This is a follow-on to my pieces a few weeks ago on 1) whether we are facing a revolution here and now in the USA (A Revolution? 040326) and 2) the state of “International Law” (032726). In the first, I pretty much did a scholarly duck of that question, and don’t propose to answer it here; but I do want to address one aspect: the state of the “international order.” In parallel with the turmoil in the domestic constitutional and political environment, the broad arrangements which seems to have governed how most countries relate to each other have been upset by a series of disruptive statements and actions emanating from Washington. Is another revolution afoot?
While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.
The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).
The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China). Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift.
On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa.
The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments.
It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.
Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes,
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement).
Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,
Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.
In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world.
This is a follow-on to my pieces a few weeks ago on 1) whether we are facing a revolution here and now in the USA (A Revolution? 040326) and 2) the state of “International Law” (032726). In the first, I pretty much did a scholarly duck of that question, and don’t propose to answer it here; but I do want to address one aspect: the state of the “international order.” In parallel with the turmoil in the domestic constitutional and political environment, the broad arrangements which seems to have governed how most countries relate to each other have been upset by a series of disruptive statements and actions emanating from Washington. Is another revolution afoot?
While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.
The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).
The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China). Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift.
On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa.
The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments.
It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.
Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes,
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement).
Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,
Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.
In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world.
While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.
The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).
The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China). Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift.
On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa.
The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments.
It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.
Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes,
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement).
Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,
Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.
In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world.
This is a follow-on to my pieces a few weeks ago on 1) whether we are facing a revolution here and now in the USA (A Revolution? 040326) and 2) the state of “International Law” (032726). In the first, I pretty much did a scholarly duck of that question, and don’t propose to answer it here; but I do want to address one aspect: the state of the “international order.” In parallel with the turmoil in the domestic constitutional and political environment, the broad arrangements which seems to have governed how most countries relate to each other have been upset by a series of disruptive statements and actions emanating from Washington. Is another revolution afoot?
While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.
The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).
The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China). Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift.
On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa.
The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments.
It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.
Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes,
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement).
Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,
Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.
In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world.
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