Last week, as I was sending out my uncheerful assessment of the state of international law, a good friend passed along a recent posting from the invaluable Heather Cox Richardson about the fundamental reshuffling of the global order currently underway as part of the present administration’s general program/chaos. My friend asked if this constituted a revolution. My bottom line: it’s too early to tell.
The Richardson piece draws on recent statements by the Foreign Minister of Singapore and other developments—Iran, Viktor Orban in Hungary, the erosion/demolition of US constitutional controls—to sketch an ominous picture of both the domestic and international scenes. I’ve commented on many aspects of this situation; the vast majority of which are somewhere between troubling and horrific. So, from certain perspectives, things look bleak. Does that make for a revolution? Let’s look at the domestic side this week.
If we take the loose, popular definition of revolution as a big, quick, dramatic change, then yes. But many Historians feel obliged to take a longer-term perspective. Modern political revolutions might well be dated from the English Civil War (1840s-50s) and the Glorious Revolution (1689). Since then, whether something counts as a revolution depends in part on when you’re asking the question.
Even the “American Revolution” (which arguably, merely replaced the ruling structure of a small peripheral country with one set of rich white guys with another set of rich white guys) has been the subject of debate as to when the “revolution” occurred. Benjamin Rush argued that the Revolution continued after the War had been won, but Thomas Jefferson, said the Revolution had already been completed by the issuing of the Declaration of Independence.
The Great French Revolution went through four different regimes before Napoleon and then reverted to the Bourbon Monarchy in 1815. Important French Historians argue that the Revolution was not completed until the 1880s. The Russian Revolution, too, went through multiple stages and directions. If you had asked whether there was a revolution happening at various stages, you might well have gotten a different answer. So, a snapshot taken in April, 2026 might look pretty inaccurate by September or by 2029.
All this potted history tells us is that you can’t tell what’s going on while it’s happening, much less have any sense of what the outcome will be. Indeed, it’s hard to find any historical evidence for a revolution ending up anywhere near what most revolutionaries thought they were starting when they were starting it. In general, the pressure of historical inertia and the complex dynamics of current events quickly and sharply skew the “best laid plans.”
Revolutions arise though a confluence of events, trends, and personalities. Once they get past the stage of throwing out the old regime, revolutionary coalitions usually fracture, cracked apart by circumstances require that compromises and leave any pre-existing ideological program severely frayed if not in shambles. Lenin flip-flopped on basic principles of socialism once he was steering the ship. Factionalism and egomania (e.g., self-proclaimed ‘guardians’ of the revolutionary spirit) usually make a hash of any coherent program.
Now that we have established a firm foundation of uncertainty, we can turn to the question of our leading “revolutionary.” The orange-haired one is a charismatic leader of the first order, but he is no ideologue. He has surrounded himself and channeled the views of a coterie of folks whose combination of smarts, sycophancy, and smarm have given him a set of policies more notable for their drama and disruption of norms than their ability to move the nation towards their self-proclaimed vision. There are definitely revolutionaries among them: Bannon, Miller, Vought; but they are all derivative of him and lack their own power base. Most of the team is just along for the ride. This is actually fortunate; he would be more dangerous if he were actually interested in constructing a new version of the US rather than self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement.
I’m not a psychologist (even if I am married to one), but you may consider the following definition from Wikipedia:
I have argued previously (Samson, 030725), that his endemic short-termism won’t move the country much past the phases of turmoil. Combined with his age and apparent cognitive decline (“Sleepy Don”) this will leave the country’s direction wide-open in a few years. Still, we can’t deny his short-term impact. Domestically, previously settled constitutional and political norms are being tossed aside at several levels.
Globally, the situation is much the same.
As in most revolutionary situations, there are a lot of problems with the incumbent regime. I have little hope that the Democrats as currently constituted are capable of addressing the real problems the country and the world face. A couple of months ago (A Poisoned Chalice, 020626) I suggested that the best that could be hoped for from the next center-left administration was to staunch the bleeding and stabilize the patient.
In sum, while we might be able to sketch several (more or less dire) scenarios for the future, we can have little confidence about the future, regardless of the outcome of the next election, not to mention any number of geopolitical, climatic, or economic contingencies. Could we be in the middle of a “revolution”? Sure, we’re at least ten years too early to tell (and likely at least 25 years).
History offers few examples of rapid cultural change. Societies evolve, change takes time to digest, what happens in capitals may not show up in the ordinary life of the hinterlands for a while. Most revolutions are futile. Resist evil, but remember to breathe.
The Richardson piece draws on recent statements by the Foreign Minister of Singapore and other developments—Iran, Viktor Orban in Hungary, the erosion/demolition of US constitutional controls—to sketch an ominous picture of both the domestic and international scenes. I’ve commented on many aspects of this situation; the vast majority of which are somewhere between troubling and horrific. So, from certain perspectives, things look bleak. Does that make for a revolution? Let’s look at the domestic side this week.
If we take the loose, popular definition of revolution as a big, quick, dramatic change, then yes. But many Historians feel obliged to take a longer-term perspective. Modern political revolutions might well be dated from the English Civil War (1840s-50s) and the Glorious Revolution (1689). Since then, whether something counts as a revolution depends in part on when you’re asking the question.
Even the “American Revolution” (which arguably, merely replaced the ruling structure of a small peripheral country with one set of rich white guys with another set of rich white guys) has been the subject of debate as to when the “revolution” occurred. Benjamin Rush argued that the Revolution continued after the War had been won, but Thomas Jefferson, said the Revolution had already been completed by the issuing of the Declaration of Independence.
The Great French Revolution went through four different regimes before Napoleon and then reverted to the Bourbon Monarchy in 1815. Important French Historians argue that the Revolution was not completed until the 1880s. The Russian Revolution, too, went through multiple stages and directions. If you had asked whether there was a revolution happening at various stages, you might well have gotten a different answer. So, a snapshot taken in April, 2026 might look pretty inaccurate by September or by 2029.
All this potted history tells us is that you can’t tell what’s going on while it’s happening, much less have any sense of what the outcome will be. Indeed, it’s hard to find any historical evidence for a revolution ending up anywhere near what most revolutionaries thought they were starting when they were starting it. In general, the pressure of historical inertia and the complex dynamics of current events quickly and sharply skew the “best laid plans.”
Revolutions arise though a confluence of events, trends, and personalities. Once they get past the stage of throwing out the old regime, revolutionary coalitions usually fracture, cracked apart by circumstances require that compromises and leave any pre-existing ideological program severely frayed if not in shambles. Lenin flip-flopped on basic principles of socialism once he was steering the ship. Factionalism and egomania (e.g., self-proclaimed ‘guardians’ of the revolutionary spirit) usually make a hash of any coherent program.
Now that we have established a firm foundation of uncertainty, we can turn to the question of our leading “revolutionary.” The orange-haired one is a charismatic leader of the first order, but he is no ideologue. He has surrounded himself and channeled the views of a coterie of folks whose combination of smarts, sycophancy, and smarm have given him a set of policies more notable for their drama and disruption of norms than their ability to move the nation towards their self-proclaimed vision. There are definitely revolutionaries among them: Bannon, Miller, Vought; but they are all derivative of him and lack their own power base. Most of the team is just along for the ride. This is actually fortunate; he would be more dangerous if he were actually interested in constructing a new version of the US rather than self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement.
I’m not a psychologist (even if I am married to one), but you may consider the following definition from Wikipedia:
- Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and emotional dysregulation that are excessive and pervasive…. ADHD symptoms arise from executive dysfunction.
I have argued previously (Samson, 030725), that his endemic short-termism won’t move the country much past the phases of turmoil. Combined with his age and apparent cognitive decline (“Sleepy Don”) this will leave the country’s direction wide-open in a few years. Still, we can’t deny his short-term impact. Domestically, previously settled constitutional and political norms are being tossed aside at several levels.
- Notions of comity and incrementalism that have characterized our political life for two hundred years are being ignored.
- Institutional safeguards embodying the concept of the separation of powers are becoming meaningless principally due to the lack of backbone shown by Republican members of Congress.
- The liberal/progressive project of constitutional change via judicial decisions that built much of the jurisprudence over the past 75 years has proven reversible.
- There are also a host of policy changes being made radically altering the scope and direction of federal government activities across the board from rights to support programs to budget priorities.
Globally, the situation is much the same.
As in most revolutionary situations, there are a lot of problems with the incumbent regime. I have little hope that the Democrats as currently constituted are capable of addressing the real problems the country and the world face. A couple of months ago (A Poisoned Chalice, 020626) I suggested that the best that could be hoped for from the next center-left administration was to staunch the bleeding and stabilize the patient.
In sum, while we might be able to sketch several (more or less dire) scenarios for the future, we can have little confidence about the future, regardless of the outcome of the next election, not to mention any number of geopolitical, climatic, or economic contingencies. Could we be in the middle of a “revolution”? Sure, we’re at least ten years too early to tell (and likely at least 25 years).
History offers few examples of rapid cultural change. Societies evolve, change takes time to digest, what happens in capitals may not show up in the ordinary life of the hinterlands for a while. Most revolutions are futile. Resist evil, but remember to breathe.
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