Blog Archives

Slave to Technology

4/24/2026

As I write this, I am about through with an almost six-week slog in the morasses of telecom service provider hell. I will not rehearse the details, since they are pedantic, you have undoubtedly your own personal experience with some similar situation, and I just can’t stand reliving the more-or-less sixteen hours I have spent on the process.

I wasn’t trying to do anything fancy either in terms of technology or commercial arrangements. Suffice it to say that I was trying to switch our cell service to Comcast to take advantage of one of their “deals.” They screwed things up so badly that I have bailed on them and switched to another carrier (with another pretty good deal). I have no illusions that any of the four “service providers” involved in my sad tale have or will actually deliver superior service, but Comcast’s performance was so wretched (even if fronted by very cordial service reps) that I will not spend any more money with them.

It's not clear which was worse, the interminable periods on hold, the identity verification processes that took as long as actually providing substantive information, or the general helplessness I felt knowing that I was caught up in the cogs of a seemingly inescapable machine. The people I dealt with were (almost) to a person polite and supportive; even if some lacked competence. I was (almost) unfailingly polite in response. Those on the front lines have little control over the situation; they are foot soldiers of corporate armies.

It became apparent (during one of those interminable waits) that I have become utterly dependent on the regular functioning of telecommunications/internet technology as part of the foundation of my quotidian life. So much so that the (recurring and very tempting) thought of hanging up on my various interlocutors and disconnecting from the entire metanetwork had to be quickly dismissed. If it had been a matter of walking away from some money, I would have hung up. As it was, however, I felt trapped; I was aware at the time that I had to work my way through their procedures to retain my connection with 21C society. My original thoughts of cost savings were quickly discarded in the face of the amount of time I had to spend/waste.

Moreover, I had to come to terms with the fact that the unavoidable price of dealing with these (apparently necessary) companies was wending my way through AI-“enhanced” call routing trees, repetitious disclaimers, breathless sales pitches, and redundant problem-“solving” protocols (rebooting, reloading, and reactivating). The stealthy way in which these companies make it exceedingly difficult to talk to a live, knowledgeable human is yet further evidence of the pinnacle of bureaucracy they occupy. Over a century ago, Max Weber famously described bureaucracy as one of the hallmarks of modern life. Little did he know.

Modern information technology was supposed to make our lives easier and, in many ways, it does. Still, I have to wonder whether the economists’ calculation of the resulting increased productivity includes not only the time spent/wasted navigating the maze or the life-shortening stress/frustration of the processes required.

The telecom/internet world is but one aspect of these phenomena, as we all know. Social Security/Medicare/health insurance is every bit as delightful. Taxes, school admissions/enrollment, compliance activities at work, and the various channels of ordinary commerce are all viable competitors. If Dante recast the seven levels of hell for the modern world, he would have a lot of material to work with. You can make your own list.

I’m not sure there’s much to be done about it. Perhaps the emerging personal AI intelligent agents will cheerfully do the slogging for us. If they can effectively solve problems faster than their corporate counterparts on the “service” side of things can create them, then being assimilated into the Borg might be worth it. Until then, I don’t think I’m ready to disconnect and return to the world of printed books, physically-present sources of music, face-to-face shopping, and snail-mail (now at 82¢ per letter!). So, unless the corporate AIs are reading this and ready to retaliate against my rant, you can still reach me at [email protected] and (415) 440-4535.

0 Comments

International (Dis-) Organization

4/17/2026

0 Comments

This is a follow-on to my pieces a few weeks ago on 1) whether we are facing a revolution here and now in the USA (A Revolution? 040326) and 2) the state of “International Law” (032726). In the first, I pretty much did a scholarly duck of that question, and don’t propose to answer it here; but I do want to address one aspect: the state of the “international order.” In parallel with the turmoil in the domestic constitutional and political environment, the broad arrangements which seems to have governed how most countries relate to each other have been upset by a series of disruptive statements and actions emanating from Washington. Is another revolution afoot?

While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.

The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).

The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China). Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift.

On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa.

The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments.

It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.

Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes,
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement).

Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,

Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.

In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world.

This is a follow-on to my pieces a few weeks ago on 1) whether we are facing a revolution here and now in the USA (A Revolution? 040326) and 2) the state of “International Law” (032726). In the first, I pretty much did a scholarly duck of that question, and don’t propose to answer it here; but I do want to address one aspect: the state of the “international order.” In parallel with the turmoil in the domestic constitutional and political environment, the broad arrangements which seems to have governed how most countries relate to each other have been upset by a series of disruptive statements and actions emanating from Washington. Is another revolution afoot?

While I will again avoid getting caught in the semantic debate, I can certainly acknowledge that the bombast has focused attention and undermined many of the givens of international society. At the same time, I will also eschew the opportunity to opine on the wisdom, maturity, and coherence of US policy statements and changes.

The first point to be noted is that there is nothing inherently stable in the international order. History is marked by periods of “normal” or reasonably steady arrangements which are a function of the power and interests of states. These are regularly marked by upsets coming from all sorts of directions; including changes in the domestic political landscape or leadership of one of the principal powers, the rise of a new power, or the accumulation of power (principally economic) over time which drives one of the above. In other words, the world changes constantly and, from time to time, the more-or-less formal system alters to recognize those changes. (This is another example of “punctuated equilibrium,” a theory advanced in the mid 20C to describe long term evolution of plants and animals, which applies to a variety of other kinds of systems).

The UN is a great illustration of the “stuck-in-the-past” mentality that surrounds international affairs. The “Big Five” given veto power reflected the world of 80 years ago, tempered by a legacy of Euro-centrism (UK & France) and the need to balance it (China). Membership has sprawled from predominantly Europe and the Western Hemisphere to almost 200 states around the world. Naturally, that means that the incumbents are less influential than they had been originally. Democracy can be hard for elites to accept. At some point, the tectonic plates of formal structures will shift.

On the other hand, where there is constant adjustment, there need not be a big and sudden shift. Changes in the EU or NATO have generally been less dramatic and scores of other adjustments in regional systems have accommodated the gradual rise or fall of “less-than-great” powers, such as Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa.

The second point is that there is an extensive history of major changes even in our own memory. In the last hundred years, we have seen the gradual passing of world leadership from Britain to United States (early 20C), the rise and fall of Nazi Germany and Japan (1930s-1945), the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and its empire (1917-(1945)-1991), the decolonization of much of Africa and South Asia (1947-74), the rise of Arab oil power (1973-), the broad tide of “globalization” (late 20C-), outbreaks of terrorism (late 20C), and the reemergence of China (early 21C); not to mention a host of 2d tier developments.

It is not clear how current changes compare, nor to what degree they should be seen as distinct rather than part of a broader flow of events.

Thirdly, as I mentioned a few weeks ago, revolutions can only be assessed in retrospect and even so, their status depends on who is asking and when they are asking. There is, to be sure, a lot of semi-intentional) chaos in US foreign policy making lately. Our sensitivity is heightened the resulting media frenzy. It is also self-centered. Not everything in the world is about us. Yes,
we have been pretty much the top dog globally for a hundred years; but there is no historical reason to assume that will continue indefinitely (rather to the contrary). This broad relative decline may well be the driver of the angst which seems to be motivating much of the current disturbance. In particular, the rise of China to parity is so disturbing to our sense of “normal” (compounded by racism and a sense of American exceptionalism/entitlement).

Indeed, this relative decline is seen not only at the formal political level (e.g., the UN), the economic level (e.g., the shift to China and other parts of Asia), but also in terms of the overall calculus of military power. Technological developments have led to a much wider dispersion of coercive power, whether we’re talking about millions of submachine guns, thousands of Ukrainian drones, hundreds of Iranian and Houthi missiles closing oil-shipping lanes, or a dozen North Korean nukes,

Finally, as with many aspects of the current Administration, we have no idea which new policies will even survive through 2028. US stated goals for Iran have flip-flopped multiple times in the first two months of the war. Last year’s much-bruited “Board of Peace” has all the ear-markings of an ego-inflating nothing burger. Noises about NATO come and go.

In the end, despite the wave of idealized nostalgia that currently passes for strategic vision in the US, the world remains complex, dynamic, and largely outside of the control of any single country. Even if we were to (amazingly) have a coherent strategy, with a top-notch team to execute it, and greater economic and military strength than we have lately been able to muster, we would still have to face the weirdness, contingency, and diversity of the world.

0 Comments

Rutabaga

4/10/2026

0 Comments

My wife and I had a long running debate about the intelligence of her cat Samantha. She (my wife) noted that Samantha would, among other things, respond to someone calling her name. I challenged that by pointing out that I could say “rutabaga” in the same tone of voice and get the same feline response. Needless to say, this debate went on until Samantha went to the great feeding bowl in the sky.

I think the same approach could be applied to the term “capitalism,” which is to say that the word itself has no meaning and much depends on the speaker’s tone and intent. The result is that much of what passes for debate about merits or deficiencies is really just people talking past each other, leading to a waste of time and no clearer understanding of the issues involved, much less to specific solutions for the considerable problems and abuses of the current way of doing things. Of course, there is no single “right” definition, conceptual words morph across cultures, histories, and speakers’ intentions. All we can ask is that people make clear what they mean by “capitalism,” (or, for that matter, by “history,” “democracy,” or American “greatness”) and their purpose in using the term.

As I have previously noted in this occasional series, Historians have described the emergence of a socio-economic system, primarily in Western Europe and primarily over the past five hundred years. “Capitalism” in this reading has evolved both in terms of its institutions, practices, and significance over this time; indeed, its protean nature is one of its notable attributes (e.g., it’s a long way from the Bank of England in the late 17C to bitcoin in the 21C). We can trace these changes not only through those institutions (e.g., the number of limited liability corporations), but also through the critique of these phenomena by contemporary commentators (including champions of religion, ethics, nature, and humanism).

Of these analysts, Marx was the most important for both his insights and his profound long-term influence on both thinkers and practitioners of political economy. Marx got a number of things wrong (and those who claimed to implement his ideas in Russia and other places over the past 110 years got even more wrong), but his juxtaposition of “capitalism” and “socialism” remains the touchstone of debate, even though, as the subsequent practice of both business and government has evolved, the distinctions have become increasingly blurry (see, e.g., “state capitalism” in China, “public-private partnerships,” and the quasi-investment banking deals coming out the White House lately).

While both capitalism and socialism have evolved considerably since the 19C, most political debate is conducted under a somewhat simplistic A vs. B rubric which does little to comprehend the national or historical variants or the complex texture of each. Indeed, what has emerged, especially since the 20C triumph of capitalism over communism and fascism, is the use of “capitalism” as a somewhat generic term for the dominant socio-economic system of modernity. It’s a label that doesn’t tell us much in general, much less with particular regard to “capital” or “capitalists.”

For example, once we stop thinking of “our” mode of “capitalism” as the (if you’ll pardon the expression) gold standard, we can see that there are many ways to mix the roles of the state and the private sector. Using various indices, we can line up countries according to tax rates and progressivity, public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, extent of the social safety net, competition/antitrust policy, or the pro rata number of bureaucrats. We would find a continuum for each standard rather than sharply distinguished groupings. Moreover, we would find pretty much of a mish-mash, with particular national systems high on one measure and low on another. In other words, there’s no simple model of capitalism and likely few places that are at the extremes across a group of standards.

From another perspective, we have to acknowledge that whatever “capitalism” is, it has evolved over the past several centuries in many ways. So, critiques by Marx or others, however accurate they might have been at the time, don’t necessarily tell us very much about the phenomena that we face in the 21C. A recent study of the “Crisis of Democratic Capitalism” (2023) illustrates this point. In general, Martin Wolf’s analysis is quite perceptive, especially his tight linkage between the types of political and economic systems which dominate our world. However, the “crisis” with which he is concerned is not with “capitalism” per se, but rather with the hypercapitalism (i.e., push towards plutocracy/monopoly/oligarchy) characteristic of many “advanced” countries today.

The situation with “capital” and “capitalists” is much the same. We now have “natural capital,” human capital,” and “information capital” among others. Such terms however, don’t make a copse of trees or a group of laborers into capitalists. Similarly, no everyone who lives and actively participates in our modern socio-economic-political system is thereby a “capitalist,” even if they have a 401k.

The phenomenological morass is one reason I prefer to think of capitalism in terms of epistemology or a set of attitudes about money, personal value, and the nature of society which can be considered at both the societal and individual levels.

The upshot of this conceptual and semantic confusion is that public debate about capitalism (as well as a fair amount of scholarly discussion) is confusing and fruitless. I often think it would be better for both public and scholarly debates to stop using terms that have been hollowed out by abuse and overuse (capitalism, sovereignty, and progress all come to mind in this context). Taking a few moments to flesh out what we mean would avoid these semantic traps and perhaps provide some clarity of both diagnosis and prescription. In my History work, for example, I try to avoid bald references to the “industrial revolution,” referring instead to the “period of rapid industrialization.”

“A rose,” as the Bard said “by any other name would smell as sweet.” The way our world works, too, would be however good or bad it is, regardless of the labelling. Samantha responded both to her name and to “rutabaga;” although more quickly in either case if you had a piece of turkey in your hand.

0 Comments

A Revolution?

4/3/2026

0 Comments

Last week, as I was sending out my uncheerful assessment of the state of international law, a good friend passed along a recent posting from the invaluable Heather Cox Richardson about the fundamental reshuffling of the global order currently underway as part of the present administration’s general program/chaos. My friend asked if this constituted a revolution. My bottom line: it’s too early to tell.

The Richardson piece draws on recent statements by the Foreign Minister of Singapore and other developments—Iran, Viktor Orban in Hungary, the erosion/demolition of US constitutional controls—to sketch an ominous picture of both the domestic and international scenes. I’ve commented on many aspects of this situation; the vast majority of which are somewhere between troubling and horrific. So, from certain perspectives, things look bleak. Does that make for a revolution? Let’s look at the domestic side this week.

If we take the loose, popular definition of revolution as a big, quick, dramatic change, then yes. But many Historians feel obliged to take a longer-term perspective. Modern political revolutions might well be dated from the English Civil War (1840s-50s) and the Glorious Revolution (1689). Since then, whether something counts as a revolution depends in part on when you’re asking the question.

Even the “American Revolution” (which arguably, merely replaced the ruling structure of a small peripheral country with one set of rich white guys with another set of rich white guys) has been the subject of debate as to when the “revolution” occurred. Benjamin Rush argued that the Revolution continued after the War had been won, but Thomas Jefferson, said the Revolution had already been completed by the issuing of the Declaration of Independence.

The Great French Revolution went through four different regimes before Napoleon and then reverted to the Bourbon Monarchy in 1815. Important French Historians argue that the Revolution was not completed until the 1880s. The Russian Revolution, too, went through multiple stages and directions. If you had asked whether there was a revolution happening at various stages, you might well have gotten a different answer. So, a snapshot taken in April, 2026 might look pretty inaccurate by September or by 2029.

All this potted history tells us is that you can’t tell what’s going on while it’s happening, much less have any sense of what the outcome will be. Indeed, it’s hard to find any historical evidence for a revolution ending up anywhere near what most revolutionaries thought they were starting when they were starting it. In general, the pressure of historical inertia and the complex dynamics of current events quickly and sharply skew the “best laid plans.”

Revolutions arise though a confluence of events, trends, and personalities. Once they get past the stage of throwing out the old regime, revolutionary coalitions usually fracture, cracked apart by circumstances require that compromises and leave any pre-existing ideological program severely frayed if not in shambles. Lenin flip-flopped on basic principles of socialism once he was steering the ship. Factionalism and egomania (e.g., self-proclaimed ‘guardians’ of the revolutionary spirit) usually make a hash of any coherent program.

Now that we have established a firm foundation of uncertainty, we can turn to the question of our leading “revolutionary.” The orange-haired one is a charismatic leader of the first order, but he is no ideologue. He has surrounded himself and channeled the views of a coterie of folks whose combination of smarts, sycophancy, and smarm have given him a set of policies more notable for their drama and disruption of norms than their ability to move the nation towards their self-proclaimed vision. There are definitely revolutionaries among them: Bannon, Miller, Vought; but they are all derivative of him and lack their own power base. Most of the team is just along for the ride. This is actually fortunate; he would be more dangerous if he were actually interested in constructing a new version of the US rather than self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement.

I’m not a psychologist (even if I am married to one), but you may consider the following definition from Wikipedia:

Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and emotional dysregulation that are excessive and pervasive…. ADHD symptoms arise from executive dysfunction.

I have argued previously (Samson, 030725), that his endemic short-termism won’t move the country much past the phases of turmoil. Combined with his age and apparent cognitive decline (“Sleepy Don”) this will leave the country’s direction wide-open in a few years. Still, we can’t deny his short-term impact. Domestically, previously settled constitutional and political norms are being tossed aside at several levels.

Notions of comity and incrementalism that have characterized our political life for two hundred years are being ignored.
Institutional safeguards embodying the concept of the separation of powers are becoming meaningless principally due to the lack of backbone shown by Republican members of Congress.
The liberal/progressive project of constitutional change via judicial decisions that built much of the jurisprudence over the past 75 years has proven reversible.
There are also a host of policy changes being made radically altering the scope and direction of federal government activities across the board from rights to support programs to budget priorities.

Globally, the situation is much the same.

As in most revolutionary situations, there are a lot of problems with the incumbent regime. I have little hope that the Democrats as currently constituted are capable of addressing the real problems the country and the world face. A couple of months ago (A Poisoned Chalice, 020626) I suggested that the best that could be hoped for from the next center-left administration was to staunch the bleeding and stabilize the patient.

In sum, while we might be able to sketch several (more or less dire) scenarios for the future, we can have little confidence about the future, regardless of the outcome of the next election, not to mention any number of geopolitical, climatic, or economic contingencies. Could we be in the middle of a “revolution”? Sure, we’re at least ten years too early to tell (and likely at least 25 years).

History offers few examples of rapid cultural change. Societies evolve, change takes time to digest, what happens in capitals may not show up in the ordinary life of the hinterlands for a while. Most revolutions are futile. Resist evil, but remember to breathe.

0 Comments

Slave to Technology

International (Dis-) Organization

Rutabaga

A Revolution?

Condemned to Repeat It --
Musings on history, society, and the world.

Archives

Sign up for alerts when there's a new post

Slave to Technology

International (Dis-) Organization

Rutabaga

A Revolution?

Condemned to Repeat It --Musings on history, society, and the world.

Archives

Sign up for alerts when there's a new post

Condemned to Repeat It --
Musings on history, society, and the world.