Aficionados of international finance are familiar with the so-called “trilemma” which states that a country cannot simultaneously fix its currency exchange rates, have an internationally open financial system, and maintain an independent monetary policy. I’m not going to go into the details here; but it’s an example of the conflict among conflicting policy goals that is increasingly prevalent (or at least our awareness of these conflicts is growing) in the 21C.
I think there’s parallel trilemma out there, one that will loom larger in the public imagination than the obscurities of econometric analysis. It has to do with long-term demographic trends, economic growth, and national control of borders/immigration. It’s a particular problem for those who claim the mantle of “populists,” (a label of dubious and varied meaning), with adherents not only here in the US, but also India, Russia, and most other countries in Europe. (I’m deliberately not using the traditional “left/right” framework to talk political alignments since they’re increasingly meaningless (see also “Beyond Left and Right” 092322).
“Populists” tend to be nationalist, with a strong aversion to immigration. At the far end of the group there are those who talk openly about national blood lines and racial purity. This is tribalism writ large, trying to cope with a globalized world with way too much change/complexity happening. They also seem to share concerns about economic growth and inequality, since they are disproportionately strong among those of the “working class” and the lower economic strata of the “middle class.” They’re unhappy about taxes and inflation and job security, they resent their country’s elites and are tired of being ignored/pushed aside. To the extent that they hold a set of coherent policy prescriptions, therefore, they want: 1) minimal immigration (especially of racially and religiously different folks (aka “others”); 2) a stronger economic situation for those with middling education and working skills; and 3) a growth in the US population.
Here's the problem with their desires: “Home team” birth rates (especially white/Christian) are dropping; often for sensible reasons and this threatens all three of the aforementioned policy goals.
I’ve talked about long-term demographic trends previously. Lower birth rates in better off countries will put pressure on the ability and willingness of those societies to financially support the increasing percentage of older folks who are expecting the state to support them. Transitions from traditional workforce configurations, increasingly under pressure from globalization and automation/AI, will stress both social and economic fabrics in those countries. Relatively higher birth rates in the “Global South” (especially Africa), combined with climate crises will continue to incent those populations to seek better lives in the “Global North.”
Lower domestic birth rates in the “Global North” without immigration will lead to lower domestic economic strength and exacerbate the financial precariousness of many whose longer-term job outlooks are not encouraging. Allowing immigration will exacerbate the psychological precariousness of those for whom national identity is existential.
Raising domestic birth rates, especially among those who are part of the “home team” and who face a raft of economic challenges already is problematic, both historically and in terms of the availability of government funds for various subsidies/benefits. Governments have tried this, pretty much without success, since the 19C. Patriotism (babies for the fatherland) peters out as a motivator after a brief spurt. The progress in women’s self-awareness and power over the past 200 years will make it hard to reinstate a rigid and draconian patriarchy of reproduction. The deterrents facing young families—the cost of housing, long-term job insecurity, the cost of child rearing (not to mention longer-term existential angst over the climate crisis)—are daunting and not solvable even if governments were awash in cash. In the face of these economics, even a comprehensive ban on abortion wouldn’t move the needle much in terms of population levels.
These “populist” groups—MAGAites, LePen’s National Rally in France, Farage’s Reform Party in the UK, AfD in Germany, Modi’s BJP in India, Putin, and dozens of others)—don’t know what to do. Stoking unhappiness is one thing, making policy sense (even in the short/medium term) is another. It’s always easier to criticize than construct. I imagine we will continue to see hand-wringing, more “blame game” politics (particularly aimed at immigrants), and some (small and ineffective) money thrown at the problem. However, there’s no coherent vision of a solution on offer.
Indeed, while “populists” are pretty much inherently anti-elite, perhaps a better descriptor (at least for the current batch) is “short-term’ers” or “presentists.” It is difficult to understand how they think things are going to work out if their immediate policy and style goals are met. Shall we return to the autarkic world of the pre-modern world or the spasm of “beggar-thy-neighbor” that contributed to and was accelerated by the Great Depression? Trade wars and disruption of global supply chains will lead to increased costs, fewer products, fewer jobs, and lower employment. Getting rid of the Federal Reserve and the Justice Department isn’t going to bring happiness once the scalps have dried out.
The lack of policy coherence or plausible social vision is matched by the refusal to look at history (the other reason I think that they are overly “present-ist”). I’m more than aware of the limited applicability of historical precedent, at the same time, I can see that the absence of any historical precedent for the proposals being effective and the aggressive dismissal of countervailing historical examples shows that MAGA-its’ efforts to revive AMERICAN GREATNESS is based on myth (edging into fantasy). In 1950 the US bestrode the world even though we only had 6 % of global population (and 28% of global GDP). Now we have about 4% of global population (and 13% of global GDP). Even if everything else broke “our” way (and leaving all moral, equity, and climate issues to the side), it would take a long time to get back to the heyday of AMERICAN GREATNESS. Don’t wait up.
I think there’s parallel trilemma out there, one that will loom larger in the public imagination than the obscurities of econometric analysis. It has to do with long-term demographic trends, economic growth, and national control of borders/immigration. It’s a particular problem for those who claim the mantle of “populists,” (a label of dubious and varied meaning), with adherents not only here in the US, but also India, Russia, and most other countries in Europe. (I’m deliberately not using the traditional “left/right” framework to talk political alignments since they’re increasingly meaningless (see also “Beyond Left and Right” 092322).
“Populists” tend to be nationalist, with a strong aversion to immigration. At the far end of the group there are those who talk openly about national blood lines and racial purity. This is tribalism writ large, trying to cope with a globalized world with way too much change/complexity happening. They also seem to share concerns about economic growth and inequality, since they are disproportionately strong among those of the “working class” and the lower economic strata of the “middle class.” They’re unhappy about taxes and inflation and job security, they resent their country’s elites and are tired of being ignored/pushed aside. To the extent that they hold a set of coherent policy prescriptions, therefore, they want: 1) minimal immigration (especially of racially and religiously different folks (aka “others”); 2) a stronger economic situation for those with middling education and working skills; and 3) a growth in the US population.
Here's the problem with their desires: “Home team” birth rates (especially white/Christian) are dropping; often for sensible reasons and this threatens all three of the aforementioned policy goals.
I’ve talked about long-term demographic trends previously. Lower birth rates in better off countries will put pressure on the ability and willingness of those societies to financially support the increasing percentage of older folks who are expecting the state to support them. Transitions from traditional workforce configurations, increasingly under pressure from globalization and automation/AI, will stress both social and economic fabrics in those countries. Relatively higher birth rates in the “Global South” (especially Africa), combined with climate crises will continue to incent those populations to seek better lives in the “Global North.”
Lower domestic birth rates in the “Global North” without immigration will lead to lower domestic economic strength and exacerbate the financial precariousness of many whose longer-term job outlooks are not encouraging. Allowing immigration will exacerbate the psychological precariousness of those for whom national identity is existential.
Raising domestic birth rates, especially among those who are part of the “home team” and who face a raft of economic challenges already is problematic, both historically and in terms of the availability of government funds for various subsidies/benefits. Governments have tried this, pretty much without success, since the 19C. Patriotism (babies for the fatherland) peters out as a motivator after a brief spurt. The progress in women’s self-awareness and power over the past 200 years will make it hard to reinstate a rigid and draconian patriarchy of reproduction. The deterrents facing young families—the cost of housing, long-term job insecurity, the cost of child rearing (not to mention longer-term existential angst over the climate crisis)—are daunting and not solvable even if governments were awash in cash. In the face of these economics, even a comprehensive ban on abortion wouldn’t move the needle much in terms of population levels.
These “populist” groups—MAGAites, LePen’s National Rally in France, Farage’s Reform Party in the UK, AfD in Germany, Modi’s BJP in India, Putin, and dozens of others)—don’t know what to do. Stoking unhappiness is one thing, making policy sense (even in the short/medium term) is another. It’s always easier to criticize than construct. I imagine we will continue to see hand-wringing, more “blame game” politics (particularly aimed at immigrants), and some (small and ineffective) money thrown at the problem. However, there’s no coherent vision of a solution on offer.
Indeed, while “populists” are pretty much inherently anti-elite, perhaps a better descriptor (at least for the current batch) is “short-term’ers” or “presentists.” It is difficult to understand how they think things are going to work out if their immediate policy and style goals are met. Shall we return to the autarkic world of the pre-modern world or the spasm of “beggar-thy-neighbor” that contributed to and was accelerated by the Great Depression? Trade wars and disruption of global supply chains will lead to increased costs, fewer products, fewer jobs, and lower employment. Getting rid of the Federal Reserve and the Justice Department isn’t going to bring happiness once the scalps have dried out.
The lack of policy coherence or plausible social vision is matched by the refusal to look at history (the other reason I think that they are overly “present-ist”). I’m more than aware of the limited applicability of historical precedent, at the same time, I can see that the absence of any historical precedent for the proposals being effective and the aggressive dismissal of countervailing historical examples shows that MAGA-its’ efforts to revive AMERICAN GREATNESS is based on myth (edging into fantasy). In 1950 the US bestrode the world even though we only had 6 % of global population (and 28% of global GDP). Now we have about 4% of global population (and 13% of global GDP). Even if everything else broke “our” way (and leaving all moral, equity, and climate issues to the side), it would take a long time to get back to the heyday of AMERICAN GREATNESS. Don’t wait up.
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