1940) however, it became clear that early assessments based on a more limited war were outdated. By the end of 1942, the press of operational and shorter-term issues overwhelmed the attention of those who were trying to look further out.
* In both the US and Britain, another motivation for the planning was the desire to be able to present a post-war vision that would inspire both soldiers and the home front to make the sacrifices necessary during the war. So, to some degree, the plans made served a domestic propaganda purpose as well as helping senior officials think about what might emerge. This may well have skewed the visions/plans developed in the process.
* “Post-war” planning in the US had a different tenor than that in other countries. We never faced an existential threat, so there was no question of having to start anew. Rather, recognizing that the War wrought significant changes, issues of domestic policy (e.g., race, housing) were considered as modifications of pre-existing practices. In the UK, survival was the sole focus through 1942 when several initiatives began to look at the nature of Britain after the War. The Beveridge Report of that year was the most notable and was the template for the postwar welfare state.
* Governments-in-exile (mostly European and based in London) similarly concentrated on the war effort initially. Later, their post-war planning (for both their home countries and their global imperial holdings) were pretty much premised on the restoration of the status quo ante. Until later in the war, there seems to have been little in the way of focused attention on how their occupied societies would change (and need to change) after the Axis powers were ousted.
* “Planning” was much less of a ‘thing’ back then. Especially in governments (but also in larger private sector institutions), the extensive apparatus and tool kit of strategic thinking and foreshadowing the future was sparse on the ground. The attention to organized planning didn’t gain much traction until after the War.
* As with almost all long-term planning projects, the reality turned out far different from what was on paper. There was never a return to “normalcy.” Restarting societies after the war was principally a matter of relief and repair which gradually morphed into a new status quo. After the USSR joined the Allied effort (mid-1941), it was assumed that they would be part of the postwar international order. Indeed, some have argued that considerable concessions were made (e.g. European boundaries) to try to keep them “in the game.” Of course, by late in the war, the prospect of continued contention between the US/UK and Soviet Union seriously dimmed those prospects.
Eighty-some years later, what perspectives can we gain as we try to muster the energy/fortitude/optimism to see the world of 2029?
1. It’s much too early to tell what the world will look like. Getting beyond platitudes and general philosophy will likely turn out to be futile.
2. Much of the effort will be about repair and recovery. There is more than enough anxiety about the challenges of the next few years to make it especially difficult to entertain radical/innovative changes for the longer-term future.
3. Long-term planning is as much about supporting morale during the immediate struggle as it is about what will actually happen.
4. No one (other than a sliver of academics) cares about what the losers were planning.
RSS Feed