While many can recall the distinctive rock music hits of the late 1960s (e.g., “Stairway to Heaven,” Hey Jude,” or, “To Sir, with Love”) only a select few can dredge up any sense of the mid-1969 hit by the (otherwise entirely forgettable) duo of Zager and Evans: “In the Year 2525.” In an era in which lyrics were often light on semantics (e.g., “In-a-gadda-da-vida” (1968) or the Archies’ classic “Sugar, Sugar” (1969)) the song’s narrative was pretty meaty, projecting the future course of human history; certainly a rarity among the froth of popular culture.
The original “Star Trek” series had just completed its run, with a reasonably optimistic take on the 23d century, but the view encapsulated in the song (which ran through the year 9595) was definitely darker. They thus nicely straddle the range of utopia/dystopia themes which runs back to the 17C in European secular culture (and considerably further back if you count religious projections and eschatologies). They were both part of a burgeoning of future-focused writing, both fictional and “serious” which accompanied the surge of energy in the West in the decades following WWII. Economic growth from 1945 to the mid ‘70s joined with technological developments and a brash confidence epitomized by JFK’s (successful) lunar challenge.
Still, as we know now, many of those predictions and much of that confidence was—to put it mildly—premature. Many aspects of technology continued to leap ahead (although few had any sense of the information/computer age by 1970), but many stalled. Manned space flight stopped pushing the “boldly go where no one has gone before” envelope in the 1970s and even now the Artemis project to return to the Moon after more than 50 years is seeing continued delays. The ATT Picturephone, a highlight of the 1964 World’s Fair, didn’t really show up as a mass market tool until the COVID pandemic “Zoom’ed it” forward 55 years later. And, of course, we’re still waiting on those famous flying cars.
All further evidence that neither historians nor anyone else are good at predicting the future. Most of what falls into the categories of forecasting, “visions,” and predicting are really just about projecting the emotional mind-set of the present—positive or negative—rather than any particular insight about what will actually happen. Sometimes someone gets it right (much like the proverbial broken clock that’s accurate twice a day (at least that proverb worked in an analog clock environment, a broken digital device isn’t even accurate that often!)), but that’s down to luck and ordinary probabilities.
The ”Space Age” of the 1950s-70s spawned all manner of science fictional accounts of aliens, planets and techno-wonders (I still have quite a collection!). As noted above, the range of futures predicted in the ‘60s covered quite a range and can’t tell us too much about that era’s zeitgeist. However, the fact that such prognostications were splashed across and avidly consumed by mass popular culture (“The Jetsons,” “Lost in Space,” “My Favorite Martian,” “Star Trek,” and “Planet of the Apes”) is some evidence for that period’s at least an interest in, if not an optimism for, the future. [But see, Kubrick’s adaptation of Arthur Clarke’s “2001” which raised some profound philosophical questions.] In contrast, over the past decade or so a skew towards dystopian visions similarly indicates our darker outlook, rather than what the world will actually look like 20/40/100 years hence.
The post-WWII burst of futurism was, however, marked by a more rigorous and quasi-academic timbre. The inadequacy of pre-WWI and WWII planning led to more intense scenario development (exemplified by Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation’s work on potential routes into and results of nuclear war. New magazines published scholarly prognostications which carried enough of a sheen of thoughtfulness/reliability to reinforce the popular sense that our civilization was advancing to the point where we could feel some confidence about how the future would be. Audits of these predictions, however, were not implemented and we may suspect that their average quality was only marginally better than Nostradamus (mid-16C).
This applies not only to technological visions, but also (perhaps more so) to human affairs, whether framed in terms of economics, psychology, politics, or culture. We can easily extrapolate from current trends (e.g., the rise of China, climate change, medical improvements) but by the time the infamous butterfly in Borneo flaps its wings, the resulting typhoon/monsoon/guerilla platoon will puncture such neatly drawn projections like—well, a balloon.
Zager and Evans’ hit was the pop version of this deeper cultural trend. We’ll find out in 500 years whether they were right.
The original “Star Trek” series had just completed its run, with a reasonably optimistic take on the 23d century, but the view encapsulated in the song (which ran through the year 9595) was definitely darker. They thus nicely straddle the range of utopia/dystopia themes which runs back to the 17C in European secular culture (and considerably further back if you count religious projections and eschatologies). They were both part of a burgeoning of future-focused writing, both fictional and “serious” which accompanied the surge of energy in the West in the decades following WWII. Economic growth from 1945 to the mid ‘70s joined with technological developments and a brash confidence epitomized by JFK’s (successful) lunar challenge.
Still, as we know now, many of those predictions and much of that confidence was—to put it mildly—premature. Many aspects of technology continued to leap ahead (although few had any sense of the information/computer age by 1970), but many stalled. Manned space flight stopped pushing the “boldly go where no one has gone before” envelope in the 1970s and even now the Artemis project to return to the Moon after more than 50 years is seeing continued delays. The ATT Picturephone, a highlight of the 1964 World’s Fair, didn’t really show up as a mass market tool until the COVID pandemic “Zoom’ed it” forward 55 years later. And, of course, we’re still waiting on those famous flying cars.
All further evidence that neither historians nor anyone else are good at predicting the future. Most of what falls into the categories of forecasting, “visions,” and predicting are really just about projecting the emotional mind-set of the present—positive or negative—rather than any particular insight about what will actually happen. Sometimes someone gets it right (much like the proverbial broken clock that’s accurate twice a day (at least that proverb worked in an analog clock environment, a broken digital device isn’t even accurate that often!)), but that’s down to luck and ordinary probabilities.
The ”Space Age” of the 1950s-70s spawned all manner of science fictional accounts of aliens, planets and techno-wonders (I still have quite a collection!). As noted above, the range of futures predicted in the ‘60s covered quite a range and can’t tell us too much about that era’s zeitgeist. However, the fact that such prognostications were splashed across and avidly consumed by mass popular culture (“The Jetsons,” “Lost in Space,” “My Favorite Martian,” “Star Trek,” and “Planet of the Apes”) is some evidence for that period’s at least an interest in, if not an optimism for, the future. [But see, Kubrick’s adaptation of Arthur Clarke’s “2001” which raised some profound philosophical questions.] In contrast, over the past decade or so a skew towards dystopian visions similarly indicates our darker outlook, rather than what the world will actually look like 20/40/100 years hence.
The post-WWII burst of futurism was, however, marked by a more rigorous and quasi-academic timbre. The inadequacy of pre-WWI and WWII planning led to more intense scenario development (exemplified by Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation’s work on potential routes into and results of nuclear war. New magazines published scholarly prognostications which carried enough of a sheen of thoughtfulness/reliability to reinforce the popular sense that our civilization was advancing to the point where we could feel some confidence about how the future would be. Audits of these predictions, however, were not implemented and we may suspect that their average quality was only marginally better than Nostradamus (mid-16C).
This applies not only to technological visions, but also (perhaps more so) to human affairs, whether framed in terms of economics, psychology, politics, or culture. We can easily extrapolate from current trends (e.g., the rise of China, climate change, medical improvements) but by the time the infamous butterfly in Borneo flaps its wings, the resulting typhoon/monsoon/guerilla platoon will puncture such neatly drawn projections like—well, a balloon.
Zager and Evans’ hit was the pop version of this deeper cultural trend. We’ll find out in 500 years whether they were right.
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